5 files changed, 168 insertions, 184 deletions

diff --git a/src/crypto/rand/CMakeLists.txt b/src/crypto/rand/CMakeLists.txt
index 374d8f1..35d5290 100644
--- a/src/crypto/rand/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/src/crypto/rand/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-include_directories(. .. ../../include)
+include_directories(../../include)
 
 if (${ARCH} STREQUAL "x86_64")
   set(
diff --git a/src/crypto/rand/hwrand.c b/src/crypto/rand/hwrand.c
index 5f81f09..f0bbccd 100644
--- a/src/crypto/rand/hwrand.c
+++ b/src/crypto/rand/hwrand.c
@@ -15,23 +15,28 @@
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 
 #include <assert.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/cpu.h>
 
+#include "internal.h"
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
 
-int CRYPTO_have_hwrand(void) {
-  return (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1u << 30)) != 0;
-}
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
 
 /* These functions are defined in asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl */
 extern int CRYPTO_rdrand(uint8_t out[8]);
 extern int CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
 
+static int have_rdrand(void) {
+  return (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1u << 30)) != 0;
+}
+
 int CRYPTO_hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+  if (!have_rdrand()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   const size_t len_multiple8 = len & ~7;
   if (!CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(buf, len_multiple8)) {
     return 0;
@@ -53,12 +58,8 @@ int CRYPTO_hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
 
 #else
 
-int CRYPTO_have_hwrand(void) {
+int CRYPTO_hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-void CRYPTO_hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
-  abort();
-}
-
 #endif
diff --git a/src/crypto/rand/internal.h b/src/crypto/rand/internal.h
index 5e6ea11..f35abbb 100644
--- a/src/crypto/rand/internal.h
+++ b/src/crypto/rand/internal.h
@@ -24,13 +24,9 @@ extern "C" {
  * system. */
 void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
 
-/* CRYPTO_have_hwrand returns one iff |CRYPTO_hwrand| can be called to generate
- * hardware entropy. */
-int CRYPTO_have_hwrand(void);
-
-/* CRYPTO_hwrand fills |len| bytes at |buf| with entropy from the hardware.
- * This function can only be called if |CRYPTO_have_hwrand| returns one.
- * It returns one on success or zero on hardware failure. */
+/* CRYPTO_hwrand fills |len| bytes at |buf| with entropy from the hardware. It
+ * returns one on success or zero on hardware failure or if hardware support is
+ * unavailable. */
 int CRYPTO_hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
 
 
diff --git a/src/crypto/rand/rand.c b/src/crypto/rand/rand.c
index a96ac48..e76a120 100644
--- a/src/crypto/rand/rand.c
+++ b/src/crypto/rand/rand.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include <openssl/chacha.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -69,17 +70,12 @@ static void rand_thread_state_free(void *state) {
   OPENSSL_free(state);
 }
 
-extern void CRYPTO_chacha_20(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                             const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[8],
-                             size_t counter);
-
 int RAND_bytes(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
   if (len == 0) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  if (!CRYPTO_have_hwrand() ||
-      !CRYPTO_hwrand(buf, len)) {
+  if (!CRYPTO_hwrand(buf, len)) {
     /* Without a hardware RNG to save us from address-space duplication, the OS
      * entropy is used directly. */
     CRYPTO_sysrand(buf, len);
@@ -162,6 +158,10 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *path, long num) {
 
 void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy) {}
 
+int RAND_egd(const char *path) {
+  return 255;
+}
+
 int RAND_poll(void) {
   return 1;
 }
@@ -169,3 +169,18 @@ int RAND_poll(void) {
 int RAND_status(void) {
   return 1;
 }
+
+static const struct rand_meth_st kSSLeayMethod = {
+  RAND_seed,
+  RAND_bytes,
+  RAND_cleanup,
+  RAND_add,
+  RAND_pseudo_bytes,
+  RAND_status,
+};
+
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) {
+  return (RAND_METHOD*) &kSSLeayMethod;
+}
+
+void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *method) {}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rand/urandom.c b/src/crypto/rand/urandom.c
index 788a979..1cc5260 100644
--- a/src/crypto/rand/urandom.c
+++ b/src/crypto/rand/urandom.c
@@ -30,92 +30,126 @@
 
 
 /* This file implements a PRNG by reading from /dev/urandom, optionally with a
- * fork-safe buffer.
- *
- * If buffering is enabled then it maintains a global, linked list of buffers.
- * Threads which need random bytes grab a buffer from the list under a lock and
- * copy out the bytes that they need. In the rare case that the buffer is
- * empty, it's refilled from /dev/urandom outside of the lock.
- *
- * Large requests are always serviced from /dev/urandom directly.
- *
- * Each buffer contains the PID of the process that created it and it's tested
- * against the current PID each time. Thus processes that fork will discard all
- * the buffers filled by the parent process. There are two problems with this:
- *
- * 1) glibc maintains a cache of the current PID+PPID and, if this cache isn't
- *    correctly invalidated, the getpid() will continue to believe that
- *    it's the old process. Glibc depends on the glibc wrappers for fork,
- *    vfork and clone being used in order to invalidate the getpid() cache.
- *
- * 2) If a process forks, dies and then its child forks, it's possible that
- *    the third process will end up with the same PID as the original process.
- *    If the second process never used any random values then this will mean
- *    that the third process has stale, cached values and won't notice.
- */
-
-/* BUF_SIZE is intended to be a 4K allocation with malloc overhead. struct
- * rand_buffer also fits in this space and the remainder is entropy. */
-#define BUF_SIZE (4096 - 16)
-
-/* rand_buffer contains unused, random bytes. These structures form a linked
- * list via the |next| pointer, which is NULL in the final element. */
+ * buffer, which is unsafe across |fork|. */
+
+#define BUF_SIZE 4096
+
+/* rand_buffer contains unused, random bytes, some of which may have been
+ * consumed already. */
 struct rand_buffer {
-  size_t used; /* used contains the number of bytes of |rand| that have
-                  been consumed. */
-  struct rand_buffer *next;
-  pid_t pid; /* pid contains the pid at the time that the buffer was
-                created so that data is not duplicated after a fork. */
-  pid_t ppid; /* ppid contains the parent pid in order to try and reduce
-                 the possibility of duplicated PID confusing the
-                 detection of a fork. */
-  uint8_t rand[];
+  size_t used;
+  uint8_t rand[BUF_SIZE];
 };
 
-/* rand_bytes_per_buf is the number of actual entropy bytes in a buffer. */
-static const size_t rand_bytes_per_buf = BUF_SIZE - sizeof(struct rand_buffer);
-
-static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX global_lock = CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
+/* requested_lock is used to protect the |*_requested| variables. */
+static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX requested_lock = CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
 
-/* list_head is the start of a global, linked-list of rand_buffer objects. It's
- * protected by |global_lock|. */
-static struct rand_buffer *list_head;
+/* urandom_fd_requested is set by |RAND_set_urandom_fd|.  It's protected by
+ * |requested_lock|. */
+static int urandom_fd_requested = -2;
 
-/* urandom_fd is a file descriptor to /dev/urandom. It's protected by
- * |global_lock|. */
+/* urandom_fd is a file descriptor to /dev/urandom. It's protected by |once|. */
 static int urandom_fd = -2;
 
+/* urandom_buffering_requested is set by |RAND_enable_fork_unsafe_buffering|.
+ * It's protected by |requested_lock|. */
+static int urandom_buffering_requested = 0;
+
 /* urandom_buffering controls whether buffering is enabled (1) or not (0). This
- * is protected by |global_lock|. */
+ * is protected by |once|. */
 static int urandom_buffering = 0;
 
-/* urandom_get_fd_locked returns a file descriptor to /dev/urandom. The caller
- * of this function must hold |global_lock|. */
-static int urandom_get_fd_locked(void) {
-  if (urandom_fd != -2) {
-    return urandom_fd;
+static CRYPTO_once_t once = CRYPTO_ONCE_INIT;
+
+/* init_once initializes the state of this module to values previously
+ * requested. This is the only function that modifies |urandom_fd| and
+ * |urandom_buffering|, whose values may be read safely after calling the
+ * once. */
+static void init_once(void) {
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(&requested_lock);
+  urandom_buffering = urandom_buffering_requested;
+  int fd = urandom_fd_requested;
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&requested_lock);
+
+  if (fd == -2) {
+    do {
+      fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+    } while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
   }
 
-  urandom_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
-  return urandom_fd;
+  if (fd < 0) {
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
+  if (flags == -1) {
+    abort();
+  }
+  flags |= FD_CLOEXEC;
+  if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags) == -1) {
+    abort();
+  }
+  urandom_fd = fd;
 }
 
-/* RAND_cleanup frees all buffers, closes any cached file descriptor
- * and resets the global state. */
-void RAND_cleanup(void) {
-  struct rand_buffer *cur;
+void RAND_cleanup(void) {}
 
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&global_lock);
-  while ((cur = list_head)) {
-    list_head = cur->next;
-    OPENSSL_free(cur);
+void RAND_set_urandom_fd(int fd) {
+  fd = dup(fd);
+  if (fd < 0) {
+    abort();
   }
-  if (urandom_fd >= 0) {
-    close(urandom_fd);
+
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&requested_lock);
+  urandom_fd_requested = fd;
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&requested_lock);
+
+  CRYPTO_once(&once, init_once);
+  if (urandom_fd != fd) {
+    abort();  // Already initialized.
   }
-  urandom_fd = -2;
-  list_head = NULL;
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&global_lock);
+}
+
+void RAND_enable_fork_unsafe_buffering(int fd) {
+  if (fd >= 0) {
+    fd = dup(fd);
+    if (fd < 0) {
+      abort();
+    }
+  } else {
+    fd = -2;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&requested_lock);
+  urandom_buffering_requested = 1;
+  urandom_fd_requested = fd;
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&requested_lock);
+
+  CRYPTO_once(&once, init_once);
+  if (urandom_buffering != 1 || (fd >= 0 && urandom_fd != fd)) {
+    abort();  // Already initialized.
+  }
+}
+
+static struct rand_buffer *get_thread_local_buffer(void) {
+  struct rand_buffer *buf =
+      CRYPTO_get_thread_local(OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_URANDOM_BUF);
+  if (buf != NULL) {
+    return buf;
+  }
+
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct rand_buffer));
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  buf->used = BUF_SIZE;  /* To trigger a |read_full| on first use. */
+  if (!CRYPTO_set_thread_local(OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_URANDOM_BUF, buf,
+                               OPENSSL_free)) {
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return buf;
 }
 
 /* read_full reads exactly |len| bytes from |fd| into |out| and returns 1. In
@@ -138,110 +172,48 @@ static char read_full(int fd, uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-/* CRYPTO_sysrand puts |num| random bytes into |out|. */
-void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
-  int fd;
-  struct rand_buffer *buf;
-  size_t todo;
-  pid_t pid, ppid;
-
-  if (requested == 0) {
-    return;
-  }
+/* read_from_buffer reads |requested| random bytes from the buffer into |out|,
+ * refilling it if necessary to satisfy the request. */
+static void read_from_buffer(struct rand_buffer *buf,
+                             uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
+  size_t remaining = BUF_SIZE - buf->used;
 
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&global_lock);
-  fd = urandom_get_fd_locked();
+  while (requested > remaining) {
+    memcpy(out, &buf->rand[buf->used], remaining);
+    buf->used += remaining;
+    out += remaining;
+    requested -= remaining;
 
-  if (fd < 0) {
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&global_lock);
-    abort();
-    return;
-  }
-
-  /* If buffering is not enabled, or if the request is large, then the
-   * result comes directly from urandom. */
-  if (!urandom_buffering || requested > BUF_SIZE / 2) {
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&global_lock);
-    if (!read_full(fd, out, requested)) {
+    if (!read_full(urandom_fd, buf->rand, BUF_SIZE)) {
       abort();
-    }
-    return;
-  }
-
-  pid = getpid();
-  ppid = getppid();
-
-  for (;;) {
-    buf = list_head;
-    if (buf && buf->pid == pid && buf->ppid == ppid &&
-        rand_bytes_per_buf - buf->used >= requested) {
-      memcpy(out, &buf->rand[buf->used], requested);
-      buf->used += requested;
-      CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&global_lock);
       return;
     }
-
-    /* If we don't immediately have enough entropy with the correct
-     * PID, remove the buffer from the list in order to gain
-     * exclusive access and unlock. */
-    if (buf) {
-      list_head = buf->next;
-    }
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&global_lock);
-
-    if (!buf) {
-      buf = (struct rand_buffer *)OPENSSL_malloc(BUF_SIZE);
-      if (!buf) {
-        abort();
-        return;
-      }
-      /* The buffer doesn't contain any random bytes yet
-       * so we mark it as fully used so that it will be
-       * filled below. */
-      buf->used = rand_bytes_per_buf;
-      buf->next = NULL;
-      buf->pid = pid;
-      buf->ppid = ppid;
-    }
-
-    if (buf->pid == pid && buf->ppid == ppid) {
-      break;
-    }
-
-    /* We have forked and so cannot use these bytes as they
-     * may have been used in another process. */
-    OPENSSL_free(buf);
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&global_lock);
+    buf->used = 0;
+    remaining = BUF_SIZE;
   }
 
-  while (requested > 0) {
-    todo = rand_bytes_per_buf - buf->used;
-    if (todo > requested) {
-      todo = requested;
-    }
-    memcpy(out, &buf->rand[buf->used], todo);
-    requested -= todo;
-    out += todo;
-    buf->used += todo;
+  memcpy(out, &buf->rand[buf->used], requested);
+  buf->used += requested;
+}
 
-    if (buf->used < rand_bytes_per_buf) {
-      break;
-    }
+/* CRYPTO_sysrand puts |requested| random bytes into |out|. */
+void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
+  if (requested == 0) {
+    return;
+  }
 
-    if (!read_full(fd, buf->rand, rand_bytes_per_buf)) {
-      OPENSSL_free(buf);
-      abort();
+  CRYPTO_once(&once, init_once);
+  if (urandom_buffering && requested < BUF_SIZE) {
+    struct rand_buffer *buf = get_thread_local_buffer();
+    if (buf != NULL) {
+      read_from_buffer(buf, out, requested);
       return;
     }
-
-    buf->used = 0;
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&global_lock);
-  assert(list_head != buf);
-  buf->next = list_head;
-  list_head = buf;
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&global_lock);
+  if (!read_full(urandom_fd, out, requested)) {
+    abort();
+  }
 }
 
 #endif  /* !OPENSSL_WINDOWS */