/* * Copyright (C) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of Apple Computer, Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of * its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived * from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "config.h" #include "SecurityOrigin.h" #include "CString.h" #include "Document.h" #include "KURL.h" #include "OriginAccessEntry.h" #include namespace WebCore { static SecurityOrigin::LocalLoadPolicy localLoadPolicy = SecurityOrigin::AllowLocalLoadsForLocalOnly; typedef Vector OriginAccessWhiteList; typedef HashMap OriginAccessMap; static OriginAccessMap& originAccessMap() { DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(OriginAccessMap, originAccessMap, ()); return originAccessMap; } static URLSchemesMap& localSchemes() { DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(URLSchemesMap, localSchemes, ()); if (localSchemes.isEmpty()) { localSchemes.add("file"); #if PLATFORM(MAC) localSchemes.add("applewebdata"); #endif #if PLATFORM(QT) localSchemes.add("qrc"); #endif } return localSchemes; } static URLSchemesMap& schemesWithUniqueOrigins() { DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(URLSchemesMap, schemesWithUniqueOrigins, ()); // This is a willful violation of HTML5. // See https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11885 if (schemesWithUniqueOrigins.isEmpty()) schemesWithUniqueOrigins.add("data"); return schemesWithUniqueOrigins; } SecurityOrigin::SecurityOrigin(const KURL& url, SandboxFlags sandboxFlags) : m_sandboxFlags(sandboxFlags) , m_protocol(url.protocol().isNull() ? "" : url.protocol().lower()) , m_host(url.host().isNull() ? "" : url.host().lower()) , m_port(url.port()) , m_isUnique(isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin) || shouldTreatURLSchemeAsNoAccess(m_protocol)) , m_universalAccess(false) , m_domainWasSetInDOM(false) { // These protocols do not create security origins; the owner frame provides the origin if (m_protocol == "about" || m_protocol == "javascript") m_protocol = ""; // document.domain starts as m_host, but can be set by the DOM. m_domain = m_host; // By default, only local SecurityOrigins can load local resources. m_canLoadLocalResources = isLocal(); if (m_canLoadLocalResources) { // Directories should never be readable. if (!url.hasPath() || url.path().endsWith("/")) m_isUnique = true; } if (isDefaultPortForProtocol(m_port, m_protocol)) m_port = 0; } SecurityOrigin::SecurityOrigin(const SecurityOrigin* other) : m_sandboxFlags(other->m_sandboxFlags) , m_protocol(other->m_protocol.threadsafeCopy()) , m_host(other->m_host.threadsafeCopy()) , m_domain(other->m_domain.threadsafeCopy()) , m_port(other->m_port) , m_isUnique(other->m_isUnique) , m_universalAccess(other->m_universalAccess) , m_domainWasSetInDOM(other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) , m_canLoadLocalResources(other->m_canLoadLocalResources) { } bool SecurityOrigin::isEmpty() const { return m_protocol.isEmpty(); } PassRefPtr SecurityOrigin::create(const KURL& url, SandboxFlags sandboxFlags) { if (!url.isValid()) return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(KURL(), sandboxFlags)); return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(url, sandboxFlags)); } PassRefPtr SecurityOrigin::createEmpty() { return create(KURL()); } PassRefPtr SecurityOrigin::threadsafeCopy() { return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(this)); } void SecurityOrigin::setDomainFromDOM(const String& newDomain) { m_domainWasSetInDOM = true; m_domain = newDomain.lower(); } static HashSet& schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation() { DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(HashSet, schemes, ()); return schemes; } void SecurityOrigin::setDomainRelaxationForbiddenForURLScheme(bool forbidden, const String& scheme) { if (scheme.isEmpty()) return; if (forbidden) schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation().add(scheme); else schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation().remove(scheme); } bool SecurityOrigin::isDomainRelaxationForbiddenForURLScheme(const String& scheme) { if (scheme.isEmpty()) return false; return schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation().contains(scheme); } bool SecurityOrigin::canAccess(const SecurityOrigin* other) const { if (m_universalAccess) return true; if (isUnique() || other->isUnique()) return false; // Here are two cases where we should permit access: // // 1) Neither document has set document.domain. In this case, we insist // that the scheme, host, and port of the URLs match. // // 2) Both documents have set document.domain. In this case, we insist // that the documents have set document.domain to the same value and // that the scheme of the URLs match. // // This matches the behavior of Firefox 2 and Internet Explorer 6. // // Internet Explorer 7 and Opera 9 are more strict in that they require // the port numbers to match when both pages have document.domain set. // // FIXME: Evaluate whether we can tighten this policy to require matched // port numbers. // // Opera 9 allows access when only one page has set document.domain, but // this is a security vulnerability. if (m_protocol == other->m_protocol) { if (!m_domainWasSetInDOM && !other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) { if (m_host == other->m_host && m_port == other->m_port) return true; } else if (m_domainWasSetInDOM && other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) { if (m_domain == other->m_domain) return true; } } return false; } bool SecurityOrigin::canRequest(const KURL& url) const { if (m_universalAccess) return true; if (isUnique()) return false; RefPtr targetOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(url); if (targetOrigin->isUnique()) return false; // We call isSameSchemeHostPort here instead of canAccess because we want // to ignore document.domain effects. if (isSameSchemeHostPort(targetOrigin.get())) return true; if (OriginAccessWhiteList* list = originAccessMap().get(toString())) { for (size_t i = 0; i < list->size(); ++i) { if (list->at(i).matchesOrigin(*targetOrigin)) return true; } } return false; } bool SecurityOrigin::taintsCanvas(const KURL& url) const { if (canRequest(url)) return false; // This function exists because we treat data URLs as having a unique origin, // contrary to the current (9/19/2009) draft of the HTML5 specification. // We still want to let folks paint data URLs onto untainted canvases, so // we special case data URLs below. If we change to match HTML5 w.r.t. // data URL security, then we can remove this function in favor of // !canRequest. if (url.protocolIs("data")) return false; return true; } bool SecurityOrigin::canLoad(const KURL& url, const String& referrer, Document* document) { if (!shouldTreatURLAsLocal(url.string())) return true; // If we were provided a document, we let its local file policy dictate the result, // otherwise we allow local loads only if the supplied referrer is also local. if (document) return document->securityOrigin()->canLoadLocalResources(); if (!referrer.isEmpty()) return shouldTreatURLAsLocal(referrer); return false; } void SecurityOrigin::grantLoadLocalResources() { // This function exists only to support backwards compatibility with older // versions of WebKit. Granting privileges to some, but not all, documents // in a SecurityOrigin is a security hazard because the documents without // the privilege can obtain the privilege by injecting script into the // documents that have been granted the privilege. ASSERT(allowSubstituteDataAccessToLocal()); m_canLoadLocalResources = true; } void SecurityOrigin::grantUniversalAccess() { m_universalAccess = true; } bool SecurityOrigin::isLocal() const { return shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLocal(m_protocol); } bool SecurityOrigin::isSecureTransitionTo(const KURL& url) const { // New window created by the application if (isEmpty()) return true; RefPtr other = SecurityOrigin::create(url); return canAccess(other.get()); } String SecurityOrigin::toString() const { if (isEmpty()) return "null"; if (isUnique()) return "null"; if (m_protocol == "file") return String("file://"); Vector result; result.reserveInitialCapacity(m_protocol.length() + m_host.length() + 10); append(result, m_protocol); append(result, "://"); append(result, m_host); if (m_port) { append(result, ":"); append(result, String::number(m_port)); } return String::adopt(result); } PassRefPtr SecurityOrigin::createFromString(const String& originString) { return SecurityOrigin::create(KURL(KURL(), originString)); } static const char SeparatorCharacter = '_'; PassRefPtr SecurityOrigin::createFromDatabaseIdentifier(const String& databaseIdentifier) { // Make sure there's a first separator int separator1 = databaseIdentifier.find(SeparatorCharacter); if (separator1 == -1) return create(KURL()); // Make sure there's a second separator int separator2 = databaseIdentifier.reverseFind(SeparatorCharacter); if (separator2 == -1) return create(KURL()); // Ensure there were at least 2 separator characters. Some hostnames on intranets have // underscores in them, so we'll assume that any additional underscores are part of the host. if (separator1 == separator2) return create(KURL()); // Make sure the port section is a valid port number or doesn't exist bool portOkay; int port = databaseIdentifier.right(databaseIdentifier.length() - separator2 - 1).toInt(&portOkay); bool portAbsent = (separator2 == static_cast(databaseIdentifier.length()) - 1); if (!(portOkay || portAbsent)) return create(KURL()); if (port < 0 || port > 65535) return create(KURL()); // Split out the 3 sections of data String protocol = databaseIdentifier.substring(0, separator1); String host = databaseIdentifier.substring(separator1 + 1, separator2 - separator1 - 1); return create(KURL(KURL(), protocol + "://" + host + ":" + String::number(port))); } String SecurityOrigin::databaseIdentifier() const { DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, separatorString, (&SeparatorCharacter, 1)); return m_protocol + separatorString + m_host + separatorString + String::number(m_port); } bool SecurityOrigin::equal(const SecurityOrigin* other) const { if (other == this) return true; if (!isSameSchemeHostPort(other)) return false; if (m_domainWasSetInDOM != other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) return false; if (m_domainWasSetInDOM && m_domain != other->m_domain) return false; return true; } bool SecurityOrigin::isSameSchemeHostPort(const SecurityOrigin* other) const { if (m_host != other->m_host) return false; if (m_protocol != other->m_protocol) return false; if (m_port != other->m_port) return false; return true; } void SecurityOrigin::registerURLSchemeAsLocal(const String& scheme) { localSchemes().add(scheme); } void SecurityOrigin::removeURLSchemeRegisteredAsLocal(const String& scheme) { if (scheme == "file") return; #if PLATFORM(MAC) if (scheme == "applewebdata") return; #endif localSchemes().remove(scheme); } const URLSchemesMap& SecurityOrigin::localURLSchemes() { return localSchemes(); } bool SecurityOrigin::shouldTreatURLAsLocal(const String& url) { // This avoids an allocation of another String and the HashSet contains() // call for the file: and http: schemes. if (url.length() >= 5) { const UChar* s = url.characters(); if (s[0] == 'h' && s[1] == 't' && s[2] == 't' && s[3] == 'p' && s[4] == ':') return false; if (s[0] == 'f' && s[1] == 'i' && s[2] == 'l' && s[3] == 'e' && s[4] == ':') return true; } int loc = url.find(':'); if (loc == -1) return false; String scheme = url.left(loc); return localSchemes().contains(scheme); } bool SecurityOrigin::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLocal(const String& scheme) { // This avoids an allocation of another String and the HashSet contains() // call for the file: and http: schemes. if (scheme.length() == 4) { const UChar* s = scheme.characters(); if (s[0] == 'h' && s[1] == 't' && s[2] == 't' && s[3] == 'p') return false; if (s[0] == 'f' && s[1] == 'i' && s[2] == 'l' && s[3] == 'e') return true; } if (scheme.isEmpty()) return false; return localSchemes().contains(scheme); } void SecurityOrigin::registerURLSchemeAsNoAccess(const String& scheme) { schemesWithUniqueOrigins().add(scheme); } bool SecurityOrigin::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsNoAccess(const String& scheme) { return schemesWithUniqueOrigins().contains(scheme); } bool SecurityOrigin::shouldHideReferrer(const KURL& url, const String& referrer) { bool referrerIsSecureURL = protocolIs(referrer, "https"); bool referrerIsWebURL = referrerIsSecureURL || protocolIs(referrer, "http"); if (!referrerIsWebURL) return true; if (!referrerIsSecureURL) return false; bool URLIsSecureURL = url.protocolIs("https"); return !URLIsSecureURL; } void SecurityOrigin::setLocalLoadPolicy(LocalLoadPolicy policy) { localLoadPolicy = policy; } bool SecurityOrigin::restrictAccessToLocal() { return localLoadPolicy != SecurityOrigin::AllowLocalLoadsForAll; } bool SecurityOrigin::allowSubstituteDataAccessToLocal() { return localLoadPolicy != SecurityOrigin::AllowLocalLoadsForLocalOnly; } void SecurityOrigin::whiteListAccessFromOrigin(const SecurityOrigin& sourceOrigin, const String& destinationProtocol, const String& destinationDomains, bool allowDestinationSubdomains) { ASSERT(isMainThread()); ASSERT(!sourceOrigin.isEmpty()); if (sourceOrigin.isEmpty()) return; String sourceString = sourceOrigin.toString(); OriginAccessWhiteList* list = originAccessMap().get(sourceString); if (!list) { list = new OriginAccessWhiteList; originAccessMap().set(sourceString, list); } list->append(OriginAccessEntry(destinationProtocol, destinationDomains, allowDestinationSubdomains ? OriginAccessEntry::AllowSubdomains : OriginAccessEntry::DisallowSubdomains)); } void SecurityOrigin::resetOriginAccessWhiteLists() { ASSERT(isMainThread()); OriginAccessMap& map = originAccessMap(); deleteAllValues(map); map.clear(); } } // namespace WebCore