| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
We now peform a total-size preflight pass before committing data to the
wire. This is to eliminate the large superfluous network traffic that
would otherwise happen if the transport enforces internal quotas: we
now instead ask the transport up front whether it's prepared to accept
a given payload size for the package.
From the app's perspective this preflight operation is indistinguishable
from a full-data backup pass. If the app has provided its own full-data
handling in a subclassed backup agent, their usual file-providing code
path will be executed. However, the files named for backup during this
pass are not opened and read; just measured for their total size. As
far as component lifecycles, this measurement pass is simply another
call to the agent, immediately after it is bound, with identical
timeout semantics to the existing full-data backup invocation.
Once the app's file set has been measured the preflight operation
invokes a new method on BackupTransport, called checkFullBackupSize().
This method is called after performFullBackup() (which applies any
overall whitelist/blacklist policy) but before any data is delivered
to the transport via sendBackupData(). The return code from
checkFullBackupSize() is similar to the other transport methods:
TRANSPORT_OK to permit the full backup to proceed; or
TRANSPORT_REJECT_PACKAGE to indicate that the requested payload is
unacceptable; or TRANSPORT_ERROR to report a more serious overall
transport-level problem that prevents a full-data backup operation
from occurring right now.
The estimated payload currently does not include the size of the
source-package metadata (technically, the manifest entry in its
archive payload) or the size of any widget metadata associated with
the package's install. In practice this means the preflighted size
underestimates by 3 to 5 KB. In addition, the preflight API currently
cannot distinguish between payload sizes larger than 2 gigabytes;
any payload estimate larger than that is passed as Integer.MAX_VALUE
to the checkFullBackupSize() query.
Bug 19846750
Change-Id: I44498201e2d4b07482dcb3ca8fa6935dddc467ca
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Do not use LOG_FATAL_IF in JNI setup. This is one-time on startup
and important enough to always check.
Add a header with common helper definitions. Move to inlined functions
instead of macros to clean up the code.
Change-Id: Ib12d0eed61b110c45d748e80ec36c563e9dec7e5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Turn on -Wall -Werror in core/jni. Fix warnings.
Clang TODO: For GCC we need to turn off Wunused-but-set-variable in
the GL bindings. However, Clang doesn't have that warning and thus
complains about an unknown pragma. It is necessary to make the
pragma #ifdef-ed on the compiler being GCC.
Change-Id: I14cab48d45c2771eef0432082356c47ed44a3d7f
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
For storing pointers, long is used, as
native pointers can be 64-bit.
In addition, some minor changes have been done
to conform with standard JNI practice (e.g. use
of jint instead of int in JNI function prototypes)
Change-Id: I7aee49dc26cf6c86af8f1d882e9cd1cc145a1977
Signed-off-by: Ashok Bhat <ashok.bhat@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Oakland <marcus.oakland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kévin PETIT <kevin.petit@arm.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
step 2: move libutils headers to their new home: androidfw
Change-Id: I14624ba23db92a81f2cb929f104386e1fab293ef
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
See https://android-git.corp.google.com/g/#/c/157220
Bug: 5449033
Change-Id: Ic9c19d30693bd56755f55906127cd6bd7126096c
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
It's not okay to pass null to JNI methods and trust that it will just
back off and return a null result cleanly. Fixes bug 5361822 .
Change-Id: Id8a17b958fd183d55cb6475f394e158c13aae2ea
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Every available shared-storage volume is backed up, tagged with its
ordinal in the set of mounted shared volumes. This is an approximation
of "internal + the external card". This lets us restore things to the
same volume [or "equivalent" volume, in the case of a cross-model
restore] as they originated on.
Also fixed a bug in the handling of files/dirs with spaces in
their names.
Change-Id: I380019da8d0bb5b3699bd7c11eeff621a88e78c3
|
|
This is the basic infrastructure for pulling a full(*) backup of the
device's data over an adb(**) connection to the local device. The
basic process consists of these interacting pieces:
1. The framework's BackupManagerService, which coordinates the
collection of app data and routing to the destination.
2. A new framework-provided BackupAgent implementation called
FullBackupAgent, which is instantiated in the target applications'
processes in turn, and knows how to emit a datastream that contains
all of the app's saved data files.
3. A new shell-level program called "bu" that is used to bridge from
adb to the framework's Backup Manager.
4. adb itself, which now knows how to use 'bu' to kick off a backup
operation and pull the resulting data stream to the desktop host.
5. A system-provided application that verifies with the user that
an attempted backup/restore operation is in fact expected and to
be allowed.
The full agent implementation is not used during normal operation of
the delta-based app-customized remote backup process. Instead it's
used during user-confirmed *full* backup of applications and all their
data to a local destination, e.g. via the adb connection.
The output format is 'tar'. This makes it very easy for the end
user to examine the resulting dataset, e.g. for purpose of extracting
files for debug purposes; as well as making it easy to contemplate
adding things like a direct gzip stage to the data pipeline during
backup/restore. It also makes it convenient to construct and maintain
synthetic backup datasets for testing purposes.
Within the tar format, certain artificial conventions are used.
All files are stored within top-level directories according to
their semantic origin:
apps/pkgname/a/ : Application .apk file itself
apps/pkgname/obb/: The application's associated .obb containers
apps/pkgname/f/ : The subtree rooted at the getFilesDir() location
apps/pkgname/db/ : The subtree rooted at the getDatabasePath() parent
apps/pkgname/sp/ : The subtree rooted at the getSharedPrefsFile() parent
apps/pkgname/r/ : Files stored relative to the root of the app's file tree
apps/pkgname/c/ : Reserved for the app's getCacheDir() tree; not stored.
For each package, the first entry in the tar stream is a file called
"_manifest", nominally rooted at apps/pkgname. This file contains some
metadata about the package whose data is stored in the archive.
The contents of shared storage can optionally be included in the tar
stream. It is placed in the synthetic location:
shared/...
uid/gid are ignored; app uids are assigned at install time, and the
app's data is handled from within its own execution environment, so
will automatically have the app's correct uid.
Forward-locked .apk files are never backed up. System-partition
.apk files are not backed up unless they have been overridden by a
post-factory upgrade, in which case the current .apk *is* backed up --
i.e. the .apk that matches the on-disk data. The manifest preceding
each application's portion of the tar stream provides version numbers
and signature blocks for version checking, as well as an indication
of whether the restore logic should expect to install the .apk before
extracting the data.
System packages can designate their own full backup agents. This is
to manage things like the settings provider which (a) cannot be shut
down on the fly in order to do a clean snapshot of their file trees,
and (b) manage data that is not only irrelevant but actively hostile
to non-identical devices -- CDMA telephony settings would seriously
mess up a GSM device if emplaced there blind, for example.
When a full backup or restore is initiated from adb, the system will
present a confirmation UI that the user must explicitly respond to
within a short [~ 30 seconds] timeout. This is to avoid the
possibility of malicious desktop-side software secretly grabbing a copy
of all the user's data for nefarious purposes.
(*) The backup is not strictly a full mirror. In particular, the
settings database is not cloned; it is handled the same way that
it is in cloud backup/restore. This is because some settings
are actively destructive if cloned onto a different (or
especially a different-model) device: telephony settings and
AndroidID are good examples of this.
(**) On the framework side it doesn't care that it's adb; it just
sends the tar stream to a file descriptor. This can easily be
retargeted around whatever transport we might decide to use
in the future.
KNOWN ISSUES:
* the security UI is desperately ugly; no proper designs have yet
been done for it
* restore is not yet implemented
* shared storage backup is not yet implemented
* symlinks aren't yet handled, though some infrastructure for
dealing with them has been put in place.
Change-Id: Ia8347611e23b398af36ea22c36dff0a276b1ce91
|