| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This also drops the boolean parameter from
KeyGeneratorSpec.Builder.setEncryptionRequired to match the already
launched KeyPairGeneratorSpec.Builder.setEncryptionRequired.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I91a3e8c77958971b1bda8329319f1a0d8043b669
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This adds more detailed class-level Javadocs (incl. examples) for the
following public API of Android KeyStore facility:
* KeyPairGeneratorSpec,
* KeyGeneratorSpec,
* KeyStoreParameter,
* KeyStoreKeySpec.
This also clarifies what encryption at rest means.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I9951a528c34dea322534763b596902a2b6ac64f9
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Add KeyStore.onUserPasswordChanged for the lockscreen to call when
the user changes their password. Keystore will then handle the logic of
deleting keys. Instead of calling Keystore.password_uid for both
unlocking and password changes the behavior has been split into
Keystore.unlock and onUserPasswordChanged.
Change-Id: I324914c00195d762cbaa8c63084e41fa796b7df8
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This is to make the Android KeyStore API more generic.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I18bcc96db4af17127e5dc038becc9deb85bb48aa
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mnc-dev
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Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: Idfcf57251e76185425b9271d6a2001c5556f9f59
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KeyGenerator.init is supposed to check whether all provided parameters
are OK. This is because KeyGenerator.generateKey cannot throw checked
exceptions. This CL makes AndroidKeyStore KeyGenerator implementation
do just that. Unfortunately, keymaster/kestore doesn't provide a way
to check whether all the parameters are OK without actually generating
a key. Thus, this KeyGenerator does its best inside init method
(before Keymaster is called), and then surfaces any remaining issues
(flagged by Keymaster/keystore) as unchecked IllegalStateException.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I9a04da880dcbe26c37f41d1477e41bdc74db04c9
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This switches to ProviderException in most places in AndroidKeyStore
primitives where checked exceptions cannot be thrown. This is to
follow JCA design.
KeyStoreKeyGeneratorSpi is not touched by this CL because there's
another CL already doing that.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: If7e93042f973334b9bba004f5a330f831c1e77c1
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This makes AndroidKeyStore Cipher and KeyGenerator implementations mix
in additional entropy into keymaster's RNG regardless of whether they
were provided with a SecureRandom instance.
In practice, they are always provided with a SecureRandom instance.
However, to be safe, when no SecureRandom instance is provided the
code now uses a platform-default SecureRandom implementation.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I85bca30d7bdc82c2a342094dcbe6044e48a63dca
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The Javadoc incorrectly stated that:
* 0 means authentication required for every use.
* -1 means that timeout is not specified and the key can be any time.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: Ie5f37e74dc207f23443527ac1725ae8a37213d75
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This defines the String enum values based on JCA standard names for
key algorithm, block mode, padding schemes, and digests. This should
make it safer to interact with AndroidKeyStore code that uses JCA
strings. This was requested by API Council.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I241d9225a13b85479d0a84e49d0a98cbc77e5817
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This propagates the concept that 0 is an invalid crypto operation
handle to the outside of AndroidKeyStore abstraction.
Bug: 20864436
Change-Id: I1e5abb66c5d41d8fc32aac44372495a708c2b6e2
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This converts KM_ERROR_CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED into
InvalidAlgorithmParameterSpec, as expected by the contract of JCA
Cipher.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I6a01e2d7118c478b27a0d7a5a14a127de8913755
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FingerprintService is a lower layer of abstraction which should
ideally be accessed only via FingerprintManager from
AndroidKeyStore.
The main issue with the switch is that it requires a reference to a
Context. This is now obtained using ActivityThread's hidden API.
Change-Id: If921e169838ee2cc5c7690b8c8d8ea95c33248aa
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This streamlines the exception throwing logic for per-op auth keys of
AndroidKeyStore.
Change-Id: I7e27c17fd89d5a7f71f5d7578f584189c5236fb8
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Change-Id: I24e697e989b5f88c3f5e61343fbff60a09aa4c12
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* MAC length is now specified as a parameters to the begin operation
instead of as a parameter at key generation/import time.
* KM_TAG_MAC_LENGTH is now in bits instead of in bytes.
Change-Id: I752fe232d11d3ac39a575a48948215d84ded8fb9
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mnc-dev
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Bouncy Castle JCA provider incorrectly declares that its Cipher, Mac,
Signature, and KeyAgreement implementations accept arbitrary keys (
including AndroidKeyStore keys). As a result, when a Cipher, Mac,
Signature, or KeyAgreement instance is requested from JCA without
explicitly specifying the provider (which follows best practices)
and then initialied with an AndroidKeyStore key, JCA chooses the
BouncyCastle's implementation, which in turn blows up because it
can't handle such keys.
The workaround is to install Cipher, Mac, Signature, and
KeyAgreement implementations backed by AndroidKeyStore as a
higher-priority JCA provider than the Bouncy Castle one. This is
achieved by splitting out the above implementations from
AndroidKeyStoreProvider into AndroidKeyStoreBCWorkaroundProvider
and installing the AndroidKeyStoreProvider at the usual priority
(below Bouncy Castle) and the AndroidKeyStoreBCWorkaroundProvider
at above Bouncy Castle priority.
Bug: 20691708
Change-Id: I336464f4a49bc30c6845ddc4e84b07f4105424dd
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Bug: 20642549
Change-Id: Ibda270921f13a1fd695264583b0e4bd255f63aed
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This makes symmetric Cipher and Mac implementations backed by
AndroidKeyStore succeed in their initialization when the key is
configured to require user authentication for every use. Users
of such keys should obtain an instance of Cipher or Mac, initialize
it with the key, and then authorize the operation by passing this
Cipher or Mac instance to FingerprintManager.authenticate.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: Ia15a1e5f8274c3623f665dae1f400ff539639ab1
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This enables users of AndroidKeyStore crypto to differentiate between
the key being unusable until the user is authenticated
(UserNotAuthenticatedException) and the key being permanently unusable
(KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException). The latter is the case when the
secure lock screen has been disabled or reset, and, for keys that
require user authentication for every use, when a new fingerprint is
enrolled or all fingerprints are unenrolled.
NOTE: The KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException subsumes/replaces the
NewFingerprintEnrolledException which has thus been removed. There
is no way to find out whether a key was permenently invalidated
specifically because a new fingerprint was added.
Bug: 20642549
Bug: 20526234
Change-Id: I0206cd99eef5c605c9c4d6afc5eea02eb3b1fe6b
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OP_AUTH_NEEDED will be returned from begin when an operation needs
a per operation authentication before calling update. Note that the
begin call succeeds when this error is returned, the token and handle
are valid.
(cherry picked from commit dabe520a3e6b0d0c40adfd748483fa336c43c366)
Change-Id: I0ba4e997360843b5eb6c1db9c5fcd1c4d5a2c717
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This simplifies the AndroidKeyStore API around user authentication: no
more explicit control over which user authenticators are bound to
which keys.
User-authenticated keys with timeout are unlocked by whatever unlocks
the secure lock screen (currently, password/PIN/pattern or
fingerprint). User-authenticated keys that need authentication for
every use are unlocked by fingerprint only.
Bug: 20526234
Bug: 20642549
Change-Id: I1e5e6c988f32657d820797ad5696797477a9ebe9
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using NativeConstants."
* commit '6c1af7ea497b1a2f04bdf45a19d2147f5b9665b9':
frameworks/base: switch to using NativeConstants.
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NativeCrypto is a conscrypt class that contained several OpenSSL
constants. NativeConstants is the new class that contains the same
thing, but the latter is automatically generated and thus won't drift
from the C headers.
Bug: 20521989
Change-Id: I45c7b9a6844a06e3ffd09be692ebf733e1ebbbcc
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Change-Id: Ifa29891b8ad7979cbc28c54180b9606bb1319ff0
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This changes the implementation of AndroidKeyStore-backed Cipher and
Mac to avoid throwing runtime exceptions during normal use. Runtime
exceptions will now be thrown only due to truly exceptional and
unrecoverable errors (e.g., keystore unreachable, or crypto primitive
not initialized).
This also changes the implementation of Cipher to cache any errors
encountered in Cipher.update until Cipher.doFinal which then throws
them as checked exceptions.
Bug: 20525947
Change-Id: I3c4ad57fe70abfbb817a79402f722a0208660727
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Cipher state when init fails."
* commit 'edf5454a14cc53de92eaf1ef15fcfb21d8caccca':
Reset AndroidKeyStore Mac and Cipher state when init fails.
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For consistency, this also switches AndroidKeyStore's Mac init/reset
implementation to the same approach as used in Cipher.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: Id34caf7cfe04f2058e22d8632890f762927bb31c
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When AndroidKeyStore keys require used authentication, they need to be
bound to a Keymaster's Secure User ID. This ID will be set by keystore
soon. Until then, set it from the framework level (i.e., from apps
which use AndroidKeyStore).
NOTE: Accessing gatekeeper to obtain the Secure User ID will be
blocked by SELinux policy. To test this code, disable SELinux
enforcing mode.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I7a3315eb52f0fc978d14d5d0e9613f2f36c6c01e
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Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: Idaed45d7e84f5f3eb4f623552b60206c504e967a
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KM_ORIGIN_UNKNOWN constant."
* commit 'b1aa7d0bc821614d943075c0d786cc3f5eeb8c73':
Add Keymaster KM_ORIGIN_UNKNOWN constant.
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This tracks d359b044830b292f492f8a8df5471f869e358399 from
hardware/libhardware.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I9a7bd8bdee51c18ae0427eff4efe036213d2b175
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workaround."
* commit '22b5d9b969176a196b0b29ce9441ac3d1d35d208':
Remove IV auto-generation workaround.
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This workaround prevents use of keys with randomized encryption
(IND-CPA). Since randomized encryption is on by default, it's better
to keep it working and break non-randomized encryption (until
Keymaster is fixed).
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: I4b11ce72cff705be41d3e66f28b507d6ddc1da79
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keys from AndroidKeyStore."
* commit '763100e6442494a85cfcb7949c8021836071b1f6':
Unbreak obtaining symmetric keys from AndroidKeyStore.
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This tracks 59f977c6988e21b3b8aa6c83428bd6ee1a98816d due to which
AndroidKeyStore is unable to provide symmetric keys because it
assumes that the digest field is not repeating.
Bug: 18088752
Change-Id: Ie8ed01449280b7c759e81aeaf2066953b0abaf2a
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