From 68af5a0e5cdb5e5c9ae53af4eb6e5ab8dbdd9cb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Clemens Ladisch Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2013 11:21:09 +0200 Subject: ALSA: usb-audio: work around Android accessory firmware bug commit 342cda29343a6272c630f94ed56810a76740251b upstream. When the Android firmware enables the audio interfaces in accessory mode, it always declares in the control interface's baInterfaceNr array that interfaces 0 and 1 belong to the audio function. However, the accessory interface itself, if also enabled, already is at index 0 and shifts the actual audio interface numbers to 1 and 2, which prevents the PCM streaming interface from being seen by the host driver. To get the PCM interface interface to work, detect when the descriptors point to the (for this driver useless) accessory interface, and redirect to the correct one. Reported-by: Jeremy Rosen Tested-by: Jeremy Rosen Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/card.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/card.c b/sound/usb/card.c index ce29d87..b3c7e19 100644 --- a/sound/usb/card.c +++ b/sound/usb/card.c @@ -148,14 +148,32 @@ static int snd_usb_create_stream(struct snd_usb_audio *chip, int ctrlif, int int return -EINVAL; } + alts = &iface->altsetting[0]; + altsd = get_iface_desc(alts); + + /* + * Android with both accessory and audio interfaces enabled gets the + * interface numbers wrong. + */ + if ((chip->usb_id == USB_ID(0x18d1, 0x2d04) || + chip->usb_id == USB_ID(0x18d1, 0x2d05)) && + interface == 0 && + altsd->bInterfaceClass == USB_CLASS_VENDOR_SPEC && + altsd->bInterfaceSubClass == USB_SUBCLASS_VENDOR_SPEC) { + interface = 2; + iface = usb_ifnum_to_if(dev, interface); + if (!iface) + return -EINVAL; + alts = &iface->altsetting[0]; + altsd = get_iface_desc(alts); + } + if (usb_interface_claimed(iface)) { snd_printdd(KERN_INFO "%d:%d:%d: skipping, already claimed\n", dev->devnum, ctrlif, interface); return -EINVAL; } - alts = &iface->altsetting[0]; - altsd = get_iface_desc(alts); if ((altsd->bInterfaceClass == USB_CLASS_AUDIO || altsd->bInterfaceClass == USB_CLASS_VENDOR_SPEC) && altsd->bInterfaceSubClass == USB_SUBCLASS_MIDISTREAMING) { -- cgit v1.1 From a0631b300bac987a591ae485d8a19a08aa57b4d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris Metcalf Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2013 16:47:47 -0400 Subject: tilepro: work around module link error with gcc 4.7 commit 3cb3f839d306443f3d1e79b0bde1a2ad2c12b555 upstream. gcc 4.7.x is emitting calls to __ffsdi2 where previously it used to inline the appropriate ctz instructions. While this needs to be fixed in gcc, it's also easy to avoid having it cause build failures when building with those compilers by exporting __ffsdi2 to modules. Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/tile/lib/exports.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/tile/lib/exports.c b/arch/tile/lib/exports.c index 49284fa..0996ef7 100644 --- a/arch/tile/lib/exports.c +++ b/arch/tile/lib/exports.c @@ -89,4 +89,6 @@ uint64_t __ashrdi3(uint64_t, unsigned int); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ashrdi3); uint64_t __ashldi3(uint64_t, unsigned int); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ashldi3); +int __ffsdi2(uint64_t); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ffsdi2); #endif -- cgit v1.1 From 1819a873d94cd7abeb94f235175052f72fe6fa2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Zhanghaoyu (A)" Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 07:36:13 +0000 Subject: KVM: x86: remove vcpu's CPL check in host-invoked XCR set commit 764bcbc5a6d7a2f3e75c9f0e4caa984e2926e346 upstream. __kvm_set_xcr function does the CPL check when set xcr. __kvm_set_xcr is called in two flows, one is invoked by guest, call stack shown as below, handle_xsetbv(or xsetbv_interception) kvm_set_xcr __kvm_set_xcr the other one is invoked by host, for example during system reset: kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs __kvm_set_xcr The former does need the CPL check, but the latter does not. Signed-off-by: Zhang Haoyu [Tweaks to commit message. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 15e79a6..34afae8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -548,8 +548,6 @@ int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr) if (index != XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK) return 1; xcr0 = xcr; - if (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) != 0) - return 1; if (!(xcr0 & XSTATE_FP)) return 1; if ((xcr0 & XSTATE_YMM) && !(xcr0 & XSTATE_SSE)) @@ -563,7 +561,8 @@ int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr) int kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr) { - if (__kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, index, xcr)) { + if (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) != 0 || + __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, index, xcr)) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); return 1; } -- cgit v1.1 From 41a187532a9458873a603aee48f017c0288d03fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 21:25:52 +0000 Subject: tcp: fix tcp_md5_hash_skb_data() [ Upstream commit 54d27fcb338bd9c42d1dfc5a39e18f6f9d373c2e ] TCP md5 communications fail [1] for some devices, because sg/crypto code assume page offsets are below PAGE_SIZE. This was discovered using mlx4 driver [2], but I suspect loopback might trigger the same bug now we use order-3 pages in tcp_sendmsg() [1] Failure is giving following messages. huh, entered softirq 3 NET_RX ffffffff806ad230 preempt_count 00000100, exited with 00000101? [2] mlx4 driver uses order-2 pages to allocate RX frags Reported-by: Matt Schnall Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Bernhard Beck Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 2c423b6..0be492f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -3043,7 +3043,11 @@ int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, for (i = 0; i < shi->nr_frags; ++i) { const struct skb_frag_struct *f = &shi->frags[i]; - sg_set_page(&sg, f->page, f->size, f->page_offset); + unsigned int offset = f->page_offset; + struct page *page = f->page + (offset >> PAGE_SHIFT); + + sg_set_page(&sg, page, f->size, + offset_in_page(offset)); if (crypto_hash_update(desc, &sg, f->size)) return 1; } -- cgit v1.1 From cc56da01f9325fd72ebf4d759b8333020bdc5f6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Thu, 16 May 2013 22:25:34 +0000 Subject: gianfar: add missing iounmap() on error in gianfar_ptp_probe() [ Upstream commit e5f5e380e0f3bb11f04ca5bc66a551e58e0ad26e ] Add the missing iounmap() before return from gianfar_ptp_probe() in the error handling case. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/gianfar_ptp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/gianfar_ptp.c b/drivers/net/gianfar_ptp.c index c413479..68cfa08 100644 --- a/drivers/net/gianfar_ptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/gianfar_ptp.c @@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ static int gianfar_ptp_probe(struct platform_device *dev) return 0; no_clock: + iounmap(etsects->regs); no_ioremap: release_resource(etsects->rsrc); no_resource: -- cgit v1.1 From 8410e49bf36d9adf4aba8a5cb8e1540da6aec862 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 17 May 2013 04:53:13 +0000 Subject: ipv6: fix possible crashes in ip6_cork_release() [ Upstream commit 284041ef21fdf2e0d216ab6b787bc9072b4eb58a ] commit 0178b695fd6b4 ("ipv6: Copy cork options in ip6_append_data") added some code duplication and bad error recovery, leading to potential crash in ip6_cork_release() as kfree() could be called with garbage. use kzalloc() to make sure this wont happen. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI Cc: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index ae9f6d4..4e49ab0 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int getfrag(void *from, char *to, if (WARN_ON(np->cork.opt)) return -EINVAL; - np->cork.opt = kmalloc(opt->tot_len, sk->sk_allocation); + np->cork.opt = kzalloc(opt->tot_len, sk->sk_allocation); if (unlikely(np->cork.opt == NULL)) return -ENOBUFS; -- cgit v1.1 From 54ba13b9018c810664923626be5b22d220a955e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore Date: Fri, 17 May 2013 09:08:50 +0000 Subject: netlabel: improve domain mapping validation [ Upstream commit 6b21e1b77d1a3d58ebfd513264c885695e8a0ba5 ] The net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c:netlbl_domhsh_add() function does not properly validate new domain hash entries resulting in potential problems when an administrator attempts to add an invalid entry. One such problem, as reported by Vlad Halilov, is a kernel BUG (found in netlabel_domainhash.c:netlbl_domhsh_audit_add()) when adding an IPv6 outbound mapping with a CIPSO configuration. This patch corrects this problem by adding the necessary validation code to netlbl_domhsh_add() via the newly created netlbl_domhsh_validate() function. Ideally this patch should also be pushed to the currently active -stable trees. Reported-by: Vlad Halilov Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c index de0d8e4..10b273a 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c @@ -246,6 +246,71 @@ static void netlbl_domhsh_audit_add(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry, } } +/** + * netlbl_domhsh_validate - Validate a new domain mapping entry + * @entry: the entry to validate + * + * This function validates the new domain mapping entry to ensure that it is + * a valid entry. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +static int netlbl_domhsh_validate(const struct netlbl_dom_map *entry) +{ + struct netlbl_af4list *iter4; + struct netlbl_domaddr4_map *map4; +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) + struct netlbl_af6list *iter6; + struct netlbl_domaddr6_map *map6; +#endif /* IPv6 */ + + if (entry == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (entry->type) { + case NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED: + if (entry->type_def.cipsov4 != NULL || + entry->type_def.addrsel != NULL) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4: + if (entry->type_def.cipsov4 == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT: + netlbl_af4list_foreach(iter4, &entry->type_def.addrsel->list4) { + map4 = netlbl_domhsh_addr4_entry(iter4); + switch (map4->type) { + case NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED: + if (map4->type_def.cipsov4 != NULL) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4: + if (map4->type_def.cipsov4 == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) + netlbl_af6list_foreach(iter6, &entry->type_def.addrsel->list6) { + map6 = netlbl_domhsh_addr6_entry(iter6); + switch (map6->type) { + case NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } +#endif /* IPv6 */ + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Domain Hash Table Functions */ @@ -312,6 +377,10 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_add(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry, struct netlbl_af6list *tmp6; #endif /* IPv6 */ + ret_val = netlbl_domhsh_validate(entry); + if (ret_val != 0) + return ret_val; + /* XXX - we can remove this RCU read lock as the spinlock protects the * entire function, but before we do we need to fixup the * netlbl_af[4,6]list RCU functions to do "the right thing" with -- cgit v1.1 From 04e093d128963bfe46f50dbcff4c70147464fd0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 07:44:20 +0000 Subject: tcp: xps: fix reordering issues [ Upstream commit 547669d483e5783d722772af1483fa474da7caf9 ] commit 3853b5841c01a ("xps: Improvements in TX queue selection") introduced ooo_okay flag, but the condition to set it is slightly wrong. In our traces, we have seen ACK packets being received out of order, and RST packets sent in response. We should test if we have any packets still in host queue. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Tom Herbert Cc: Yuchung Cheng Cc: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 0d9b959..3e3592d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -833,11 +833,13 @@ static int tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int clone_it, &md5); tcp_header_size = tcp_options_size + sizeof(struct tcphdr); - if (tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) == 0) { + if (tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) == 0) tcp_ca_event(sk, CA_EVENT_TX_START); - skb->ooo_okay = 1; - } else - skb->ooo_okay = 0; + + /* if no packet is in qdisc/device queue, then allow XPS to select + * another queue. + */ + skb->ooo_okay = sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk) == 0; skb_push(skb, tcp_header_size); skb_reset_transport_header(skb); -- cgit v1.1 From 34e4c0aed353934a72809784999900fc7b5653ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 24 May 2013 05:49:58 +0000 Subject: ip_tunnel: fix kernel panic with icmp_dest_unreach [ Upstream commit a622260254ee481747cceaaa8609985b29a31565 ] Daniel Petre reported crashes in icmp_dst_unreach() with following call graph: Daniel found a similar problem mentioned in http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1007.0/00961.html And indeed this is the root cause : skb->cb[] contains data fooling IP stack. We must clear IPCB in ip_tunnel_xmit() sooner in case dst_link_failure() is called. Or else skb->cb[] might contain garbage from GSO segmentation layer. A similar fix was tested on linux-3.9, but gre code was refactored in linux-3.10. I'll send patches for stable kernels as well. Many thanks to Daniel for providing reports, patches and testing ! Reported-by: Daniel Petre Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/ipip.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c index d7bb94c..91ddbd4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c @@ -716,6 +716,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipgre_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev tiph = &tunnel->parms.iph; } + memset(&(IPCB(skb)->opt), 0, sizeof(IPCB(skb)->opt)); if ((dst = tiph->daddr) == 0) { /* NBMA tunnel */ @@ -853,7 +854,6 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipgre_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev skb_reset_transport_header(skb); skb_push(skb, gre_hlen); skb_reset_network_header(skb); - memset(&(IPCB(skb)->opt), 0, sizeof(IPCB(skb)->opt)); IPCB(skb)->flags &= ~(IPSKB_XFRM_TUNNEL_SIZE | IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED | IPSKB_REROUTED); skb_dst_drop(skb); diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipip.c b/net/ipv4/ipip.c index 6f06f7f..6d1165f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipip.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipip.c @@ -448,6 +448,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipip_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) if (tos & 1) tos = old_iph->tos; + memset(&(IPCB(skb)->opt), 0, sizeof(IPCB(skb)->opt)); if (!dst) { /* NBMA tunnel */ if ((rt = skb_rtable(skb)) == NULL) { @@ -531,7 +532,6 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipip_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) skb->transport_header = skb->network_header; skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)); skb_reset_network_header(skb); - memset(&(IPCB(skb)->opt), 0, sizeof(IPCB(skb)->opt)); IPCB(skb)->flags &= ~(IPSKB_XFRM_TUNNEL_SIZE | IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED | IPSKB_REROUTED); skb_dst_drop(skb); -- cgit v1.1 From e1b796f9408a33d18709e9fdbf18ce91dfede962 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 14:07:44 -0700 Subject: net: Block MSG_CMSG_COMPAT in send(m)msg and recv(m)msg [ Upstream commits 1be374a0518a288147c6a7398792583200a67261 and a7526eb5d06b0084ef12d7b168d008fcf516caab ] MSG_CMSG_COMPAT is (AFAIK) not intended to be part of the API -- it's a hack that steals a bit to indicate to other networking code that a compat entry was used. So don't allow it from a non-compat syscall. This prevents an oops when running this code: int main() { int s; struct sockaddr_in addr; struct msghdr *hdr; char *highpage = mmap((void*)(TASK_SIZE_MAX - 4096), 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); if (highpage == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap"); s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); if (s == -1) err(1, "socket"); addr.sin_family = AF_INET; addr.sin_port = htons(1); addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0) err(1, "connect"); void *evil = highpage + 4096 - COMPAT_MSGHDR_SIZE; printf("Evil address is %p\n", evil); if (syscall(__NR_sendmmsg, s, evil, 1, MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) < 0) err(1, "sendmmsg"); return 0; } Cc: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/socket.h | 3 +++ net/compat.c | 13 ++++++++-- net/socket.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h index 2417952..50b2530 100644 --- a/include/linux/socket.h +++ b/include/linux/socket.h @@ -332,6 +332,9 @@ extern int put_cmsg(struct msghdr*, int level, int type, int len, void *data); struct timespec; +/* The __sys_...msg variants allow MSG_CMSG_COMPAT */ +extern long __sys_recvmsg(int fd, struct msghdr __user *msg, unsigned flags); +extern long __sys_sendmsg(int fd, struct msghdr __user *msg, unsigned flags); extern int __sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags, struct timespec *timeout); extern int __sys_sendmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c index c578d93..68220c8 100644 --- a/net/compat.c +++ b/net/compat.c @@ -732,19 +732,25 @@ static unsigned char nas[21] = { asmlinkage long compat_sys_sendmsg(int fd, struct compat_msghdr __user *msg, unsigned flags) { - return sys_sendmsg(fd, (struct msghdr __user *)msg, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT); + if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) + return -EINVAL; + return __sys_sendmsg(fd, (struct msghdr __user *)msg, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT); } asmlinkage long compat_sys_sendmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned vlen, unsigned int flags) { + if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) + return -EINVAL; return __sys_sendmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT); } asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmsg(int fd, struct compat_msghdr __user *msg, unsigned int flags) { - return sys_recvmsg(fd, (struct msghdr __user *)msg, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT); + if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) + return -EINVAL; + return __sys_recvmsg(fd, (struct msghdr __user *)msg, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT); } asmlinkage long compat_sys_recv(int fd, void __user *buf, size_t len, unsigned flags) @@ -766,6 +772,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg, int datagrams; struct timespec ktspec; + if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) + return -EINVAL; + if (timeout == NULL) return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT, NULL); diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index 1b0f0fc..e4c7f90 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -1876,9 +1876,9 @@ struct used_address { unsigned int name_len; }; -static int __sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg, - struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned flags, - struct used_address *used_address) +static int ___sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg, + struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned flags, + struct used_address *used_address) { struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat = (struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg; @@ -1998,22 +1998,30 @@ out: * BSD sendmsg interface */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sendmsg, int, fd, struct msghdr __user *, msg, unsigned, flags) +long __sys_sendmsg(int fd, struct msghdr __user *msg, unsigned flags) { int fput_needed, err; struct msghdr msg_sys; - struct socket *sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed); + struct socket *sock; + sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed); if (!sock) goto out; - err = __sys_sendmsg(sock, msg, &msg_sys, flags, NULL); + err = ___sys_sendmsg(sock, msg, &msg_sys, flags, NULL); fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed); out: return err; } +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sendmsg, int, fd, struct msghdr __user *, msg, unsigned int, flags) +{ + if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) + return -EINVAL; + return __sys_sendmsg(fd, msg, flags); +} + /* * Linux sendmmsg interface */ @@ -2044,15 +2052,16 @@ int __sys_sendmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen, while (datagrams < vlen) { if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) { - err = __sys_sendmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)compat_entry, - &msg_sys, flags, &used_address); + err = ___sys_sendmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)compat_entry, + &msg_sys, flags, &used_address); if (err < 0) break; err = __put_user(err, &compat_entry->msg_len); ++compat_entry; } else { - err = __sys_sendmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)entry, - &msg_sys, flags, &used_address); + err = ___sys_sendmsg(sock, + (struct msghdr __user *)entry, + &msg_sys, flags, &used_address); if (err < 0) break; err = put_user(err, &entry->msg_len); @@ -2076,11 +2085,13 @@ int __sys_sendmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen, SYSCALL_DEFINE4(sendmmsg, int, fd, struct mmsghdr __user *, mmsg, unsigned int, vlen, unsigned int, flags) { + if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) + return -EINVAL; return __sys_sendmmsg(fd, mmsg, vlen, flags); } -static int __sys_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg, - struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned flags, int nosec) +static int ___sys_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg, + struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned flags, int nosec) { struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat = (struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg; @@ -2177,23 +2188,31 @@ out: * BSD recvmsg interface */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(recvmsg, int, fd, struct msghdr __user *, msg, - unsigned int, flags) +long __sys_recvmsg(int fd, struct msghdr __user *msg, unsigned flags) { int fput_needed, err; struct msghdr msg_sys; - struct socket *sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed); + struct socket *sock; + sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed); if (!sock) goto out; - err = __sys_recvmsg(sock, msg, &msg_sys, flags, 0); + err = ___sys_recvmsg(sock, msg, &msg_sys, flags, 0); fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed); out: return err; } +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(recvmsg, int, fd, struct msghdr __user *, msg, + unsigned int, flags) +{ + if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) + return -EINVAL; + return __sys_recvmsg(fd, msg, flags); +} + /* * Linux recvmmsg interface */ @@ -2231,17 +2250,18 @@ int __sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen, * No need to ask LSM for more than the first datagram. */ if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) { - err = __sys_recvmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)compat_entry, - &msg_sys, flags & ~MSG_WAITFORONE, - datagrams); + err = ___sys_recvmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)compat_entry, + &msg_sys, flags & ~MSG_WAITFORONE, + datagrams); if (err < 0) break; err = __put_user(err, &compat_entry->msg_len); ++compat_entry; } else { - err = __sys_recvmsg(sock, (struct msghdr __user *)entry, - &msg_sys, flags & ~MSG_WAITFORONE, - datagrams); + err = ___sys_recvmsg(sock, + (struct msghdr __user *)entry, + &msg_sys, flags & ~MSG_WAITFORONE, + datagrams); if (err < 0) break; err = put_user(err, &entry->msg_len); @@ -2308,6 +2328,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(recvmmsg, int, fd, struct mmsghdr __user *, mmsg, int datagrams; struct timespec timeout_sys; + if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) + return -EINVAL; + if (!timeout) return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, mmsg, vlen, flags, NULL); -- cgit v1.1 From 64274c35beebe1be22650a9353c0c33a7b8b723c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 29 May 2013 09:06:27 +0000 Subject: net: force a reload of first item in hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu [ Upstream commit c87a124a5d5e8cf8e21c4363c3372bcaf53ea190 ] Roman Gushchin discovered that udp4_lib_lookup2() was not reloading first item in the rcu protected list, in case the loop was restarted. This produced soft lockups as in https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/4/16/37 rcu_dereference(X)/ACCESS_ONCE(X) seem to not work as intended if X is ptr->field : In some cases, gcc caches the value or ptr->field in a register. Use a barrier() to disallow such caching, as documented in Documentation/atomic_ops.txt line 114 Thanks a lot to Roman for providing analysis and numerous patches. Diagnosed-by: Roman Gushchin Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Boris Zhmurov Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/rculist_nulls.h | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h b/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h index 2ae1371..1c33dd7 100644 --- a/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h +++ b/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h @@ -105,9 +105,14 @@ static inline void hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(struct hlist_nulls_node *n, * @head: the head for your list. * @member: the name of the hlist_nulls_node within the struct. * + * The barrier() is needed to make sure compiler doesn't cache first element [1], + * as this loop can be restarted [2] + * [1] Documentation/atomic_ops.txt around line 114 + * [2] Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt around line 146 */ #define hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(tpos, pos, head, member) \ - for (pos = rcu_dereference_raw(hlist_nulls_first_rcu(head)); \ + for (({barrier();}), \ + pos = rcu_dereference_raw(hlist_nulls_first_rcu(head)); \ (!is_a_nulls(pos)) && \ ({ tpos = hlist_nulls_entry(pos, typeof(*tpos), member); 1; }); \ pos = rcu_dereference_raw(hlist_nulls_next_rcu(pos))) -- cgit v1.1 From 0e7d0e50a7502671ff7deed63595ed2d20ac1e8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gao feng Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2013 22:16:21 +0000 Subject: ipv6: assign rt6_info to inet6_ifaddr in init_loopback [ Upstream commit 534c877928a16ae5f9776436a497109639bf67dc ] Commit 25fb6ca4ed9cad72f14f61629b68dc03c0d9713f "net IPv6 : Fix broken IPv6 routing table after loopback down-up" forgot to assign rt6_info to the inet6_ifaddr. When disable the net device, the rt6_info which allocated in init_loopback will not be destroied in __ipv6_ifa_notify. This will trigger the waring message below [23527.916091] unregister_netdevice: waiting for tap0 to become free. Usage count = 1 Reported-by: Arkadiusz Miskiewicz Signed-off-by: Gao feng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index 0b73370..3a07320 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -2360,8 +2360,10 @@ static void init_loopback(struct net_device *dev) sp_rt = addrconf_dst_alloc(idev, &sp_ifa->addr, 0); /* Failure cases are ignored */ - if (!IS_ERR(sp_rt)) + if (!IS_ERR(sp_rt)) { + sp_ifa->rt = sp_rt; ip6_ins_rt(sp_rt); + } } read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); } -- cgit v1.1 From bba0c7f5421c40314ef48be4a7540efa76166dcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2013 15:53:47 +0200 Subject: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in socket destruction [ Upstream commit 1abd165ed757db1afdefaac0a4bc8a70f97d258c ] While stress testing sctp sockets, I hit the following panic: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: [] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp] PGD 7cead067 PUD 7ce76067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: sctp(F) libcrc32c(F) [...] CPU: 7 PID: 2950 Comm: acc Tainted: GF 3.10.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T410/0H19HD, BIOS 1.6.3 02/01/2011 task: ffff88007ce0e0c0 ti: ffff88007b568000 task.ti: ffff88007b568000 RIP: 0010:[] [] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b569e08 EFLAGS: 00010292 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88007db78a00 RCX: dead000000200200 RDX: ffffffffa049fdb0 RSI: ffff8800379baf38 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88007b569e18 R08: ffff88007c230da0 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880077990d00 R14: 0000000000000084 R15: ffff88007db78a00 FS: 00007fc18ab61700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc60000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000007cf9d000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Stack: ffff88007b569e38 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e38 ffffffffa049fded ffffffff81abf0c0 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e58 ffffffff8145b60e 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88007b569eb8 ffffffff814df36e Call Trace: [] sctp_destroy_sock+0x3d/0x80 [sctp] [] sk_common_release+0x1e/0xf0 [] inet_create+0x2ae/0x350 [] __sock_create+0x11f/0x240 [] sock_create+0x30/0x40 [] SyS_socket+0x4c/0xc0 [] ? do_page_fault+0xe/0x10 [] ? page_fault+0x22/0x30 [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 0c c9 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e8 fb fe ff ff c9 c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 66 66 66 66 90 <48> 8b 47 20 48 89 fb c6 47 1c 01 c6 40 12 07 e8 9e 68 01 00 48 RIP [] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp] RSP CR2: 0000000000000020 ---[ end trace e0d71ec1108c1dd9 ]--- I did not hit this with the lksctp-tools functional tests, but with a small, multi-threaded test program, that heavily allocates, binds, listens and waits in accept on sctp sockets, and then randomly kills some of them (no need for an actual client in this case to hit this). Then, again, allocating, binding, etc, and then killing child processes. This panic then only occurs when ``echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable'' is set. The cause for that is actually very simple: in sctp_endpoint_init() we enter the path of sctp_auth_init_hmacs(). There, we try to allocate our crypto transforms through crypto_alloc_hash(). In our scenario, it then can happen that crypto_alloc_hash() fails with -EINTR from crypto_larval_wait(), thus we bail out and release the socket via sk_common_release(), sctp_destroy_sock() and hit the NULL pointer dereference as soon as we try to access members in the endpoint during sctp_endpoint_free(), since endpoint at that time is still NULL. Now, if we have that case, we do not need to do any cleanup work and just leave the destruction handler. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Neil Horman Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sctp/socket.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 6b766cd..d0a8a77 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3809,6 +3809,12 @@ SCTP_STATIC void sctp_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk) /* Release our hold on the endpoint. */ ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep; + /* This could happen during socket init, thus we bail out + * early, since the rest of the below is not setup either. + */ + if (ep == NULL) + return; + sctp_endpoint_free(ep); local_bh_disable(); percpu_counter_dec(&sctp_sockets_allocated); -- cgit v1.1 From b4d45a2af9c9ca5c14e00375366125e7c31d5293 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 16:02:27 +0200 Subject: packet: packet_getname_spkt: make sure string is always 0-terminated [ Upstream commit 2dc85bf323515e59e15dfa858d1472bb25cad0fe ] uaddr->sa_data is exactly of size 14, which is hard-coded here and passed as a size argument to strncpy(). A device name can be of size IFNAMSIZ (== 16), meaning we might leave the destination string unterminated. Thus, use strlcpy() and also sizeof() while we're at it. We need to memset the data area beforehand, since strlcpy does not padd the remaining buffer with zeroes for user space, so that we do not possibly leak anything. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 4058afe..d596ceb 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -1767,12 +1767,11 @@ static int packet_getname_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, return -EOPNOTSUPP; uaddr->sa_family = AF_PACKET; + memset(uaddr->sa_data, 0, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data)); rcu_read_lock(); dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex); if (dev) - strncpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, 14); - else - memset(uaddr->sa_data, 0, 14); + strlcpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data)); rcu_read_unlock(); *uaddr_len = sizeof(*uaddr); -- cgit v1.1 From 6e092615d27d7036832c18f1c14b691c6c1cbb1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 16:07:23 +0200 Subject: l2tp: Fix PPP header erasure and memory leak [ Upstream commit 55b92b7a11690bc377b5d373872a6b650ae88e64 ] Copy user data after PPP framing header. This prevents erasure of the added PPP header and avoids leaking two bytes of uninitialised memory at the end of skb's data buffer. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 770b497..6af7be6 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -350,12 +350,12 @@ static int pppol2tp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msgh skb_put(skb, 2); /* Copy user data into skb */ - error = memcpy_fromiovec(skb->data, m->msg_iov, total_len); + error = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, total_len), m->msg_iov, + total_len); if (error < 0) { kfree_skb(skb); goto error_put_sess_tun; } - skb_put(skb, total_len); l2tp_xmit_skb(session, skb, session->hdr_len); -- cgit v1.1 From 60ab7833a93b180b420a18e24e88e3a9528a7038 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 16:07:36 +0200 Subject: l2tp: Fix sendmsg() return value [ Upstream commit a6f79d0f26704214b5b702bbac525cb72997f984 ] PPPoL2TP sockets should comply with the standard send*() return values (i.e. return number of bytes sent instead of 0 upon success). Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 6af7be6..4613225 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msgh sock_put(ps->tunnel_sock); sock_put(sk); - return error; + return total_len; error_put_sess_tun: sock_put(ps->tunnel_sock); -- cgit v1.1 From c77a0bc75e37339dcbd4caf20d5ce2a4e7070740 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anders Hammarquist Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2013 01:45:48 +0200 Subject: USB: serial: ti_usb_3410_5052: new device id for Abbot strip port cable commit 35a2fbc941accd0e9f1bfadd669311786118d874 upstream. Add product id for Abbott strip port cable for Precision meter which uses the TI 3410 chip. Signed-off-by: Anders Hammarquist Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.c | 3 ++- drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.h | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.c b/drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.c index 2856474..a8c4f44 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.c @@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ static struct usb_device_id ti_id_table_3410[15+TI_EXTRA_VID_PID_COUNT+1] = { { USB_DEVICE(IBM_VENDOR_ID, IBM_4543_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(IBM_VENDOR_ID, IBM_454B_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(IBM_VENDOR_ID, IBM_454C_PRODUCT_ID) }, - { USB_DEVICE(ABBOTT_VENDOR_ID, ABBOTT_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(ABBOTT_VENDOR_ID, ABBOTT_STEREO_PLUG_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(ABBOTT_VENDOR_ID, ABBOTT_STRIP_PORT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(TI_VENDOR_ID, FRI2_PRODUCT_ID) }, }; diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.h b/drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.h index b353e7e..4a2423e 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.h +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.h @@ -52,7 +52,9 @@ /* Abbott Diabetics vendor and product ids */ #define ABBOTT_VENDOR_ID 0x1a61 -#define ABBOTT_PRODUCT_ID 0x3410 +#define ABBOTT_STEREO_PLUG_ID 0x3410 +#define ABBOTT_PRODUCT_ID ABBOTT_STEREO_PLUG_ID +#define ABBOTT_STRIP_PORT_ID 0x3420 /* Commands */ #define TI_GET_VERSION 0x01 -- cgit v1.1 From 863c94fa3948619d3e425f9a3c61e6baf72ee666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2013 10:35:30 -0700 Subject: Linux 3.0.84 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 5bc4e40..ac2a241 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 3 PATCHLEVEL = 0 -SUBLEVEL = 83 +SUBLEVEL = 84 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Sneaky Weasel -- cgit v1.1