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* selinux: introduce permissive typesEric Paris2008-04-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce the concept of a permissive type. A new ebitmap is introduced to the policy database which indicates if a given type has the permissive bit set or not. This bit is tested for the scontext of any denial. The bit is meaningless on types which only appear as the target of a decision and never the source. A domain running with a permissive type will be allowed to perform any action similarly to when the system is globally set permissive. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22Paul Moore2008-01-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features it supports. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Fix trivial typos in Kconfig* filesDavid Sterba2007-05-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | Fix several typos in help text in Kconfig* files. Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* Still more typo fixesMatt LaPlante2006-10-031-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* more misc typo fixesMatt LaPlante2006-10-031-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* [PATCH] selinux: add support for range transitions on object classesDarrel Goeddel2006-09-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduces support for policy version 21. This version of the binary kernel policy allows for defining range transitions on security classes other than the process security class. As always, backwards compatibility for older formats is retained. The security class is read in as specified when using the new format, while the "process" security class is assumed when using an older policy format. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: enable configuration of max policy versionStephen Smalley2006-09-261-0/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enable configuration of SELinux maximum supported policy version to support legacy userland (init) that does not gracefully handle kernels that support newer policy versions two or more beyond the installed policy, as in FC3 and FC4. [bunk@stusta.de: improve Kconfig help text] Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [SECMARK]: Add new packet controls to SELinuxJames Morris2006-06-171-0/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old packet controls. Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets, then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls. To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is still present, but not active by default. To restore previous behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a '1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter selinux_compat_net. Switching between the network control models requires the security load_policy permission. The old controls will probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged. With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is not affected at all. It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime). It is also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel configuration. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] selinux: require AUDITStephen Smalley2006-02-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Make SELinux depend on AUDIT as it requires the basic audit support to log permission denials at all. Note that AUDITSYSCALL remains optional for SELinux, although it can be useful in providing further information upon denials. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: require SECURITY_NETWORKStephen Smalley2006-02-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+97
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
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