From 4c657ddd1f5e7c36472c751620302bb8740c053f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Hutchings Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2016 02:34:52 +0000 Subject: pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed read Quoting the RHEL advisory: > It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer > offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially > resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user > could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user > space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate) The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to 3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y. We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds. Change-Id: I988802f38acf40c7671fa0978880928b02d29b56 References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings (cherry picked from commit feae3ca2e5e1a8f44aa6290255d3d9709985d0b2) --- fs/pipe.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c index 84da1cd..c3e1cfb 100644 --- a/fs/pipe.c +++ b/fs/pipe.c @@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov, void *addr; size_t chars = buf->len, remaining; int error, atomic; + int offset; if (chars > total_len) chars = total_len; @@ -402,9 +403,10 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov, atomic = !iov_fault_in_pages_write(iov, chars); remaining = chars; + offset = buf->offset; redo: addr = ops->map(pipe, buf, atomic); - error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr, &buf->offset, + error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr, &offset, &remaining, atomic); ops->unmap(pipe, buf, addr); if (unlikely(error)) { @@ -420,6 +422,7 @@ redo: break; } ret += chars; + buf->offset += chars; buf->len -= chars; /* Was it a packet buffer? Clean up and exit */ -- cgit v1.1