| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs
to just after the function exported, etc.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to
move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal
net/compat.c file in the future.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking
controls whereby an application can determine the label of the
security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to
via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or
UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security
context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of
the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the
security context is for each individual packet. An example
application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start
daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.
Patch design approach:
- Design for TCP
The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for
a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security
association. The application may retrieve this context using
getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a
connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry
cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a
security association has a security context, the context string is
returned, as for UNIX domain sockets.
- Design for UDP
Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different
API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer
security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can
be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established
and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have
different peer and thus the security context might change every time.
As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with
the packet retrieval.
The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).
Patch implementation details:
- Implementation for TCP
The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt
with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error
checking):
getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen);
printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf);
The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check
for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED ==
sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of
struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If
these have security associations with security contexts, the security
context is returned.
getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or
the buffer is unmodified.
- Implementation for UDP
To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to
the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via
getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using
the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for UDP should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new
ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.
When the packet is received we get the security context from the
sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the
ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook,
selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security
context from the SELinux space. The existing function,
selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the
security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to
kernel space.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between
applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in
labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then
extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For
UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the
auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This removes more unneeded casts on the return value for kmalloc(),
sock_kmalloc(), and vmalloc().
Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <kjak@users.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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To help in reducing the number of include dependencies, several files were
touched as they were getting needed headers indirectly for stuff they use.
Thanks also to Alan Menegotto for pointing out that net/dccp/proto.c had
linux/dccp.h include twice.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As DCCP needs to be called in the same spots.
Now we have a member in inet_sock (is_icsk), set at sock creation time from
struct inet_protosw->flags (if INET_PROTOSW_ICSK is set, like for TCP and
DCCP) to see if a struct sock instance is a inet_connection_sock for places
like the ones in ip_sockglue.c (v4 and v6) where we previously were looking if
sk_type was SOCK_STREAM, that is insufficient because we now use the same code
for DCCP, that has sk_type SOCK_DCCP.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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From: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
This is the net/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch.
Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in net/.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@conectiva.com.br>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
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This variant is needed to satisfy sparse __user annotations.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Of this type, mostly:
CHECK net/ipv6/netfilter.c
net/ipv6/netfilter.c:96:12: warning: symbol 'ipv6_netfilter_init' was not declared. Should it be static?
net/ipv6/netfilter.c:101:6: warning: symbol 'ipv6_netfilter_fini' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The interface needs much redesigning if we wish to allow
normal users to do this in some way.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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1) Changes IP_ADD_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP to ignore
EADDRINUSE errors on a "courtesy join" -- prior membership or not
is ok for these.
2) Adds "leave group" equivalence of (INCLUDE, empty) filters in the
delta-based API. Without this, mixing delta-based API calls that
end in an (INCLUDE, empty) filter would not allow a subsequent
regular IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP. It also frees socket buffer memory that
isn't needed for both the multicast group record and source filter.
Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In light of my recent patch to net/ipv4/udp.c that replaced the
spin_lock_irq calls on the receive queue lock with spin_lock_bh,
here is a similar patch for all other occurences of spin_lock_irq
on receive/error queue locks in IPv4 and IPv6.
In these stacks, we know that they can only be entered from user
or softirq context. Therefore it's safe to disable BH only.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
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