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* KEYS: Propagate error code instead of returning -EINVALDan Carpenter2010-06-271-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is from a Smatch check I'm writing. strncpy_from_user() returns -EFAULT on error so the first change just silences a warning but doesn't change how the code works. The other change is a bug fix because install_thread_keyring_to_cred() can return a variety of errors such as -EINVAL, -EEXIST, -ENOMEM or -EKEYREVOKED. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* keyctl_session_to_parent(): use thread_group_empty() to check singlethreadnessOleg Nesterov2010-05-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No functional changes. keyctl_session_to_parent() is the only user of signal->count which needs the correct value. Change it to use thread_group_empty() instead, this must be strictly equivalent under tasklist, and imho looks better. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* umh: creds: convert call_usermodehelper_keys() to use subprocess_info->init()Oleg Nesterov2010-05-273-2/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | call_usermodehelper_keys() uses call_usermodehelper_setkeys() to change subprocess_info->cred in advance. Now that we have info->init() we can change this code to set tgcred->session_keyring in context of execing kernel thread. Note: since currently call_usermodehelper_keys() is never called with UMH_NO_WAIT, call_usermodehelper_keys()->key_get() and umh_keys_cleanup() are not really needed, we could rely on install_session_keyring_to_cred() which does key_get() on success. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* kernel-wide: replace USHORT_MAX, SHORT_MAX and SHORT_MIN with USHRT_MAX, ↵Alexey Dobriyan2010-05-251-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SHRT_MAX and SHRT_MIN - C99 knows about USHRT_MAX/SHRT_MAX/SHRT_MIN, not USHORT_MAX/SHORT_MAX/SHORT_MIN. - Make SHRT_MIN of type s16, not int, for consistency. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/dma/timb_dma.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix security/keys/keyring.c] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* switch selinux delayed superblock handling to iterate_supers()Al Viro2010-05-212-48/+8
| | | | | | ... kill their private list, while we are at it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* kref: remove kref_setNeilBrown2010-05-211-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Of the three uses of kref_set in the kernel: One really should be kref_put as the code is letting go of a reference, Two really should be kref_init because the kref is being initialised. This suggests that making kref_set available encourages bad code. So fix the three uses and remove kref_set completely. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* KEYS: Return more accurate error codesDan Carpenter2010-05-181-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | We were using the wrong variable here so the error codes weren't being returned properly. The original code returns -ENOKEY. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM: Add __init to fixup function.Tetsuo Handa2010-05-172-3/+3
| | | | | | | | register_security() became __init function. So do verify() and security_fixup_ops(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* TOMOYO: Add pathname grouping support.Tetsuo Handa2010-05-176-54/+433
| | | | | | | | This patch adds pathname grouping support, which is useful for grouping pathnames that cannot be represented using /\{dir\}/ pattern. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* ima: remove ACPI dependencyMimi Zohar2010-05-171-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The ACPI dependency moved to the TPM, where it belongs. Although IMA per-se does not require access to the bios measurement log, verifying the IMA boot aggregate does, which requires ACPI. This patch prereq's 'TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal' http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/4/378. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: Jean-Christophe Dubois <jcd@tribudubois.net> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security/selinux/ss: Use kstrdupJulia Lawall2010-05-171-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use kstrdup when the goal of an allocation is copy a string into the allocated region. The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // <smpl> @@ expression from,to; expression flag,E1,E2; statement S; @@ - to = kmalloc(strlen(from) + 1,flag); + to = kstrdup(from, flag); ... when != \(from = E1 \| to = E1 \) if (to==NULL || ...) S ... when != \(from = E2 \| to = E2 \) - strcpy(to, from); // </smpl> Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* TOMOYO: Use stack memory for pending entry.Tetsuo Handa2010-05-105-192/+190
| | | | | | | Use stack memory for pending entry to reduce kmalloc() which will be kfree()d. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Revert "ima: remove ACPI dependency"James Morris2010-05-071-2/+3
| | | | | | | | This reverts commit a674fa46c79ffa37995bd1c8e4daa2b3be5a95ae. Previous revert was a prereq. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()David Howells2010-05-064-130/+215
| | | | | | | | | | Do preallocation for __key_link() so that the various callers in request_key.c can deal with any errors from this source before attempting to construct a key. This allows them to assume that the actual linkage step is guaranteed to be successful. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2010-05-062-20/+23
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: security/keys/keyring.c Resolved conflict with whitespace fix in find_keyring_by_name() Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * KEYS: call_sbin_request_key() must write lock keyrings before modifying themDavid Howells2010-05-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | call_sbin_request_key() creates a keyring and then attempts to insert a link to the authorisation key into that keyring, but does so without holding a write lock on the keyring semaphore. It will normally get away with this because it hasn't told anyone that the keyring exists yet. The new keyring, however, has had its serial number published, which means it can be accessed directly by that handle. This was found by a previous patch that adds RCU lockdep checks to the code that reads the keyring payload pointer, which includes a check that the keyring semaphore is actually locked. Without this patch, the following command: keyctl request2 user b a @s will provoke the following lockdep warning is displayed in dmesg: =================================================== [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ] --------------------------------------------------- security/keys/keyring.c:727 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by keyctl/2076: #0: (key_types_sem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811a5b29>] key_type_lookup+0x1c/0x71 #1: (keyring_serialise_link_sem){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811a6d1e>] __key_link+0x4d/0x3c5 stack backtrace: Pid: 2076, comm: keyctl Not tainted 2.6.34-rc6-cachefs #54 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81051fdc>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb2 [<ffffffff811a6d1e>] ? __key_link+0x4d/0x3c5 [<ffffffff811a6e6f>] __key_link+0x19e/0x3c5 [<ffffffff811a5952>] ? __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb1/0xdc [<ffffffff811a59bf>] ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x42/0x5f [<ffffffff811aa0dc>] call_sbin_request_key+0xe7/0x33b [<ffffffff8139376a>] ? mutex_unlock+0x9/0xb [<ffffffff811a5952>] ? __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb1/0xdc [<ffffffff811a59bf>] ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x42/0x5f [<ffffffff811aa6fa>] ? request_key_auth_new+0x1c2/0x23c [<ffffffff810aaf15>] ? cache_alloc_debugcheck_after+0x108/0x173 [<ffffffff811a9d00>] ? request_key_and_link+0x146/0x300 [<ffffffff810ac568>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xe1/0x118 [<ffffffff811a9e45>] request_key_and_link+0x28b/0x300 [<ffffffff811a89ac>] sys_request_key+0xf7/0x14a [<ffffffff81052c0b>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10c/0x130 [<ffffffff81394fb9>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff81001eeb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * KEYS: Use RCU dereference wrappers in keyring key type codeDavid Howells2010-05-051-10/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The keyring key type code should use RCU dereference wrappers, even when it holds the keyring's key semaphore. Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * KEYS: find_keyring_by_name() can gain access to a freed keyringToshiyuki Okajima2010-05-051-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | find_keyring_by_name() can gain access to a keyring that has had its reference count reduced to zero, and is thus ready to be freed. This then allows the dead keyring to be brought back into use whilst it is being destroyed. The following timeline illustrates the process: |(cleaner) (user) | | free_user(user) sys_keyctl() | | | | key_put(user->session_keyring) keyctl_get_keyring_ID() | || //=> keyring->usage = 0 | | |schedule_work(&key_cleanup_task) lookup_user_key() | || | | kmem_cache_free(,user) | | . |[KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING] | . install_user_keyrings() | . || | key_cleanup() [<= worker_thread()] || | | || | [spin_lock(&key_serial_lock)] |[mutex_lock(&key_user_keyr..mutex)] | | || | atomic_read() == 0 || | |{ rb_ease(&key->serial_node,) } || | | || | [spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock)] |find_keyring_by_name() | | ||| | keyring_destroy(keyring) ||[read_lock(&keyring_name_lock)] | || ||| | |[write_lock(&keyring_name_lock)] ||atomic_inc(&keyring->usage) | |. ||| *** GET freeing keyring *** | |. ||[read_unlock(&keyring_name_lock)] | || || | |list_del() |[mutex_unlock(&key_user_k..mutex)] | || | | |[write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock)] ** INVALID keyring is returned ** | | . | kmem_cache_free(,keyring) . | . | atomic_dec(&keyring->usage) v *** DESTROYED *** TIME If CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y then we may see the following message generated: ============================================================================= BUG key_jar: Poison overwritten ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: 0xffff880197a7e200-0xffff880197a7e200. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b INFO: Allocated in key_alloc+0x10b/0x35f age=25 cpu=1 pid=5086 INFO: Freed in key_cleanup+0xd0/0xd5 age=12 cpu=1 pid=10 INFO: Slab 0xffffea000592cb90 objects=16 used=2 fp=0xffff880197a7e200 flags=0x200000000000c3 INFO: Object 0xffff880197a7e200 @offset=512 fp=0xffff880197a7e300 Bytes b4 0xffff880197a7e1f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Object 0xffff880197a7e200: 6a 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b jkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Alternatively, we may see a system panic happen, such as: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001 IP: [<ffffffff810e61a3>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x5b/0xe9 PGD 6b2b4067 PUD 6a80d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_loaded CPU 1 ... Pid: 31245, comm: su Not tainted 2.6.34-rc5-nofixed-nodebug #2 D2089/PRIMERGY RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810e61a3>] [<ffffffff810e61a3>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x5b/0xe9 RSP: 0018:ffff88006af3bd98 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff88007d19900b RDX: 0000000100000000 RSI: 00000000000080d0 RDI: ffffffff81828430 RBP: ffffffff81828430 R08: ffff88000a293750 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000100000 R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: 00000000000080d0 R14: 0000000000000296 R15: ffffffff810f20ce FS: 00007f97116bc700(0000) GS:ffff88000a280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 000000006a91c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process su (pid: 31245, threadinfo ffff88006af3a000, task ffff8800374414c0) Stack: 0000000512e0958e 0000000000008000 ffff880037f8d180 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000008001 ffff88007d199000 ffffffff810f20ce 0000000000008000 ffff88006af3be48 0000000000000024 ffffffff810face3 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810f20ce>] ? get_empty_filp+0x70/0x12f [<ffffffff810face3>] ? do_filp_open+0x145/0x590 [<ffffffff810ce208>] ? tlb_finish_mmu+0x2a/0x33 [<ffffffff810ce43c>] ? unmap_region+0xd3/0xe2 [<ffffffff810e4393>] ? virt_to_head_page+0x9/0x2d [<ffffffff81103916>] ? alloc_fd+0x69/0x10e [<ffffffff810ef4ed>] ? do_sys_open+0x56/0xfc [<ffffffff81008a02>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 c6 fa 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 65 4c 8b 04 25 60 e8 00 00 48 8b 45 00 49 01 c0 49 8b 18 48 85 db 74 0d 48 63 45 18 <48> 8b 04 03 49 89 00 eb 14 4c 89 f9 83 ca ff 44 89 e6 48 89 ef RIP [<ffffffff810e61a3>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x5b/0xe9 This problem is that find_keyring_by_name does not confirm that the keyring is valid before accepting it. Skipping keyrings that have been reduced to a zero count seems the way to go. To this end, use atomic_inc_not_zero() to increment the usage count and skip the candidate keyring if that returns false. The following script _may_ cause the bug to happen, but there's no guarantee as the window of opportunity is small: #!/bin/sh LOOP=100000 USER=dummy_user /bin/su -c "exit;" $USER || { /usr/sbin/adduser -m $USER; add=1; } for ((i=0; i<LOOP; i++)) do /bin/su -c "echo '$i' > /dev/null" $USER done (( add == 1 )) && /usr/sbin/userdel -r $USER exit Note that the nominated user must not be in use. An alternative way of testing this may be: for ((i=0; i<100000; i++)) do keyctl session foo /bin/true || break done >&/dev/null as that uses a keyring named "foo" rather than relying on the user and user-session named keyrings. Reported-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | TOMOYO: Use mutex_lock_interruptible.Tetsuo Handa2010-05-066-24/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some of TOMOYO's functions may sleep after mutex_lock(). If OOM-killer selected a process which is waiting at mutex_lock(), the to-be-killed process can't be killed. Thus, replace mutex_lock() with mutex_lock_interruptible() so that the to-be-killed process can immediately return from TOMOYO's functions. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | KEYS: Better handling of errors from construct_alloc_key()David Howells2010-05-061-2/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Errors from construct_alloc_key() shouldn't just be ignored in the way they are by construct_key_and_link(). The only error that can be ignored so is EINPROGRESS as that is used to indicate that we've found a key and don't need to construct one. We don't, however, handle ENOMEM, EDQUOT or EACCES to indicate allocation failures of one sort or another. Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | KEYS: keyring_serialise_link_sem is only needed for keyring->keyring linksDavid Howells2010-05-061-7/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | keyring_serialise_link_sem is only needed for keyring->keyring links as it's used to prevent cycle detection from being avoided by parallel keyring additions. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2010-05-0632-15/+52
|\ \ | |/
| * KEYS: Fix RCU handling in key_gc_keyring()David Howells2010-05-051-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | key_gc_keyring() needs to either hold the RCU read lock or hold the keyring semaphore if it's going to scan the keyring's list. Given that it only needs to read the key list, and it's doing so under a spinlock, the RCU read lock is the thing to use. Furthermore, the RCU check added in e7b0a61b7929632d36cf052d9e2820ef0a9c1bfe is incorrect as holding the spinlock on key_serial_lock is not grounds for assuming a keyring's pointer list can be read safely. Instead, a simple rcu_dereference() inside of the previously mentioned RCU read lock is what we want. Reported-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * KEYS: Fix an RCU warning in the reading of user keysDavid Howells2010-05-051-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix an RCU warning in the reading of user keys: =================================================== [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ] --------------------------------------------------- security/keys/user_defined.c:202 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by keyctl/3637: #0: (&key->sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff811a80ae>] keyctl_read_key+0x9c/0xcf stack backtrace: Pid: 3637, comm: keyctl Not tainted 2.6.34-rc5-cachefs #18 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81051f6c>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb2 [<ffffffff811aa55f>] user_read+0x47/0x91 [<ffffffff811a80be>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf [<ffffffff811a8a06>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb7 [<ffffffff81001eeb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-04-271-1/+1
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: keys: don't need to use RCU in keyring_read() as semaphore is held
| | * keys: don't need to use RCU in keyring_read() as semaphore is heldDavid Howells2010-04-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | keyring_read() doesn't need to use rcu_dereference() to access the keyring payload as the caller holds the key semaphore to prevent modifications from happening whilst the data is read out. This should solve the following warning: =================================================== [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ] --------------------------------------------------- security/keys/keyring.c:204 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by keyctl/2144: #0: (&key->sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff81177f7c>] keyctl_read_key+0x9c/0xcf stack backtrace: Pid: 2144, comm: keyctl Not tainted 2.6.34-rc2-cachefs #113 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8105121f>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb2 [<ffffffff811762d5>] keyring_read+0x4d/0xe7 [<ffffffff81177f8c>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf [<ffffffff811788d4>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb9 [<ffffffff81001eeb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | keys: the request_key() syscall should link an existing key to the dest keyringDavid Howells2010-04-271-1/+8
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The request_key() system call and request_key_and_link() should make a link from an existing key to the destination keyring (if supplied), not just from a new key to the destination keyring. This can be tested by: ring=`keyctl newring fred @s` keyctl request2 user debug:a a keyctl request user debug:a $ring keyctl list $ring If it says: keyring is empty then it didn't work. If it shows something like: 1 key in keyring: 1070462727: --alswrv 0 0 user: debug:a then it did. request_key() system call is meant to recursively search all your keyrings for the key you desire, and, optionally, if it doesn't exist, call out to userspace to create one for you. If request_key() finds or creates a key, it should, optionally, create a link to that key from the destination keyring specified. Therefore, if, after a successful call to request_key() with a desination keyring specified, you see the destination keyring empty, the code didn't work correctly. If you see the found key in the keyring, then it did - which is what the patch is required for. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * keys: fix an RCU warningDavid Howells2010-04-241-5/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the following RCU warning: =================================================== [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ] --------------------------------------------------- security/keys/request_key.c:116 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection! This was caused by doing: [root@andromeda ~]# keyctl newring fred @s 539196288 [root@andromeda ~]# keyctl request2 user a a 539196288 request_key: Required key not available Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * security: testing the wrong variable in create_by_name()Dan Carpenter2010-04-221-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is a typo here. We should be testing "*dentry" instead of "dentry". If "*dentry" is an ERR_PTR, it gets dereferenced in either mkdir() or create() which would cause an OOPs. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: Reduce max avtab size to avoid page allocation failuresStephen Smalley2010-04-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reduce MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS so that the avtab allocation is an order 2 allocation rather than an order 4 allocation on x86_64. This addresses reports of page allocation failures: http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=126757230625867&w=2 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=570433 Reported-by: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au> Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking ↵Tejun Heo2010-03-3028-3/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
* | TOMOYO: Use GFP_NOFS rather than GFP_KERNEL.Tetsuo Handa2010-05-064-18/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In Ubuntu, security_path_*() hooks are exported to Unionfs. Thus, prepare for being called from inside VFS functions because I'm not sure whether it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL or not. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | ima: remove ACPI dependencyMimi Zohar2010-05-051-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The ACPI dependency moved to the TPM, where it belongs. Although IMA per-se does not require access to the bios measurement log, verifying the IMA boot aggregate does, which requires ACPI. This patch prereq's 'TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal' http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/4/378. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: Jean-Christophe Dubois <jcd@tribudubois.net> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | selinux: generalize disabling of execmem for plt-in-heap archsStephen Smalley2010-04-291-6/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On Tue, 2010-04-27 at 11:47 -0700, David Miller wrote: > From: "Tom \"spot\" Callaway" <tcallawa@redhat.com> > Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 14:20:21 -0400 > > > [root@apollo ~]$ cat /proc/2174/maps > > 00010000-00014000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 15466577 > > /sbin/mingetty > > 00022000-00024000 rwxp 00002000 fd:00 15466577 > > /sbin/mingetty > > 00024000-00046000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 > > [heap] > > SELINUX probably barfs on the executable heap, the PLT is in the HEAP > just like powerpc32 and that's why VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS has to set > both executable and writable. > > You also can't remove the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdefs in selinux, since > because of the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS setting used still in that arch, > the heap will always have executable permission, just like sparc does. > You have to support those binaries forever, whether you like it or not. > > Let's just replace the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdef in SELINUX with CONFIG_PPC32 > || CONFIG_SPARC as in Tom's original patch and let's be done with > this. > > In fact I would go through all the arch/ header files and check the > VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS settings and add the necessary new ifdefs to the > SELINUX code so that other platforms don't have the pain of having to > go through this process too. To avoid maintaining per-arch ifdefs, it seems that we could just directly use (VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC) as the basis for deciding whether to enable or disable these checks. VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS isn't constant on some architectures but instead depends on current->personality, but we want this applied uniformly. So we'll just use the initial task state to determine whether or not to enable these checks. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | LSM Audit: rename LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONEEric Paris2010-04-282-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Most of the LSM common audit work uses LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* for the naming. This was not so for LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT which means the generic initializer cannot be used. This patch just renames the flag so the generic initializer can be used. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SMACK: Don't #include Ext2 headersDavid Howells2010-04-271-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't #include Ext2 headers into Smack unnecessarily. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: whitespace coding style fixesJustin P. Mattock2010-04-237-45/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Whitespace coding style fixes. Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for writeKees Cook2010-04-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Redirecting directly to lsm, here's the patch discussed on lkml: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/4/22/219 The mmap_min_addr value is useful information for an admin to see without being root ("is my system vulnerable to kernel NULL pointer attacks?") and its setting is trivially easy for an attacker to determine by calling mmap() in PAGE_SIZE increments starting at 0, so trying to keep it private has no value. Only require CAP_SYS_RAWIO if changing the value, not reading it. Comment from Serge : Me, I like to write my passwords with light blue pen on dark blue paper, pasted on my window - if you're going to get my password, you're gonna get a headache. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | IMA: include the word IMA in printk messagesEric Paris2010-04-233-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As an example IMA emits a warning when it can't find a TPM chip: "No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!" This patch prefaces that message with IMA so we know what subsystem is bypassing the TPM. Do this for all pr_info and pr_err messages. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | IMA: drop the word integrity in the audit messageEric Paris2010-04-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | integrity_audit_msg() uses "integrity:" in the audit message. This violates the (loosely defined) audit system requirements that everything be a key=value pair and it doesn't provide additional information. This can be obviously gleaned from the message type. Just drop it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | IMA: use audit_log_untrusted_string rather than %sEric Paris2010-04-211-13/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert all of the places IMA calls audit_log_format with %s into audit_log_untrusted_string(). This is going to cause them all to get quoted, but it should make audit log injection harder. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | IMA: handle comments in policyEric Paris2010-04-211-7/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA policy load parser will reject any policies with a comment. This patch will allow the parser to just ignore lines which start with a #. This is not very robust. # can ONLY be used at the very beginning of a line. Inline comments are not allowed. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | IMA: handle whitespace betterEric Paris2010-04-211-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA parser will fail if whitespace is used in any way other than a single space. Using a tab or even using 2 spaces in a row will result in a policy being rejected. This patch makes the kernel ignore whitespace a bit better. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | IMA: reject policies with unknown entriesEric Paris2010-04-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the ima policy load code will print what it doesn't understand but really I think it should reject any policy it doesn't understand. This patch makes it so! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | IMA: set entry->action to UNKNOWN rather than hard codingEric Paris2010-04-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ima_parse_rule currently sets entry->action = -1 and then later tests if (entry->action == UNKNOWN). It is true that UNKNOWN == -1 but actually setting it to UNKNOWN makes a lot more sense in case things change in the future. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | IMA: do not allow the same rule to specify the same thing twiceEric Paris2010-04-211-1/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA will accept rules which specify things twice and will only pay attention to the last one. We should reject such rules. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | ima: handle multiple rules per writeEric Paris2010-04-213-26/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently IMA will only accept one rule per write(). This patch allows IMA to accept writes which contain multiple rules but only processes one rule per write. \n is used as the delimiter between rules. IMA will return a short write indicating that it only accepted up to the first \n. This allows simple userspace utilities like cat to be used to load an IMA policy instead of needing a special userspace utility that understood 'one write per rule' Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: return error codes on policy load failureEric Paris2010-04-211-15/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | policy load failure always return EINVAL even if the failure was for some other reason (usually ENOMEM). This patch passes error codes back up the stack where they will make their way to userspace. This might help in debugging future problems with policy load. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Security: Fix the comment of cap_file_mmap()wzt.wzt@gmail.com2010-04-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the comment of cap_file_mmap(), replace mmap_min_addr to be dac_mmap_min_addr. Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: remove dead hook acctEric Paris2010-04-122-11/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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