From e6e5494cb23d1933735ee47cc674ffe1c4afed6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2006 02:53:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Gerd Hoffmann Cc: Rusty Russell Cc: Zachary Amsden Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/proc') diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index 0137ec4..0a163a4 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ struct mem_size_stats unsigned long private_dirty; }; +__attribute__((weak)) const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return NULL; +} + static int show_map_internal(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct mem_size_stats *mss) { struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private; @@ -158,22 +163,23 @@ static int show_map_internal(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct mem_size_stats pad_len_spaces(m, len); seq_path(m, file->f_vfsmnt, file->f_dentry, "\n"); } else { - if (mm) { - if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_brk && + const char *name = arch_vma_name(vma); + if (!name) { + if (mm) { + if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_brk && vma->vm_end >= mm->brk) { - pad_len_spaces(m, len); - seq_puts(m, "[heap]"); - } else { - if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack && - vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) { - - pad_len_spaces(m, len); - seq_puts(m, "[stack]"); + name = "[heap]"; + } else if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack && + vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) { + name = "[stack]"; } + } else { + name = "[vdso]"; } - } else { + } + if (name) { pad_len_spaces(m, len); - seq_puts(m, "[vdso]"); + seq_puts(m, name); } } seq_putc(m, '\n'); -- cgit v1.1