| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Bug: 18119147
Change-Id: I75e5edf83fa01dbf2495e24df4597dce41f13654
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Too many leaking FDs.
Fixes bug: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=65857
(and more)
Change-Id: I67d8683244e54288a8105f6f65ee40abe2378d7e
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Remount will now remount the vendor partition as well, if it exists.
Sync will also allow you to sync vendor, and will include it by
default if it exists.
Change-Id: Iea1e8212f445e96233438a8d8a9d3266bf3d6557
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
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- Deal with some -Wunused issues
Change-Id: Idfd1a114e68ae637978b52fde5144d0dca0ec79f
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When a filesystem is mounted read-only, make the underlying
block device read-only too. This helps prevent an attacker
who is able to change permissions on the files in /dev
(for example, symlink attack) from modifying the block device.
In particular, this change would have stopped the LG Thrill / Optimus
3D rooting exploit
(http://vulnfactory.org/blog/2012/02/26/rooting-the-lg-thrill-optimus-3d/)
as that exploit modified the raw block device corresponding to /system.
This change also makes UID=0 less powerful. Block devices cannot
be made writable again without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so an escalation
to UID=0 by itself doesn't give full root access.
adb/mount: Prior to mounting something read-write, remove the
read-only restrictions on the underlying block device. This avoids
messing up developer workflows.
Change-Id: I135098a8fe06f327336f045aab0d48ed9de33807
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Change-Id: If8e07502bcface53aaac81022f6183c6a147edc8
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