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| author | Tianjie Xu <xunchang@google.com> | 2016-12-16 16:24:09 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Sean McCreary <mccreary@mcwest.org> | 2017-03-22 12:15:02 -0600 |
| commit | 735e1195c28a628731d3e31f76d8dc3f8a1b9fe6 (patch) | |
| tree | 2404dbce3cbf96d9f2ceffc36c694725dc20b66f | |
| parent | ad34986480edbf4e73804eb4ff300f96d9afa0a4 (diff) | |
| download | bootable_recovery-735e1195c28a628731d3e31f76d8dc3f8a1b9fe6.zip bootable_recovery-735e1195c28a628731d3e31f76d8dc3f8a1b9fe6.tar.gz bootable_recovery-735e1195c28a628731d3e31f76d8dc3f8a1b9fe6.tar.bz2 | |
Add a checker for signature boundary in verifier
The 'signature_start' variable marks the location of the signature
from the end of a zip archive. And a boundary check is missing where
'signature_start' should be within the EOCD comment field. This causes
problems when sideloading a malicious package. Also add a corresponding
test.
Bug: 31914369
Test: Verification fails correctly when sideloading recovery_test.zip on
angler.
CVE-2017-0475
Change-Id: I6ea96bf04dac5d8d4d6719e678d504f957b4d5c1
(cherry-picked from f69e6a9475983b2ad46729e44ab58d2b22cd74d0)
(cherry picked from commit 54ea136fded56810bf475885eb4bd7bf1b11f09c)
(cherry picked from commit 2c6c23f651abb3d215134dfba463eb72a5e9f8eb)
| -rw-r--r-- | verifier.cpp | 6 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/verifier.cpp b/verifier.cpp index 61e5adf..bf7071d 100644 --- a/verifier.cpp +++ b/verifier.cpp @@ -144,6 +144,12 @@ int verify_file(unsigned char* addr, size_t length, LOGI("comment is %zu bytes; signature %zu bytes from end\n", comment_size, signature_start); + if (signature_start > comment_size) { + LOGE("signature start: %zu is larger than comment size: %zu\n", signature_start, + comment_size); + return VERIFY_FAILURE; + } + if (signature_start <= FOOTER_SIZE) { LOGE("Signature start is in the footer"); return VERIFY_FAILURE; |