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| author | Adam Langley <agl@google.com> | 2015-09-24 10:57:52 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adam Langley <agl@google.com> | 2015-09-24 11:04:03 -0700 |
| commit | 1e4884f615b20946411a74e41eb9c6aa65e2d5f3 (patch) | |
| tree | dd743d9d64af3145fe96b8d5fc2f3427544794bd /src/crypto/bn/random.c | |
| parent | 08656b61d075740bfb24ddcce65223146259fc02 (diff) | |
| download | external_boringssl-1e4884f615b20946411a74e41eb9c6aa65e2d5f3.zip external_boringssl-1e4884f615b20946411a74e41eb9c6aa65e2d5f3.tar.gz external_boringssl-1e4884f615b20946411a74e41eb9c6aa65e2d5f3.tar.bz2 | |
external/boringssl: sync with upstream.
This change imports the current version of BoringSSL. The only local
change now is that |BORINGSSL_201509| is defined in base.h. This allows
this change to be made without (hopefully) breaking the build.
This change will need https://android-review.googlesource.com/172744 to
be landed afterwards to update a test.
Change-Id: I6d1f463f7785a2423bd846305af91c973c326104
Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto/bn/random.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/crypto/bn/random.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/bn/random.c b/src/crypto/bn/random.c index 549ac48..3116e54 100644 --- a/src/crypto/bn/random.c +++ b/src/crypto/bn/random.c @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) { buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bytes); if (buf == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_rand, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { unsigned count = 100; if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_rand_range, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE); return 0; } @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { } if (!--count) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_rand_range, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); return 0; } } while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0); @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { } if (!--count) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_rand_range, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); return 0; } } while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0); @@ -264,13 +264,13 @@ int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, const BIGNUM *priv, } if (BN_is_zero(range)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_generate_dsa_nonce, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO); goto err; } k_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(num_k_bytes); if (!k_bytes) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_generate_dsa_nonce, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, const BIGNUM *priv, /* No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key * this large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid * leaking the length of the private key. */ - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_generate_dsa_nonce, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } memcpy(private_bytes, priv->d, todo); |