external/boringssl: sync with upstream.

This change imports the current version of BoringSSL. The only local
change now is that |BORINGSSL_201509| is defined in base.h. This allows
this change to be made without (hopefully) breaking the build.

This change will need https://android-review.googlesource.com/172744 to
be landed afterwards to update a test.

Change-Id: I6d1f463f7785a2423bd846305af91c973c326104

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/src/crypto/cipher/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/src/crypto/cipher/e_chacha20poly1305.c
index ebf0088..9dda1b0 100644
--- a/src/crypto/cipher/e_chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/src/crypto/cipher/e_chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
   }
 
   if (tag_len > POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_init, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -107,23 +107,22 @@ static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
    * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
    * the warning. */
   if (in_len_64 >= (1ull << 32) * 64 - 64) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
     return 0;
   }
 
   if (in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len < in_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
     return 0;
   }
 
   if (max_out_len < in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal,
-                      CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
     return 0;
   }
 
   if (nonce_len != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -156,7 +155,7 @@ static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
   const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
 
   if (in_len < c20_ctx->tag_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -168,20 +167,19 @@ static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
    * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
    * the warning. */
   if (in_len_64 >= (1ull << 32) * 64 - 64) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
     return 0;
   }
 
   if (nonce_len != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
     return 0;
   }
 
   plaintext_len = in_len - c20_ctx->tag_len;
 
   if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open,
-                      CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -195,7 +193,7 @@ static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
   CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac);
 
   if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, c20_ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
     return 0;
   }