Initial commit of BoringSSL for Android.

1 files changed, 762 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_impl.c b/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_impl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6719758
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_impl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,762 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ *
+ * The DSS routines are based on patches supplied by
+ * Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov>. */
+
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+
+/* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
+ * Rabin-Miller */
+#define DSS_prime_checks 50
+
+static int sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                      BIGNUM **rp, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx;
+  BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, sign_setup, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_init(&k);
+  BN_init(&kq);
+
+  ctx = ctx_in;
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  r = BN_new();
+  if (r == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Get random k */
+  do {
+    /* If possible, we'll include the private key and message digest in the k
+     * generation. The |digest| argument is only empty if |DSA_sign_setup| is
+     * being used. */
+    int ok;
+
+    if (digest_len > 0) {
+      ok = BN_generate_dsa_nonce(&k, dsa->q, dsa->priv_key, digest, digest_len,
+                                 ctx);
+    } else {
+      ok = BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q);
+    }
+    if (!ok) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } while (BN_is_zero(&k));
+
+  BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                              CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
+  if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
+    goto err;
+
+  /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
+   * so we compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length.
+   *
+   * (This is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont()
+   * does not let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) */
+
+  if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
+    goto err;
+  if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) {
+    if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  K = &kq;
+
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Compute  part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
+  kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx);
+  if (kinv == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (*kinvp != NULL) {
+    BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
+  }
+  *kinvp = kinv;
+  kinv = NULL;
+  if (*rp != NULL) {
+    BN_clear_free(*rp);
+  }
+  *rp = r;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (!ret) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, sign_setup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    if (r != NULL) {
+      BN_clear_free(r);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ctx_in == NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  BN_clear_free(&k);
+  BN_clear_free(&kq);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static DSA_SIG *sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA *dsa) {
+  BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+  BIGNUM m;
+  BIGNUM xr;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
+  DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
+  int noredo = 0;
+
+  BN_init(&m);
+  BN_init(&xr);
+
+  if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+    reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  s = BN_new();
+  if (s == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+redo:
+  if (dsa->kinv == NULL || dsa->r == NULL) {
+    if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    kinv = dsa->kinv;
+    dsa->kinv = NULL;
+    r = dsa->r;
+    dsa->r = NULL;
+    noredo = 1;
+  }
+
+  if (digest_len > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) {
+    /* if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
+     * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
+     * fips 186-3, 4.2 */
+    digest_len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &m) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Compute  s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
+  if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err; /* s = xr */
+  }
+  if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) {
+    goto err; /* s = m + xr */
+  }
+  if (BN_cmp(s, dsa->q) > 0) {
+    if (!BN_sub(s, s, dsa->q)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = DSA_SIG_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  /* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
+   * very unlikely. */
+  if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
+    if (noredo) {
+      reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES;
+      goto err;
+    }
+    goto redo;
+  }
+  ret->r = r;
+  ret->s = s;
+
+err:
+  if (!ret) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, sign, reason);
+    BN_free(r);
+    BN_free(s);
+  }
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  BN_clear_free(&m);
+  BN_clear_free(&xr);
+  if (kinv != NULL) {
+    /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
+    BN_clear_free(kinv);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int verify(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *dgst, size_t digest_len,
+                  DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx;
+  BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
+  BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+  unsigned i;
+
+  *out_valid = 0;
+
+  if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, verify, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+  /* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */
+  if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, verify, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, verify, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_init(&u1);
+  BN_init(&u2);
+  BN_init(&t1);
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
+      BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+    ret = 1;
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
+      BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+    ret = 1;
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q
+   * save W in u2 */
+  if (BN_mod_inverse(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* save M in u1 */
+  if (digest_len > (i >> 3)) {
+    /* if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
+     * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
+     * fips 186-3, 4.2 */
+    digest_len = (i >> 3);
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, digest_len, &u1) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* u1 = M * w mod q */
+  if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* u2 = r * w mod q */
+  if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                                CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx);
+  if (!mont) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */
+  /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
+  if (!BN_mod(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* V is now in u1.  If the signature is correct, it will be
+   * equal to R. */
+  *out_valid = BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ret != 1) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, verify, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+  }
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  BN_free(&u1);
+  BN_free(&u2);
+  BN_free(&t1);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int keygen(DSA *dsa) {
+  int ok = 0;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+  BIGNUM prk;
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  priv_key = dsa->priv_key;
+  if (priv_key == NULL) {
+    priv_key = BN_new();
+    if (priv_key == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  do {
+    if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dsa->q)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } while (BN_is_zero(priv_key));
+
+  pub_key = dsa->pub_key;
+  if (pub_key == NULL) {
+    pub_key = BN_new();
+    if (pub_key == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  BN_init(&prk);
+  BN_with_flags(&prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+  if (!BN_mod_exp(pub_key, dsa->g, &prk, dsa->p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
+  dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (pub_key != NULL && dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
+    BN_free(pub_key);
+  }
+  if (priv_key != NULL && dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+  }
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+
+  return ok;
+}
+
+static int paramgen(DSA *ret, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
+                    size_t seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+                    BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  int ok = 0;
+  unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
+  BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
+  BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+  int k, n = 0, m = 0;
+  unsigned i;
+  int counter = 0;
+  int r = 0;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  unsigned int h = 2;
+  unsigned qbits, qsize;
+  const EVP_MD *evpmd;
+
+  if (bits >= 2048) {
+    qbits = 256;
+    evpmd = EVP_sha256();
+  } else {
+    qbits = 160;
+    evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+  }
+  qsize = qbits / 8;
+
+  if (qsize != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH &&
+      qsize != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+    /* invalid q size */
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (bits < 512) {
+    bits = 512;
+  }
+
+  bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64;
+
+  /* NB: seed_len == 0 is special case: copy generated seed to
+   * seed_in if it is not NULL. */
+  if (seed_len && (seed_len < (size_t)qsize)) {
+    seed_in = NULL; /* seed buffer too small -- ignore */
+  }
+  if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize) {
+    seed_len = qsize; /* App. 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186 allows larger SEED,
+                       * but our internal buffers are restricted to 160 bits*/
+  }
+  if (seed_in != NULL) {
+    memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL || mont == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+  if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    /* Find q. */
+    for (;;) {
+      int seed_is_random;
+
+      /* step 1 */
+      if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (!seed_len) {
+        if (!RAND_bytes(seed, qsize)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+        seed_is_random = 1;
+      } else {
+        seed_is_random = 0;
+        seed_len = 0; /* use random seed if 'seed_in' turns out to be bad*/
+      }
+      memcpy(buf, seed, qsize);
+      memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize);
+      /* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */
+      for (i = qsize - 1; i < qsize; i--) {
+        buf[i]++;
+        if (buf[i] != 0) {
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+
+      /* step 2 */
+      if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL) ||
+          !EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++) {
+        md[i] ^= buf2[i];
+      }
+
+      /* step 3 */
+      md[0] |= 0x80;
+      md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
+      if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      /* step 4 */
+      r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, seed_is_random, cb);
+      if (r > 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+      if (r != 0) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      /* do a callback call */
+      /* step 5 */
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0) || !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* step 6 */
+    counter = 0;
+    /* "offset = 2" */
+
+    n = (bits - 1) / 160;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      /* step 7 */
+      BN_zero(W);
+      /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
+      for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
+        /* obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */
+        for (i = qsize - 1; i < qsize; i--) {
+          buf[i]++;
+          if (buf[i] != 0) {
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+
+        if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* step 8 */
+        if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0) ||
+            !BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k) ||
+            !BN_add(W, W, r0)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+
+      /* more of step 8 */
+      if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1) ||
+          !BN_copy(X, W) ||
+          !BN_add(X, X, test)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      /* step 9 */
+      if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q) ||
+          !BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx) ||
+          !BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()) ||
+          !BN_sub(p, X, r0)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      /* step 10 */
+      if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
+        /* step 11 */
+        r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
+        if (r > 0) {
+          goto end; /* found it */
+        }
+        if (r != 0) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+
+      /* step 13 */
+      counter++;
+      /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
+
+      /* step 14 */
+      if (counter >= 4096) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+end:
+  if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* We now need to generate g */
+  /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
+  if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()) ||
+      !BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_set_word(test, h) ||
+      !BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    /* g=test^r0%p */
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_is_one(g)) {
+      break;
+    }
+    if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    h++;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ok) {
+    if (ret->p) {
+      BN_free(ret->p);
+    }
+    if (ret->q) {
+      BN_free(ret->q);
+    }
+    if (ret->g) {
+      BN_free(ret->g);
+    }
+    ret->p = BN_dup(p);
+    ret->q = BN_dup(q);
+    ret->g = BN_dup(g);
+    if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) {
+      ok = 0;
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (counter_ret != NULL) {
+      *counter_ret = counter;
+    }
+    if (h_ret != NULL) {
+      *h_ret = h;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ctx) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+
+  if (mont != NULL) {
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+  }
+
+  return ok;
+}
+
+static int finish(DSA *dsa) {
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
+  dsa->method_mont_p = NULL;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+const struct dsa_method DSA_default_method = {
+  {
+    0 /* references */,
+    1 /* is_static */,
+  },
+  NULL /* app_data */,
+
+  NULL /* init */,
+  finish /* finish */,
+
+  sign,
+  sign_setup,
+  verify,
+
+  paramgen,
+  keygen,
+};