Initial commit of BoringSSL for Android.

1 files changed, 699 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/ssl/s3_both.c b/src/ssl/s3_both.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a34d221
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -0,0 +1,699 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+
+/* ssl3_do_write sends |s->init_buf| in records of type 'type'
+ * (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns -1 on error, 1
+ * on success or zero if the transmission is still incomplete. */
+int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) {
+  int n;
+
+  n = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num);
+  if (n < 0) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (n == s->init_num) {
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
+                      (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+                      s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  s->init_off += n;
+  s->init_num -= n;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) {
+  uint8_t *p;
+  int n;
+
+  if (s->state == a) {
+    p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+    n = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+    if (n == 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
+    memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+
+    /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
+    if (!ssl_ctx_log_master_secret(s->ctx, s->s3->client_random,
+                                   SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->session->master_key,
+                                   s->session->master_key_length)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+     * renegotiation checks */
+    if (s->server) {
+      assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+      memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+      s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
+    } else {
+      assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+      memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+      s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
+    }
+
+    ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, n);
+    s->state = b;
+  }
+
+  /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+  return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to
+ * far. */
+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) {
+  const char *sender;
+  int slen;
+
+  /* If no new cipher setup then return immediately: other functions will set
+   * the appropriate error. */
+  if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+    sender = s->enc_method->server_finished_label;
+    slen = s->enc_method->server_finished_label_len;
+  } else {
+    sender = s->enc_method->client_finished_label;
+    slen = s->enc_method->client_finished_label_len;
+  }
+
+  s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac(
+      s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) {
+  int al, finished_len, ok;
+  long message_len;
+  uint8_t *p;
+
+  message_len =
+      s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE,
+                                 SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    return message_len;
+  }
+
+  /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
+  ssl3_take_mac(s);
+  ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
+
+  /* If this occurs, we have missed a message.
+   * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
+  if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+  s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+  p = s->init_msg;
+  finished_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+
+  if (finished_len != message_len) {
+    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len) != 0) {
+    al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
+  if (s->server) {
+    assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
+    s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
+  } else {
+    assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
+    s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+
+f_err:
+  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx			re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence		zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret		re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc		assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression	assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash		assign */
+int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) {
+  if (s->state == a) {
+    *((uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data) = SSL3_MT_CCS;
+    s->init_num = 1;
+    s->init_off = 0;
+
+    s->state = b;
+  }
+
+  /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+  return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+}
+
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) {
+  uint8_t *p;
+  unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+
+  if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+  p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+  l2n3(l, p);
+  l += 3;
+  ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l);
+  return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+}
+
+/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length |max|. The first four bytes (msg_type and
+ * length) are read in state |header_state|, the body is read in state |body_state|. */
+long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int header_state, int body_state, int msg_type,
+                      long max, int hash_message, int *ok) {
+  uint8_t *p;
+  unsigned long l;
+  long n;
+  int al;
+
+  if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+    /* A SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE call cannot be combined with
+     * reuse_message; the SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE would have to have
+     * been applied to the previous call. */
+    assert(hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE);
+    s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+    if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    *ok = 1;
+    s->state = body_state;
+    s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4;
+    s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+    return s->init_num;
+  }
+
+  p = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+  if (s->state == header_state) {
+    assert(s->init_num < 4);
+
+    for (;;) {
+      while (s->init_num < 4) {
+        int bytes_read = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(
+            s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], 4 - s->init_num, 0);
+        if (bytes_read <= 0) {
+          s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+          *ok = 0;
+          return bytes_read;
+        }
+        s->init_num += bytes_read;
+      }
+
+      static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
+      if (s->server || memcmp(p, kHelloRequest, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) != 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing
+       * a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct.
+       * Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */
+      s->init_num = 0;
+
+      if (s->msg_callback) {
+        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s,
+                        s->msg_callback_arg);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /* s->init_num == 4 */
+
+    if (msg_type >= 0 && *p != msg_type) {
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
+
+    n2l3(p, l);
+    if (l > (unsigned long)max) {
+      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, l + 4)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
+    s->state = body_state;
+
+    s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4;
+    s->init_num = 0;
+  }
+
+  /* next state (body_state) */
+  p = s->init_msg;
+  n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
+  while (n > 0) {
+    int bytes_read =
+        s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], n, 0);
+    if (bytes_read <= 0) {
+      s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+      *ok = 0;
+      return bytes_read;
+    }
+    s->init_num += bytes_read;
+    n -= bytes_read;
+  }
+
+  /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
+  if (hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE) {
+    ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
+  }
+  if (s->msg_callback) {
+    s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
+                    (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+  }
+  *ok = 1;
+  return s->init_num;
+
+f_err:
+  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+
+err:
+  *ok = 0;
+  return -1;
+}
+
+void ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *s) {
+  /* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in
+   * the hash. */
+  size_t header_len = s->init_msg - (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
+  ssl3_finish_mac(s, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + header_len);
+}
+
+/* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that
+ * is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+                       combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max);
+
+int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                          const EVP_MD **out_md, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using
+   * agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use
+   * SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type.  */
+  if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+    const uint8_t *hdata;
+    size_t hdatalen;
+    EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+    unsigned len;
+
+    if (!BIO_mem_contents(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
+        !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    *out_len = len;
+  } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+    if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, out) == 0 ||
+        s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) ==
+            0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    *out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    *out_md = EVP_md5_sha1();
+  } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+    if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out) == 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    *out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    *out_md = EVP_sha1();
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  switch (pkey->type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+      return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+      return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+    default:
+      return -1;
+  }
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
+  int al;
+
+  switch (type) {
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+      al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+      al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+      al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+      al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+      al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+    case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+    case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+      al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+      al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+      break;
+  }
+
+  return al;
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s) {
+  uint8_t *p;
+  size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
+
+  if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+    headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  } else {
+    headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
+  align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+  if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) {
+    len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD +
+          headerlen + align;
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) {
+      s->s3->init_extra = 1;
+      len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+    }
+    p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (p == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
+    s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
+  }
+
+  s->packet = &s->s3->rbuf.buf[0];
+  return 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_read_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s) {
+  uint8_t *p;
+  size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
+
+  if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+    headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+  } else {
+    headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
+  align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+  if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) {
+    len = s->max_send_fragment + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD +
+          headerlen + align;
+    /* Account for 1/n-1 record splitting. */
+    if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) {
+      len += headerlen + align + 1 + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+    }
+
+    p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (p == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
+    s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_write_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s) {
+  if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s) ||
+      !ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s) {
+  if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->wbuf.buf);
+    s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s) {
+  if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
+    s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* ssl_fill_hello_random fills a client_random or server_random field of length
+ * |len|. Returns 0 on failure or 1 on success. */
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, uint8_t *result, size_t len) {
+  int send_time = 0;
+
+  if (server) {
+    send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+  } else {
+    send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+  }
+
+  if (send_time) {
+    const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL);
+    uint8_t *p = result;
+
+    if (len < 4) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    p[0] = current_time >> 24;
+    p[1] = current_time >> 16;
+    p[2] = current_time >> 8;
+    p[3] = current_time;
+    return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4);
+  } else {
+    return RAND_bytes(result, len);
+  }
+}