Initial commit of BoringSSL for Android.

1 files changed, 1216 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4263cb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1216 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len,
+                         char fragment, char is_fragment);
+static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
+
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) {
+  /* If |extend| is 0, obtain new n-byte packet;
+   * if |extend| is 1, increase packet by another n bytes.
+   *
+   * The packet will be in the sub-array of |s->s3->rbuf.buf| specified by
+   * |s->packet| and |s->packet_length|. (If |s->read_ahead| is set, |max|
+   * bytes may be stored in |rbuf| (plus |s->packet_length| bytes if |extend|
+   * is one.) */
+  int i, len, left;
+  long align = 0;
+  uint8_t *pkt;
+  SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+  if (n <= 0) {
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  rb = &s->s3->rbuf;
+  if (rb->buf == NULL && !ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  left = rb->left;
+
+  align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+
+  if (!extend) {
+    /* start with empty packet ... */
+    if (left == 0) {
+      rb->offset = align;
+    } else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+      /* check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
+       * alignment... */
+      pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+      if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
+        /* Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field is
+         * insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about whether memmove
+         * will occur or not. Header values has no effect on memmove arguments
+         * and therefore no buffer overrun can be triggered. */
+        memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
+        rb->offset = align;
+      }
+    }
+    s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+    s->packet_length = 0;
+    /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
+  }
+
+  /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
+   * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into the
+   * buffer). */
+  if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && left > 0 && n > left) {
+    n = left;
+  }
+
+  /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
+  if (left >= n) {
+    s->packet_length += n;
+    rb->left = left - n;
+    rb->offset += n;
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  /* else we need to read more data */
+
+  len = s->packet_length;
+  pkt = rb->buf + align;
+  /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: |len| bytes already pointed
+   * to by |packet|, |left| extra ones at the end. */
+  if (s->packet != pkt) {
+    /* len > 0 */
+    memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
+    s->packet = pkt;
+    rb->offset = len + align;
+  }
+
+  assert(n <= (int)(rb->len - rb->offset));
+
+  if (!s->read_ahead) {
+    /* ignore max parameter */
+    max = n;
+  } else {
+    if (max < n) {
+      max = n;
+    }
+    if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) {
+      max = rb->len - rb->offset;
+    }
+  }
+
+  while (left < n) {
+    /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need to
+     * read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if possible). */
+    ERR_clear_system_error();
+    if (s->rbio != NULL) {
+      s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+      i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
+    } else {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_n, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
+      i = -1;
+    }
+
+    if (i <= 0) {
+      rb->left = left;
+      if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&
+          len + left == 0) {
+        ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+      }
+      return i;
+    }
+    left += i;
+    /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
+     * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to byte
+     * oriented as in the TLS case. */
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && n > left) {
+      n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
+  rb->offset += n;
+  rb->left = left - n;
+  s->packet_length += n;
+  s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+  return n;
+}
+
+/* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
+ * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
+ * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
+ * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
+/* Call this to get a new input record. It will return <= 0 if more data is
+ * needed, normally due to an error or non-blocking IO. When it finishes, one
+ * packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data    - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length  - number of bytes */
+/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
+static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) {
+  int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
+  int n, i, ret = -1;
+  SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+  uint8_t *p;
+  short version;
+  size_t extra;
+  unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
+
+  rr = &s->s3->rrec;
+
+  if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) {
+    extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+  } else {
+    extra = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
+    /* An application error: SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
+     * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+again:
+  /* check if we have the header */
+  if (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY ||
+      s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+    n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
+    if (n <= 0) {
+      return n; /* error or non-blocking */
+    }
+    s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+    p = s->packet;
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+
+    /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+    rr->type = *(p++);
+    ssl_major = *(p++);
+    ssl_minor = *(p++);
+    version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
+    n2s(p, rr->length);
+
+    if (s->s3->have_version && version != s->version) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+      if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) {
+        /* Send back error using their minor version number. */
+        s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+      }
+      al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+      al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+  }
+
+  /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+  if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+    /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+    i = rr->length;
+    n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
+    if (n <= 0) {
+      /* Error or non-blocking IO. Now |n| == |rr->length|, and
+       * |s->packet_length| == |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| + |rr->length|. */
+      return n;
+    }
+  }
+
+  s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+  /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, and
+   * we have that many bytes in s->packet. */
+  rr->input = &s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
+
+  /* ok, we can now read from |s->packet| data into |rr|. |rr->input| points at
+   * |rr->length| bytes, which need to be copied into |rr->data| by decryption.
+   * When the data is 'copied' into the |rr->data| buffer, |rr->input| will be
+   * pointed at the new buffer. */
+
+  /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
+   * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
+
+  /* check is not needed I believe */
+  if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
+    al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+  rr->data = rr->input;
+
+  if (!s->enc_method->enc(s, 0)) {
+    al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record,
+                      SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
+    al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  rr->off = 0;
+  /* So at this point the following is true:
+   * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record;
+   * ssl->s3->rrec.length is the number of bytes in the record;
+   * ssl->s3->rrec.off is the offset to first valid byte;
+   * ssl->s3->rrec.data is where to take bytes from (increment after use). */
+
+  /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+  s->packet_length = 0;
+
+  /* just read a 0 length packet */
+  if (rr->length == 0) {
+    empty_record_count++;
+    if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_record, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    goto again;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+
+f_err:
+  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Call this to write data in records of type |type|. It will return <= 0 if
+ * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) {
+  const uint8_t *buf = buf_;
+  unsigned int tot, n, nw;
+  int i;
+
+  s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+  assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
+  tot = s->s3->wnum;
+  s->s3->wnum = 0;
+
+  if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
+    i = s->handshake_func(s);
+    if (i < 0) {
+      return i;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out than
+   * the the original len from a write which didn't complete for non-blocking
+   * I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for this in
+   * ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be possible to
+   * end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then promptly send
+   * beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and report the error in
+   * a way the user will notice. */
+  if (len < 0 || (size_t)len < tot) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  n = (len - tot);
+  for (;;) {
+    /* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put into a
+     * record. */
+    unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment;
+    /* fragment is true if do_ssl3_write should send the first byte in its own
+     * record in order to randomise a CBC IV. */
+    int fragment = 0;
+
+    if (n > 1 && s->s3->need_record_splitting &&
+        type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && !s->s3->record_split_done) {
+      fragment = 1;
+      /* record_split_done records that the splitting has been done in case we
+       * hit an SSL_WANT_WRITE condition. In that case, we don't need to do the
+       * split again. */
+      s->s3->record_split_done = 1;
+    }
+
+    if (n > max) {
+      nw = max;
+    } else {
+      nw = n;
+    }
+
+    i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, fragment, 0);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+      s->s3->wnum = tot;
+      s->s3->record_split_done = 0;
+      return i;
+    }
+
+    if (i == (int)n || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+                        (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
+      /* next chunk of data should get another prepended, one-byte fragment in
+       * ciphersuites with known-IV weakness. */
+      s->s3->record_split_done = 0;
+      return tot + i;
+    }
+
+    n -= i;
+    tot += i;
+  }
+}
+
+/* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. If |fragment| is 1
+ * then it splits the record into a one byte record and a record with the rest
+ * of the data in order to randomise a CBC IV. If |is_fragment| is true then
+ * this call resulted from do_ssl3_write calling itself in order to create that
+ * one byte fragment. */
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len,
+                         char fragment, char is_fragment) {
+  uint8_t *p, *plen;
+  int i;
+  int prefix_len = 0;
+  int eivlen = 0;
+  long align = 0;
+  SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+  SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
+
+  /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This will
+   * happen with non blocking IO */
+  if (wb->left != 0) {
+    return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
+  }
+
+  /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+  if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+    i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+      return i;
+    }
+    /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+  }
+
+  if (wb->buf == NULL && !ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (len == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  wr = &s->s3->wrec;
+
+  if (fragment) {
+    /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
+     * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+    prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 1 /* length */, 0 /* fragment */,
+                               1 /* is_fragment */);
+    if (prefix_len <= 0) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (prefix_len >
+        (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
+      /* insufficient space */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, do_ssl3_write, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (is_fragment) {
+    /* The extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, and that will be a
+     * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD. So, if we want to align the real
+     * payload, we can just pretend that we have two headers and a byte. */
+    align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+    align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+    p = wb->buf + align;
+    wb->offset = align;
+  } else if (prefix_len) {
+    p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
+  } else {
+    align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+    p = wb->buf + align;
+    wb->offset = align;
+  }
+
+  /* write the header */
+
+  *(p++) = type & 0xff;
+  wr->type = type;
+
+  /* Some servers hang if initial ClientHello is larger than 256 bytes and
+   * record version number > TLS 1.0. */
+  if (!s->s3->have_version && s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+    *(p++) = TLS1_VERSION >> 8;
+    *(p++) = TLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
+  } else {
+    *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+    *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+  }
+
+  /* field where we are to write out packet length */
+  plen = p;
+  p += 2;
+
+  /* Leave room for the variable nonce for AEADs which specify it explicitly. */
+  if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL &&
+      s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record) {
+    eivlen = s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len;
+  }
+
+  /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+  wr->data = p + eivlen;
+  wr->length = (int)(len - (fragment != 0));
+  wr->input = (uint8_t *)buf + (fragment != 0);
+
+  /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */
+
+  memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
+  wr->input = wr->data;
+
+  /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from wr->input.
+   * Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
+
+  wr->input = p;
+  wr->data = p;
+  wr->length += eivlen;
+
+  if (!s->enc_method->enc(s, 1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* record length after mac and block padding */
+  s2n(wr->length, plen);
+
+  if (s->msg_callback) {
+    s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+  }
+
+  /* we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
+   * wr->length long. */
+  wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
+  wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+  if (is_fragment) {
+    /* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write out
+     * anything. */
+    return wr->length;
+  }
+
+  /* now let's set up wb */
+  wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
+
+  /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries
+   * later */
+  s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
+  s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
+  s->s3->wpend_type = type;
+  s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
+
+  /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+  return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
+
+err:
+  return -1;
+}
+
+/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len) {
+  int i;
+  SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
+
+  if (s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len ||
+      (s->s3->wpend_buf != buf &&
+       !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) ||
+      s->s3->wpend_type != type) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_pending, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    ERR_clear_system_error();
+    if (s->wbio != NULL) {
+      s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+      i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
+                    (unsigned int)wb->left);
+    } else {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_write_pending, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+      i = -1;
+    }
+    if (i == wb->left) {
+      wb->left = 0;
+      wb->offset += i;
+      if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+      }
+      s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+      return s->s3->wpend_ret;
+    } else if (i <= 0) {
+      if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
+           point in using a datagram service */
+        wb->left = 0;
+      }
+      return i;
+    }
+    wb->offset += i;
+    wb->left -= i;
+  }
+}
+
+/* ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec informs the record layer that a
+ * ChangeCipherSpec record is required at this point. If a Handshake record is
+ * received before ChangeCipherSpec, the connection will fail. Moreover, if
+ * there are unprocessed handshake bytes, the handshake will also fail and the
+ * function returns zero. Otherwise, the function returns one. */
+int ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) {
+  if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0 || s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec,
+                      SSL_R_UNPROCESSED_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
+ * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ *     Change cipher spec protocol
+ *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ *     Alert protocol
+ *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ *     Handshake protocol
+ *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ *     Application data protocol
+ *             none of our business
+ */
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) {
+  int al, i, j, ret;
+  unsigned int n;
+  SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
+  uint8_t alert_buffer[2];
+
+  if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL && !ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) ||
+      (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
+    /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+    uint8_t *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+    uint8_t *dst = buf;
+    unsigned int k;
+
+    /* peek == 0 */
+    n = 0;
+    while (len > 0 && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
+      *dst++ = *src++;
+      len--;
+      s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
+      n++;
+    }
+    /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+    for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) {
+      s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+    }
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
+
+  if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
+    /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+    i = s->handshake_func(s);
+    if (i < 0) {
+      return i;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+start:
+  s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+  /* s->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
+   * s->s3->rrec.data    - data
+   * s->s3->rrec.off     - offset into 'data' for next read
+   * s->s3->rrec.length  - number of bytes. */
+  rr = &s->s3->rrec;
+
+  /* get new packet if necessary */
+  if (rr->length == 0 || s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) {
+    ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+  if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+                                 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+      && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes,
+                      SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* If we are expecting a ChangeCipherSpec, it is illegal to receive a
+   * Handshake record. */
+  if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) {
+    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_RECORD_BEFORE_CCS);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
+   * 'peek' mode) */
+  if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+    rr->length = 0;
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (type == rr->type) {
+    /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
+    /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are doing a
+     * handshake for the first time */
+    if (SSL_in_init(s) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+        s->aead_read_ctx == NULL) {
+      /* TODO(davidben): Is this check redundant with the handshake_func
+       * check? */
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (len <= 0) {
+      return len;
+    }
+
+    if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) {
+      n = rr->length;
+    } else {
+      n = (unsigned int)len;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
+    if (!peek) {
+      rr->length -= n;
+      rr->off += n;
+      if (rr->length == 0) {
+        s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+        rr->off = 0;
+        if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) {
+          ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    return n;
+  }
+
+
+  /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
+   * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
+
+  /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill that so
+   * that we can process the data at a fixed place. */
+
+  if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+    const size_t size = sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment);
+    const size_t avail = size - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
+    const size_t todo = (rr->length < avail) ? rr->length : avail;
+    memcpy(s->s3->handshake_fragment + s->s3->handshake_fragment_len,
+           &rr->data[rr->off], todo);
+    rr->off += todo;
+    rr->length -= todo;
+    s->s3->handshake_fragment_len += todo;
+    if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < size) {
+      goto start; /* fragment was too small */
+    }
+  } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+    /* Note that this will still allow multiple alerts to be processed in the
+     * same record */
+    if (rr->length < sizeof(alert_buffer)) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    memcpy(alert_buffer, &rr->data[rr->off], sizeof(alert_buffer));
+    rr->off += sizeof(alert_buffer);
+    rr->length -= sizeof(alert_buffer);
+  }
+
+  /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+   * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
+
+  /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+  if (!s->server && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4 &&
+      s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST &&
+      s->session != NULL && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+    s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+    if (s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0 ||
+        s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0 ||
+        s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                      s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !s->s3->renegotiate) {
+      ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+      if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
+        i = s->handshake_func(s);
+        if (i < 0) {
+          return i;
+        }
+        if (i == 0) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+          return -1;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try again to
+     * obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
+    goto start;
+  }
+
+  if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+    const uint8_t alert_level = alert_buffer[0];
+    const uint8_t alert_descr = alert_buffer[1];
+
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_buffer, 2, s,
+                      s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->info_callback;
+    } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+    }
+
+    if (cb != NULL) {
+      j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+      cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+    }
+
+    if (alert_level == 1) {
+      /* warning */
+      s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+      if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+        s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested renegotiation and
+       * the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal alert because if
+       * application tried to renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
+       * expects it to succeed.
+       *
+       * In future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if the
+       * peer refused it where we carry on. */
+      else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+    } else if (alert_level == 2) {
+      /* fatal */
+      char tmp[16];
+
+      s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+      s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes,
+                        SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+      BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
+      ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
+      s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+      SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+      return 0;
+    } else {
+      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    goto start;
+  }
+
+  if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
+    /* but we have not received a shutdown */
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    rr->length = 0;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+    /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly what the
+     * record payload has to look like */
+    if (rr->length != 1 || rr->off != 0 || rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
+      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) {
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS;
+
+    rr->length = 0;
+
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s,
+                      s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+
+    s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
+    if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
+      goto err;
+    } else {
+      goto start;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
+  if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4 && !s->in_handshake) {
+    if ((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) {
+      s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+      s->renegotiate = 1;
+      s->new_session = 1;
+    }
+    i = s->handshake_func(s);
+    if (i < 0) {
+      return i;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    goto start;
+  }
+
+  switch (rr->type) {
+    default:
+      /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types. TLS v1.2 gives an
+       * unexpected message alert. */
+      if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+        rr->length = 0;
+        goto start;
+      }
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+      goto f_err;
+
+    case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+    case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+    case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+      /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
+       * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
+       * happen when type != rr->type */
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto f_err;
+
+    case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+      /* At this point we were expecting handshake data but have application
+       * data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() (i.e.
+       * |in_read_app_data| is set) and it makes sense to read application data
+       * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), we will indulge
+       * it. */
+      if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0 &&
+          (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
+            s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A &&
+            s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) ||
+           ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
+            s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A &&
+            s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A))) {
+        s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+        return -1;
+      } else {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+  }
+  /* not reached */
+
+f_err:
+  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) {
+  int i;
+
+  if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) {
+    i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+  } else {
+    i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
+  }
+
+  if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
+    if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
+      /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec,
+                        SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+    if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(s, i)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) {
+  /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
+  desc = s->enc_method->alert_value(desc);
+  if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
+    /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
+    desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+  }
+  if (desc < 0) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
+  if (level == 2 && s->session != NULL) {
+    SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+  }
+
+  s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+  s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
+  s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
+  if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) {
+    /* data is still being written out. */
+    return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+  }
+
+  /* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in the
+   * future */
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) {
+  int i, j;
+  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+
+  s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
+  i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0, 0);
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+  } else {
+    /* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now. If the message
+     * does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not worry too much. */
+    if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+      BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+    }
+
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s,
+                      s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->info_callback;
+    } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+    }
+
+    if (cb != NULL) {
+      j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
+      cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return i;
+}