Initial commit of BoringSSL for Android.

1 files changed, 1081 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/src/ssl/ssl_cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..624c41a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1081 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/directory.h"
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) {
+  static int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+  int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+  CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+  if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+    CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    got_write_lock = 1;
+
+    if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+      ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
+          0, "SSL for verify callback", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (got_write_lock) {
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+  } else {
+    CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+  }
+
+  return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) {
+  CERT *ret;
+
+  ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+  ret->key = &ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC];
+  return ret;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) {
+  CERT *ret;
+  int i;
+
+  ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+  ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+  /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
+   * more readable */
+
+  ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+  ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+
+  if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+    ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+    if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) {
+      BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+      if (!b) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+    }
+    if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) {
+      BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+      if (!b) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+    }
+  }
+  ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+
+  if (cert->ecdh_tmp) {
+    ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+    if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
+  ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
+    CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
+    if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
+      rpk->x509 = X509_up_ref(cpk->x509);
+    }
+
+    if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+      rpk->privatekey = EVP_PKEY_dup(cpk->privatekey);
+    }
+
+    if (cpk->chain) {
+      rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
+      if (!rpk->chain) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
+  ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+  ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+  /* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */
+
+  if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+    ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+    if (!ret->conf_sigalgs) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+    ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+  } else {
+    ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
+    ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
+    if (!ret->client_sigalgs) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgslen);
+    ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
+  } else {
+    ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
+  }
+  /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
+  ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+  /* Copy any custom client certificate types */
+  if (cert->client_certificate_types) {
+    ret->client_certificate_types = BUF_memdup(
+        cert->client_certificate_types, cert->num_client_certificate_types);
+    if (!ret->client_certificate_types) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ret->num_client_certificate_types = cert->num_client_certificate_types;
+  }
+
+  ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
+
+  ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+  ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+  if (cert->verify_store) {
+    CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+    ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+  }
+
+  if (cert->chain_store) {
+    CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+    ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
+  }
+
+  ret->ciphers_raw = NULL;
+
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  ssl_cert_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c) {
+  int i;
+  if (c == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+    if (cpk->x509) {
+      X509_free(cpk->x509);
+      cpk->x509 = NULL;
+    }
+    if (cpk->privatekey) {
+      EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+      cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+    }
+    if (cpk->chain) {
+      sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+      cpk->chain = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) {
+  if (c == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (c->dh_tmp) {
+    DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
+  }
+  if (c->ecdh_tmp) {
+    EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
+  }
+
+  ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+  if (c->peer_sigalgs) {
+    OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
+  }
+  if (c->conf_sigalgs) {
+    OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+  }
+  if (c->client_sigalgs) {
+    OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+  }
+  if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
+    OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+  }
+  if (c->client_certificate_types) {
+    OPENSSL_free(c->client_certificate_types);
+  }
+  if (c->verify_store) {
+    X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+  }
+  if (c->chain_store) {
+    X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
+  }
+  if (c->ciphers_raw) {
+    OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(c);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o) {
+  /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one (which cannot really happen, as
+   * it is initially created in SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually
+   * allows for that one being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it
+   * might turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm not sure
+   * that *all* of the existing code could cope with s->cert being NULL,
+   * otherwise we could do without the initialization in SSL_CTX_new). */
+
+  if (o == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_inst, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (*o == NULL) {
+    *o = ssl_cert_new();
+    if (*o == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) * chain) {
+  CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+  if (!cpk) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (cpk->chain) {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+  }
+  cpk->chain = chain;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) * chain) {
+  STACK_OF(X509) * dchain;
+  if (!chain) {
+    return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
+  }
+
+  dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
+  if (!dchain) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain)) {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) {
+  CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+  if (!cpk) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!cpk->chain) {
+    cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+  }
+  if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) {
+  if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  X509_up_ref(x);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) {
+  int i;
+  if (x == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+    if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == x) {
+      c->key = &c->pkeys[i];
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+    if (c->pkeys[i].x509 && !X509_cmp(c->pkeys[i].x509, x)) {
+      c->key = &c->pkeys[i];
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) {
+  c->cert_cb = cb;
+  c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void) {
+  SESS_CERT *ret;
+
+  ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_sess_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret);
+  ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc) {
+  int i;
+
+  if (sc == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (sc->cert_chain != NULL) {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+    if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
+      X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) {
+    DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+  }
+  if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
+    EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(sc);
+}
+
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type) {
+  sc->peer_cert_type = type;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) * sk) {
+  X509 *x;
+  int i;
+  X509_STORE *verify_store;
+  X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+
+  if (s->cert->verify_store) {
+    verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
+  } else {
+    verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+  }
+
+  if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_num(sk) == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+
+  /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by the
+   * context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or vice
+   * versa. */
+  X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+
+  /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+
+  if (s->verify_callback) {
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+  }
+
+  if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) {
+    i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+  } else {
+    i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+  }
+
+  s->verify_result = ctx.error;
+  X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+  return i;
+}
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * *ca_list,
+                               STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * name_list) {
+  if (*ca_list != NULL) {
+    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
+  }
+
+  *ca_list = name_list;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * sk) {
+  size_t i;
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * ret;
+  X509_NAME *name;
+
+  ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+    name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
+    if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+      sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * name_list) {
+  set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * name_list) {
+  set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->client_CA;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) {
+  if (s->server) {
+    if (s->client_CA != NULL) {
+      return s->client_CA;
+    } else {
+      return s->ctx->client_CA;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if ((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && s->s3 != NULL) {
+      return s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
+    } else {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * *sk, X509 *x) {
+  X509_NAME *name;
+
+  if (x == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (*sk == NULL) {
+    *sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+    if (*sk == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x));
+  if (name == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
+    X509_NAME_free(name);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) {
+  return add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  return add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x);
+}
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) {
+  return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+/* Load CA certs from a file into a STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
+ * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
+ * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
+ * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
+ *
+ * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
+ * \return a ::STACK containing the certs. */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) {
+  BIO *in;
+  X509 *x = NULL;
+  X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
+
+  sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
+  in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+  if (sk == NULL || in == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) {
+      break;
+    }
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+      ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+      if (ret == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+    xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+    if (xn == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* check for duplicates */
+    xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+    if (xn == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, NULL, xn)) {
+      X509_NAME_free(xn);
+    } else {
+      sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn);
+      sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (0) {
+  err:
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+      sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+    }
+    ret = NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (sk != NULL) {
+    sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
+  }
+  if (in != NULL) {
+    BIO_free(in);
+  }
+  if (x != NULL) {
+    X509_free(x);
+  }
+  if (ret != NULL) {
+    ERR_clear_error();
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Add a file of certs to a stack.
+ *
+ * \param stack the stack to add to.
+ * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
+ *     already in the stack will be added.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ *     certs may have been added to \c stack. */
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * stack,
+                                        const char *file) {
+  BIO *in;
+  X509 *x = NULL;
+  X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+  int ret = 1;
+  int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b);
+
+  oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
+  in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+  if (in == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack,
+                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) {
+      break;
+    }
+    xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+    if (xn == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+    if (xn == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, NULL, xn)) {
+      X509_NAME_free(xn);
+    } else {
+      sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
+    }
+  }
+
+  ERR_clear_error();
+
+  if (0) {
+  err:
+    ret = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in != NULL) {
+    BIO_free(in);
+  }
+  if (x != NULL) {
+    X509_free(x);
+  }
+
+  (void) sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Add a directory of certs to a stack.
+ *
+ * \param stack the stack to append to.
+ * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
+ *     examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
+ *     SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will
+ *     be included.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ *     certs may have been added to \c stack. */
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * stack,
+                                       const char *dir) {
+  OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+  const char *filename;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+
+  /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+  while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
+    char buf[1024];
+    int r;
+
+    if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof(buf)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack,
+                        SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+    if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf) ||
+        !SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (errno) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+    ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (d) {
+    OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
+  }
+  CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) {
+  int n;
+  uint8_t *p;
+
+  n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+  if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_to_buf, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  p = (uint8_t *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+  l2n3(n, p);
+  i2d_X509(x, &p);
+  *l += n + 3;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure. */
+int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) {
+  BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
+  int no_chain = 0;
+  size_t i;
+
+  X509 *x = NULL;
+  STACK_OF(X509) * extra_certs;
+  X509_STORE *chain_store;
+
+  if (cpk) {
+    x = cpk->x509;
+  }
+
+  if (s->cert->chain_store) {
+    chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
+  } else {
+    chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+  }
+
+  /* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. */
+  if (cpk && cpk->chain) {
+    extra_certs = cpk->chain;
+  } else {
+    extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+  }
+
+  if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) {
+    no_chain = 1;
+  }
+
+  /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert. */
+  if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (x != NULL) {
+    if (no_chain) {
+      if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+      if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+      /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+      ERR_clear_error();
+      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+        if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
+          X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+      X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
+    x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
+    if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
+int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags) {
+  CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+  X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
+  X509 *x;
+  int i, rv = 0;
+  unsigned long error;
+
+  if (!cpk->x509) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
+  if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
+    size_t j;
+    chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
+    if (!chain_store) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); j++) {
+      x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, j);
+      if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) {
+        error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+        if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+            ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+        ERR_clear_error();
+      }
+    }
+
+    /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
+    if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) {
+      error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+      if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+          ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (c->chain_store) {
+      chain_store = c->chain_store;
+    }
+
+    if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED) {
+      untrusted = cpk->chain;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+  if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
+    if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR) {
+      ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+    i = 1;
+    rv = 2;
+  }
+
+  if (i > 0) {
+    chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
+  }
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain,
+                      SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+    i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
+    ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+  if (cpk->chain) {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+  }
+
+  /* Remove EE certificate from chain */
+  x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
+  X509_free(x);
+  if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) {
+    if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
+      /* See if last cert is self signed */
+      x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+      X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+      if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) {
+        x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
+        X509_free(x);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  cpk->chain = chain;
+  if (rv == 0)
+    rv = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
+    X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
+  }
+
+  return rv;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) {
+  X509_STORE **pstore;
+  if (chain) {
+    pstore = &c->chain_store;
+  } else {
+    pstore = &c->verify_store;
+  }
+
+  if (*pstore) {
+    X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
+  }
+  *pstore = store;
+
+  if (ref && store) {
+    CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}