1 files changed, 26 insertions, 42 deletions

diff --git a/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_impl.c b/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_impl.c
index 6719758..b7e1fd8 100644
--- a/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_impl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_impl.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -122,14 +123,16 @@ static int sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 
   BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
-  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
-                              CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx)) {
+  if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                             (CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_p_lock, dsa->p,
+                             ctx) == NULL) {
     goto err;
   }
 
   /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
-  if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
+  if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k)) {
     goto err;
+  }
 
   /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
    * so we compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length.
@@ -137,11 +140,11 @@ static int sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
    * (This is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont()
    * does not let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) */
 
-  if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
+  if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q) && !BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) {
     goto err;
-  if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) {
-    if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
-      goto err;
   }
 
   K = &kq;
@@ -159,14 +162,10 @@ static int sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
     goto err;
   }
 
-  if (*kinvp != NULL) {
-    BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
-  }
+  BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
   *kinvp = kinv;
   kinv = NULL;
-  if (*rp != NULL) {
-    BN_clear_free(*rp);
-  }
+  BN_clear_free(*rp);
   *rp = r;
   ret = 1;
 
@@ -274,15 +273,10 @@ err:
     BN_free(r);
     BN_free(s);
   }
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  }
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
   BN_clear_free(&m);
   BN_clear_free(&xr);
-  if (kinv != NULL) {
-    /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
-    BN_clear_free(kinv);
-  }
+  BN_clear_free(kinv);
 
   return ret;
 }
@@ -363,12 +357,14 @@ static int verify(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *dgst, size_t digest_len,
   }
 
   mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
-                                CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx);
+                                (CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_p_lock,
+                                dsa->p, ctx);
   if (!mont) {
     goto err;
   }
 
-  if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) {
+  if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx,
+                        mont)) {
     goto err;
   }
 
@@ -387,9 +383,7 @@ err:
   if (ret != 1) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, verify, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
   }
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  }
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
   BN_free(&u1);
   BN_free(&u2);
   BN_free(&t1);
@@ -442,15 +436,13 @@ static int keygen(DSA *dsa) {
   ok = 1;
 
 err:
-  if (pub_key != NULL && dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
+  if (dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
     BN_free(pub_key);
   }
-  if (priv_key != NULL && dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
+  if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
     BN_free(priv_key);
   }
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  }
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 
   return ok;
 }
@@ -701,15 +693,9 @@ end:
 
 err:
   if (ok) {
-    if (ret->p) {
-      BN_free(ret->p);
-    }
-    if (ret->q) {
-      BN_free(ret->q);
-    }
-    if (ret->g) {
-      BN_free(ret->g);
-    }
+    BN_free(ret->p);
+    BN_free(ret->q);
+    BN_free(ret->g);
     ret->p = BN_dup(p);
     ret->q = BN_dup(q);
     ret->g = BN_dup(g);
@@ -730,9 +716,7 @@ err:
     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
   }
 
-  if (mont != NULL) {
-    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
-  }
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
 
   return ok;
 }