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Diffstat (limited to 'src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 1421 |
1 files changed, 1421 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60b9747 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -0,0 +1,1421 @@ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <assert.h> + +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/obj.h> +#include <openssl/sha.h> + +#include "ssl_locl.h" + + +struct handshake_digest { + long mask; + const EVP_MD *(*md_func)(void); +}; + +static const struct handshake_digest ssl_handshake_digests[SSL_MAX_DIGEST] = { + {SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5, EVP_md5}, + {SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA, EVP_sha1}, + {SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256, EVP_sha256}, + {SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384, EVP_sha384}, +}; + +#define CIPHER_ADD 1 +#define CIPHER_KILL 2 +#define CIPHER_DEL 3 +#define CIPHER_ORD 4 +#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5 + +typedef struct cipher_order_st { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; + int active; + int dead; + int in_group; + struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev; +} CIPHER_ORDER; + +static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = + { + {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in + ALL!) */ + {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0}, + + /* key exchange aliases + * (some of those using only a single bit here combine + * multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, + * e.g. kEDH combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) */ + {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* server authentication aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ + {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, 0, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* symmetric encryption aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* MAC aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* protocol version aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + + /* strength classes */ + {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, 0, 0, 0}, + /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */ + {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS, 0, 0, 0}, +}; + +int ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const EVP_AEAD **out_aead, + size_t *out_mac_secret_len, + size_t *out_fixed_iv_len, + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, uint16_t version) { + *out_aead = NULL; + *out_mac_secret_len = 0; + *out_fixed_iv_len = 0; + + switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) { + case SSL_AES128GCM: + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm(); + *out_fixed_iv_len = 4; + return 1; + + case SSL_AES256GCM: + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm(); + *out_fixed_iv_len = 4; + return 1; + + case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305: + *out_aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305(); + *out_fixed_iv_len = 0; + return 1; + + case SSL_RC4: + switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) { + case SSL_MD5: + if (version == SSL3_VERSION) { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_rc4_md5_ssl3(); + } else { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls(); + } + *out_mac_secret_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; + return 1; + case SSL_SHA1: + if (version == SSL3_VERSION) { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_ssl3(); + } else { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_tls(); + } + *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } + + case SSL_AES128: + switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) { + case SSL_SHA1: + if (version == SSL3_VERSION) { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3(); + *out_fixed_iv_len = 16; + } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(); + *out_fixed_iv_len = 16; + } else { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls(); + } + *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + return 1; + case SSL_SHA256: + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls(); + *out_mac_secret_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } + + case SSL_AES256: + switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) { + case SSL_SHA1: + if (version == SSL3_VERSION) { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3(); + *out_fixed_iv_len = 16; + } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(); + *out_fixed_iv_len = 16; + } else { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls(); + } + *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + return 1; + case SSL_SHA256: + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls(); + *out_mac_secret_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; + return 1; + case SSL_SHA384: + *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls(); + *out_mac_secret_len = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH; + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } + + case SSL_3DES: + switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) { + case SSL_SHA1: + if (version == SSL3_VERSION) { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3(); + *out_fixed_iv_len = 8; + } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(); + *out_fixed_iv_len = 8; + } else { + *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls(); + } + *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +int ssl_get_handshake_digest(size_t idx, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md) { + if (idx >= SSL_MAX_DIGEST) { + return 0; + } + *mask = ssl_handshake_digests[idx].mask; + *md = ssl_handshake_digests[idx].md_func(); + return 1; +} + +#define ITEM_SEP(a) \ + (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ',')) + +static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail) { + if (curr == *tail) { + return; + } + if (curr == *head) { + *head = curr->next; + } + if (curr->prev != NULL) { + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + } + if (curr->next != NULL) { + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + } + (*tail)->next = curr; + curr->prev = *tail; + curr->next = NULL; + *tail = curr; +} + +static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail) { + if (curr == *head) { + return; + } + if (curr == *tail) { + *tail = curr->prev; + } + if (curr->next != NULL) { + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + } + if (curr->prev != NULL) { + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + } + (*head)->prev = curr; + curr->next = *head; + curr->prev = NULL; + *head = curr; +} + +static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *ssl_method, + int num_of_ciphers, + CIPHER_ORDER *co_list, + CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) { + int i, co_list_num; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + + /* We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the method + * selected (SSLv2 and/or SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). These will later be sorted in a + * linked list with at most num entries. */ + + /* Get the initial list of ciphers */ + co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) { + c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i); + /* drop those that use any of that is not available */ + if (c != NULL && c->valid) { + co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c; + co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL; + co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL; + co_list[co_list_num].active = 0; + co_list[co_list_num].in_group = 0; + co_list_num++; + } + } + + /* Prepare linked list from list entries. */ + if (co_list_num > 0) { + co_list[0].prev = NULL; + + if (co_list_num > 1) { + co_list[0].next = &co_list[1]; + + for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) { + co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1]; + co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1]; + } + + co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2]; + } + + co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL; + + *head_p = &co_list[0]; + *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1]; + } +} + +static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, + int num_of_group_aliases, + CIPHER_ORDER *head) { + CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr; + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr; + int i; + + /* First, add the real ciphers as already collected. */ + ciph_curr = head; + ca_curr = ca_list; + while (ciph_curr != NULL) { + *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher; + ca_curr++; + ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next; + } + + /* Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. They + * represent either one or more algorithms, some of which in any affected + * category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), or represent a cipher + * strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) { + *ca_curr = cipher_aliases + i; + ca_curr++; + } + + *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */ +} + +static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule( + unsigned long cipher_id, unsigned long alg_mkey, unsigned long alg_auth, + unsigned long alg_enc, unsigned long alg_mac, unsigned long alg_ssl, + unsigned long algo_strength, int rule, int strength_bits, int in_group, + CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) { + CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last; + const SSL_CIPHER *cp; + int reverse = 0; + + if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { + /* needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers */ + reverse = 1; + } + + head = *head_p; + tail = *tail_p; + + if (reverse) { + next = tail; + last = head; + } else { + next = head; + last = tail; + } + + curr = NULL; + for (;;) { + if (curr == last) { + break; + } + + curr = next; + if (curr == NULL) { + break; + } + + next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next; + cp = curr->cipher; + + /* Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits + * or the algorithms used. */ + if (strength_bits >= 0) { + if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) { + continue; + } + } else { + if ((alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) || + (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) || + (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) || + (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) || + (alg_ssl && !(alg_ssl & cp->algorithm_ssl)) || + (algo_strength && !(algo_strength & cp->algo_strength))) { + continue; + } + } + + /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */ + if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (!curr->active) { + ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); + curr->active = 1; + curr->in_group = in_group; + } + } + + /* Move the added cipher to this location */ + else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (curr->active) { + ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); + curr->in_group = 0; + } + } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { + /* reverse == 1 */ + if (curr->active) { + /* most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions + * for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop + * works in reverse to maintain the order) */ + ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); + curr->active = 0; + curr->in_group = 0; + } + } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (head == curr) { + head = curr->next; + } else { + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + } + + if (tail == curr) { + tail = curr->prev; + } + curr->active = 0; + if (curr->next != NULL) { + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + } + if (curr->prev != NULL) { + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + } + curr->next = NULL; + curr->prev = NULL; + } + } + + *head_p = head; + *tail_p = tail; +} + +static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) { + int max_strength_bits, i, *number_uses; + CIPHER_ORDER *curr; + + /* This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting must + * keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting routine as + * '+' movement to the end of the list. */ + max_strength_bits = 0; + curr = *head_p; + while (curr != NULL) { + if (curr->active && curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits) { + max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits; + } + curr = curr->next; + } + + number_uses = OPENSSL_malloc((max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int)); + if (!number_uses) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_strength_sort, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memset(number_uses, 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int)); + + /* Now find the strength_bits values actually used. */ + curr = *head_p; + while (curr != NULL) { + if (curr->active) { + number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++; + } + curr = curr->next; + } + + /* Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending order. */ + for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) { + if (number_uses[i] > 0) { + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, 0, head_p, + tail_p); + } + } + + OPENSSL_free(number_uses); + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, + CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list) { + unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength; + const char *l, *buf; + int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen, in_group = 0, has_group = 0; + unsigned long cipher_id = 0; + char ch; + + retval = 1; + l = rule_str; + for (;;) { + ch = *l; + + if (ch == '\0') { + break; /* done */ + } + + if (in_group) { + if (ch == ']') { + if (!in_group) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_GROUP_CLOSE); + retval = found = in_group = 0; + break; + } + if (*tail_p) { + (*tail_p)->in_group = 0; + } + in_group = 0; + l++; + continue; + } + + if (ch == '|') { + rule = CIPHER_ADD; + l++; + continue; + } else if (!(ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') && !(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') && + !(ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP); + retval = found = in_group = 0; + break; + } else { + rule = CIPHER_ADD; + } + } else if (ch == '-') { + rule = CIPHER_DEL; + l++; + } else if (ch == '+') { + rule = CIPHER_ORD; + l++; + } else if (ch == '!') { + rule = CIPHER_KILL; + l++; + } else if (ch == '@') { + rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; + l++; + } else if (ch == '[') { + if (in_group) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr, SSL_R_NESTED_GROUP); + retval = found = in_group = 0; + break; + } + in_group = 1; + has_group = 1; + l++; + continue; + } else { + rule = CIPHER_ADD; + } + + /* If preference groups are enabled, the only legal operator is +. + * Otherwise the in_group bits will get mixed up. */ + if (has_group && rule != CIPHER_ADD) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr, + SSL_R_MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS); + retval = found = in_group = 0; + break; + } + + if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) { + l++; + continue; + } + + alg_mkey = 0; + alg_auth = 0; + alg_enc = 0; + alg_mac = 0; + alg_ssl = 0; + algo_strength = 0; + + for (;;) { + ch = *l; + buf = l; + buflen = 0; + while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) || + ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.')) { + ch = *(++l); + buflen++; + } + + if (buflen == 0) { + /* We hit something we cannot deal with, it is no command or separator + * nor alphanumeric, so we call this an error. */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + retval = found = in_group = 0; + l++; + break; + } + + if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { + found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */ + break; /* special treatment */ + } + + /* check for multi-part specification */ + if (ch == '+') { + multi = 1; + l++; + } else { + multi = 0; + } + + /* Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful with the + * strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation will make the rule "ADH:SOME" + * and the cipher "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. So + * additionally check whether the cipher name found has the correct + * length. We can save a strlen() call: just checking for the '\0' at the + * right place is sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot use + * strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) */ + j = found = 0; + cipher_id = 0; + while (ca_list[j]) { + if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) && + (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) { + found = 1; + break; + } else { + j++; + } + } + + if (!found) { + break; /* ignore this entry */ + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) { + if (alg_mkey) { + alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; + if (!alg_mkey) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) { + if (alg_auth) { + alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; + if (!alg_auth) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) { + if (alg_enc) { + alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; + if (!alg_enc) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) { + if (alg_mac) { + alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; + if (!alg_mac) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength) { + if (algo_strength) { + algo_strength &= ca_list[j]->algo_strength; + if (!algo_strength) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->valid) { + /* explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not become + * part of the search pattern! */ + cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id; + } else { + /* not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the protocol version + * is considered part of the search pattern. */ + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl) { + if (alg_ssl) { + alg_ssl &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl; + if (!alg_ssl) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + alg_ssl = ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl; + } + } + } + + if (!multi) { + break; + } + } + + /* Ok, we have the rule, now apply it. */ + if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { + /* special command */ + ok = 0; + if (buflen == 8 && !strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8)) { + ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p); + } else { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + } + + if (ok == 0) { + retval = 0; + } + + /* We do not support any "multi" options together with "@", so throw away + * the rest of the command, if any left, until end or ':' is found. */ + while (*l != '\0' && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) { + l++; + } + } else if (found) { + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, + alg_ssl, algo_strength, rule, -1, in_group, head_p, + tail_p); + } else { + while (*l != '\0' && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) { + l++; + } + } + } + + if (in_group) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + retval = 0; + } + + return retval; +} + +STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) * +ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *ssl_method, + struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st **cipher_list, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) * *cipher_list_by_id, + const char *rule_str, CERT *c) { + int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack = NULL, *tmp_cipher_list = NULL; + const char *rule_p; + CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr; + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL; + uint8_t *in_group_flags = NULL; + unsigned int num_in_group_flags = 0; + struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *pref_list = NULL; + + /* Return with error if nothing to do. */ + if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + /* Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled in ciphers. + * We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so it is used for + * allocation. */ + num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers(); + co_list = + (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers); + if (co_list == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_create_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, co_list, &head, &tail); + + /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference: + * TODO(davidben): Compute this order once and copy it. */ + + /* Everything else being equal, prefer ECDHE_ECDSA then ECDHE_RSA over other + * key exchange mechanisms */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, + 0, &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, 0, &head, + &tail); + + /* Order the bulk ciphers. First the preferred AEAD ciphers. We prefer + * CHACHA20 unless there is hardware support for fast and constant-time + * AES_GCM. */ + if (EVP_has_aes_hardware()) { + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, + &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, + &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, + -1, 0, &head, &tail); + } else { + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, + -1, 0, &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, + &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, + &head, &tail); + } + + /* Then the legacy non-AEAD ciphers: AES_256_CBC, AES-128_CBC, RC4_128_SHA, + * RC4_128_MD5, 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, ~SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, + &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, + &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head, + &tail); + + /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head, &tail); + + /* Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end. */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~(SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, + -1, 0, &head, &tail); + + /* Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain disabled. + * (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but we prefer + * authenticated ciphers.) + * TODO(davidben): Remove them altogether? */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, 0, &head, + &tail); + + /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, 0, &head, &tail); + + /* We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. There + * might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names of ciphers + * themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. For 1) we need the available + * ciphers and for 2) the cipher groups of cipher_aliases added together in + * one list (otherwise we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases + * table). */ + num_of_group_aliases = sizeof(cipher_aliases) / sizeof(SSL_CIPHER); + num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1; + ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER *) * num_of_alias_max); + if (ca_list == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_create_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, head); + + /* If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule before + * using the (possibly available) additional rules. */ + ok = 1; + rule_p = rule_str; + if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) { + ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head, &tail, + ca_list); + rule_p += 7; + if (*rule_p == ':') { + rule_p++; + } + } + + if (ok && strlen(rule_p) > 0) { + ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list); + } + + OPENSSL_free((void *)ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ + + if (!ok) { + goto err; + } + + /* Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error + * if we cannot get one. */ + cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); + if (cipherstack == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(num_of_ciphers); + if (!in_group_flags) { + goto err; + } + + /* The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added + * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). */ + for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) { + if (curr->active) { + if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) { + goto err; + } + in_group_flags[num_in_group_flags++] = curr->in_group; + } + } + OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */ + co_list = NULL; + + tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack); + if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) { + goto err; + } + pref_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st)); + if (!pref_list) { + goto err; + } + pref_list->ciphers = cipherstack; + pref_list->in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(num_in_group_flags); + if (!pref_list->in_group_flags) { + goto err; + } + memcpy(pref_list->in_group_flags, in_group_flags, num_in_group_flags); + OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags); + in_group_flags = NULL; + if (*cipher_list != NULL) { + ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(*cipher_list); + } + *cipher_list = pref_list; + pref_list = NULL; + + if (cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { + if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); + } + *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; + tmp_cipher_list = NULL; + (void) sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); + + sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); + } else { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(tmp_cipher_list); + tmp_cipher_list = NULL; + } + + return cipherstack; + +err: + if (co_list) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + } + if (in_group_flags) { + OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags); + } + if (cipherstack) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); + } + if (tmp_cipher_list) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(tmp_cipher_list); + } + if (pref_list && pref_list->in_group_flags) { + OPENSSL_free(pref_list->in_group_flags); + } + if (pref_list) { + OPENSSL_free(pref_list); + } + return NULL; +} + +const char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, + int len) { + const char *ver; + const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; + unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl; + static const char *format = "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n"; + + alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth; + alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc; + alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac; + alg_ssl = cipher->algorithm_ssl; + + if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3) { + ver = "SSLv3"; + } else if (alg_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) { + ver = "TLSv1.2"; + } else { + ver = "unknown"; + } + + switch (alg_mkey) { + case SSL_kRSA: + kx = "RSA"; + break; + + case SSL_kEDH: + kx = "DH"; + break; + + case SSL_kEECDH: + kx = "ECDH"; + break; + + case SSL_kPSK: + kx = "PSK"; + break; + + default: + kx = "unknown"; + } + + switch (alg_auth) { + case SSL_aRSA: + au = "RSA"; + break; + + case SSL_aNULL: + au = "None"; + break; + + case SSL_aECDSA: + au = "ECDSA"; + break; + + case SSL_aPSK: + au = "PSK"; + break; + + default: + au = "unknown"; + break; + } + + switch (alg_enc) { + case SSL_3DES: + enc = "3DES(168)"; + break; + + case SSL_RC4: + enc = "RC4(128)"; + break; + + case SSL_AES128: + enc = "AES(128)"; + break; + + case SSL_AES256: + enc = "AES(256)"; + break; + + case SSL_AES128GCM: + enc = "AESGCM(128)"; + break; + + case SSL_AES256GCM: + enc = "AESGCM(256)"; + break; + + case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305: + enc = "ChaCha20-Poly1305"; + break; + + default: + enc = "unknown"; + break; + } + + switch (alg_mac) { + case SSL_MD5: + mac = "MD5"; + break; + + case SSL_SHA1: + mac = "SHA1"; + break; + + case SSL_SHA256: + mac = "SHA256"; + break; + + case SSL_SHA384: + mac = "SHA384"; + break; + + case SSL_AEAD: + mac = "AEAD"; + break; + + default: + mac = "unknown"; + break; + } + + if (buf == NULL) { + len = 128; + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if (buf == NULL) + return "OPENSSL_malloc Error"; + } else if (len < 128) { + return "Buffer too small"; + } + + BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac); + return buf; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_is_AES(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { + return (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_AES) != 0; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_has_MD5_HMAC(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { + return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5) != 0; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_is_AESGCM(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { + return (c->algorithm_mac & (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)) != 0; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_is_CHACHA20POLY1305(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { + return (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) != 0; +} + +const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { + int i; + + if (c == NULL) { + return "(NONE)"; + } + + i = (int)(c->id >> 24L); + if (i == 3) { + return "TLSv1/SSLv3"; + } else if (i == 2) { + return "SSLv2"; + } else { + return "unknown"; + } +} + +/* return the actual cipher being used */ +const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { + if (c != NULL) { + return c->name; + } + + return "(NONE)"; +} + +const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { + if (cipher == NULL) { + return ""; + } + + switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) { + case SSL_kRSA: + return SSL_TXT_RSA; + + case SSL_kEDH: + switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) { + case SSL_aRSA: + return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA; + case SSL_aNULL: + return SSL_TXT_DH "_anon"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN"; + } + + case SSL_kEECDH: + switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) { + case SSL_aECDSA: + return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA; + case SSL_aRSA: + return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA; + case SSL_aNULL: + return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_anon"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN"; + } + + default: + return "UNKNOWN"; + } +} + +/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ +int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) { + int ret = 0; + + if (c != NULL) { + if (alg_bits != NULL) { + *alg_bits = c->alg_bits; + } + ret = c->strength_bits; + } + + return ret; +} + +unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { return c->id; } + +void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; } + +int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm) { return 1; } + +const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp) { return NULL; } + +/* For a cipher return the index corresponding to the certificate type */ +int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { + unsigned long alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; + + if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { + return SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { + return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + } + + return -1; +} + +/* ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key returns 1 if |cipher| involves a server + * public key in the key exchange, sent in a server Certificate message. + * Otherwise it returns 0. */ +int ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { + /* Anonymous ciphers do not include a server certificate. */ + if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* Neither do PSK ciphers, except for RSA_PSK. */ + if ((cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) && + !(cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)) { + return 0; + } + + /* All other ciphers include it. */ + return 1; +} + +/* ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange returns 1 if |cipher| requires a + * ServerKeyExchange message. Otherwise it returns 0. + * + * Unlike ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key, some ciphers take optional + * ServerKeyExchanges. PSK and RSA_PSK only use the ServerKeyExchange to + * communicate a psk_identity_hint, so it is optional. */ +int ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { + /* Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchanges require a ServerKeyExchange. */ + if (cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEDH || cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) { + return 1; + } + + /* It is optional in all others. */ + return 0; +} |