diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/ssl/ssl_sess.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ssl/ssl_sess.c | 878 |
1 files changed, 878 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/src/ssl/ssl_sess.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ab4585 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -0,0 +1,878 @@ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/lhash.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> + +#include "internal.h" +#include "../crypto/internal.h" + + +/* The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by + * SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate + * that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information. */ +static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0; + +static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; + +static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); +static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); +static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) { + return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic; +} + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) +{ + /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ + return ssl->session; +} + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) { + /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ + return SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session); +} + +int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { + int index; + if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, new_func, + dup_func, free_func)) { + return -1; + } + return index; +} + +int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) { + return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); +} + +void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) { + return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); +} + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) { + SSL_SESSION *ss; + + ss = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + if (ss == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + + ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ + ss->references = 1; + ss->timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; + ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ss, &ss->ex_data); + return ss; +} + +const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) { + if (len) { + *len = s->session_id_length; + } + return s->session_id; +} + +/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. + * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random + * gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one + * iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it + * takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a + * reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone + * is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our + * server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting + * question ... */ +static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *id, + unsigned int *id_len) { + static const unsigned kMaxAttempts = 10; + unsigned int retry = 0; + do { + if (!RAND_bytes(id, *id_len)) { + return 0; + } + } while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && + (++retry < kMaxAttempts)); + + if (retry < kMaxAttempts) { + return 1; + } + + /* else - woops a session_id match */ + /* XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of a + * collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent creation + * of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have means to + * atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make a + * reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the internal + * cache as well). */ + return 0; +} + +int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) { + /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ + + unsigned int tmp; + SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL; + GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; + + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, + SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); + return 0; + } + + ss = SSL_SESSION_new(); + if (ss == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* If the context has a default timeout, use it over the default. */ + if (s->initial_ctx->session_timeout != 0) { + ss->timeout = s->initial_ctx->session_timeout; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = NULL; + + if (session) { + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_VERSION || + s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION || + s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) { + ss->ssl_version = s->version; + ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } else { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + + /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + ss->session_id_length = 0; + goto sess_id_done; + } + + /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ + if (s->generate_session_id) { + cb = s->generate_session_id; + } else if (s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id) { + cb = s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id; + } + + /* Choose a session ID */ + tmp = ss->session_id_length; + if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) { + /* The callback failed */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + + /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor set it + * higher than it was. */ + if (!tmp || tmp > ss->session_id_length) { + /* The callback set an illegal length */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + + ss->session_id_length = tmp; + /* Finally, check for a conflict */ + if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, ss->session_id_length)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + + sess_id_done: + if (s->tlsext_hostname) { + ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + } + } else { + ss->session_id_length = 0; + } + + if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + + memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); + ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; + s->session = ss; + ss->ssl_version = s->version; + ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; + + return 1; +} + +/* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this + * connection. It is only called by servers. + * + * ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a + * shallow parse of the ClientHello. + * + * Returns: + * -1: error + * 0: a session may have been found. + * + * Side effects: + * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an + * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session. + * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1 + * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise). */ +int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) { + /* This is used only by servers. */ + SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; + int fatal = 0; + int try_session_cache = 1; + int r; + + if (ctx->session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { + goto err; + } + + if (ctx->session_id_len == 0) { + try_session_cache = 0; + } + + r = tls1_process_ticket(s, ctx, &ret); /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */ + switch (r) { + case -1: /* Error during processing */ + fatal = 1; + goto err; + + case 0: /* No ticket found */ + case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */ + break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */ + + case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */ + case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */ + try_session_cache = 0; + break; + + default: + abort(); + } + + if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL && + !(s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode & + SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) { + SSL_SESSION data; + data.ssl_version = s->version; + data.session_id_length = ctx->session_id_len; + if (ctx->session_id_len == 0) { + return 0; + } + memcpy(data.session_id, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len); + + CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&s->initial_ctx->lock); + ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->initial_ctx->sessions, &data); + CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&s->initial_ctx->lock); + + if (ret != NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); + } + } + + if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL && + s->initial_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) { + int copy = 1; + + ret = s->initial_ctx->get_session_cb(s, (uint8_t *)ctx->session_id, + ctx->session_id_len, ©); + if (ret != NULL) { + if (ret == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) { + /* This is a magic value which indicates that the callback needs to + * unwind the stack and figure out the session asynchronously. */ + return PENDING_SESSION; + } + + /* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so + * (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are + * shared between threads, it must handle the reference count itself + * [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be thread-safe). */ + if (copy) { + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); + } + + /* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as well if and + * only if we are supposed to. */ + if (!(s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode & + SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) { + /* The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are very + * strange */ + SSL_CTX_add_session(s->initial_ctx, ret); + } + } + } + + if (ret == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */ + + if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length || + memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) { + /* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to use it + * in this context. */ + goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ + } + + if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) { + /* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, which is + * especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application should have + * used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. + * + * For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating the event + * like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to + * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone + * noticing). */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_prev_session, + SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } + + if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { + /* timeout */ + if (try_session_cache) { + /* session was from the cache, so remove it */ + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->initial_ctx, ret); + } + goto err; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = ret; + s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; + return 1; + +err: + if (ret != NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_free(ret); + if (!try_session_cache) { + /* The session was from a ticket, so we should + * issue a ticket for the new session */ + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + } + } + if (fatal) { + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) { + int ret = 0; + SSL_SESSION *s; + + /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though it + * has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and an + * lhash */ + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c); + /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */ + + CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); + if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &s, c)) { + CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); + return 0; + } + + /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this case, s + * == c should hold (then we did not really modify ctx->sessions), or we're + * in trouble. */ + if (s != NULL && s != c) { + /* We *are* in trouble ... */ + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); + SSL_SESSION_free(s); + /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot + * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the same + * cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain the + * same session from an external cache) */ + s = NULL; + } + + /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */ + if (s == NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c); + } + + if (s != NULL) { + /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference count + * because it already takes into account the cache */ + SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ + ret = 0; + } else { + /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */ + ret = 1; + + if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) { + while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) { + if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) { + break; + } + } + } + } + + CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); + return ret; +} + +int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) { + return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1); +} + +static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lock) { + SSL_SESSION *r; + int ret = 0; + + if (c != NULL && c->session_id_length != 0) { + if (lock) { + CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); + } + r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c); + if (r == c) { + ret = 1; + r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c); + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c); + } + + if (lock) { + CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); + } + + if (ret) { + r->not_resumable = 1; + if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) { + ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r); + } + SSL_SESSION_free(r); + } + } + + return ret; +} + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) { + if (session) { + CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&session->references); + } + return session; +} + +void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) { + if (session == NULL || + !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&session->references)) { + return; + } + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, session, &session->ex_data); + + OPENSSL_cleanse(session->master_key, sizeof(session->master_key)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(session->session_id, sizeof(session->session_id)); + ssl_sess_cert_free(session->sess_cert); + X509_free(session->peer); + OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_hostname); + OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_tick); + OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list); + OPENSSL_free(session->ocsp_response); + OPENSSL_free(session->psk_identity); + OPENSSL_cleanse(session, sizeof(*session)); + OPENSSL_free(session); +} + +int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) { + if (s->session == session) { + return 1; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = session; + if (session != NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session); + s->verify_result = session->verify_result; + } + + return 1; +} + +long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) { + if (s == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + s->timeout = t; + return 1; +} + +long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) { + if (s == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return s->timeout; +} + +long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) { + if (s == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return s->time; +} + +long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) { + if (s == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + s->time = t; + return t; +} + +X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->peer; } + +int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, + unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { + if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + + s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; + memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); + + return 1; +} + +long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) { + long l; + if (s == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + l = s->session_timeout; + s->session_timeout = t; + return l; +} + +long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) { + if (s == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return s->session_timeout; +} + +typedef struct timeout_param_st { + SSL_CTX *ctx; + long time; + LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache; +} TIMEOUT_PARAM; + +static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *sess, void *void_param) { + TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = void_param; + + if (param->time == 0 || + param->time > (sess->time + sess->timeout)) { + /* timeout */ + /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to + * save on locking overhead */ + (void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, sess); + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, sess); + sess->not_resumable = 1; + if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) { + param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, sess); + } + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + } +} + +void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t) { + TIMEOUT_PARAM tp; + + tp.ctx = ctx; + tp.cache = ctx->sessions; + if (tp.cache == NULL) { + return; + } + tp.time = t; + CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); + lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp); + CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); +} + +int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) { + if (s->session != NULL && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) && + !SSL_in_init(s)) { + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */ +static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) { + if (s->next == NULL || s->prev == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) { + /* last element in list */ + if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) { + /* only one element in list */ + ctx->session_cache_head = NULL; + ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL; + } else { + ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev; + s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); + } + } else { + if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) { + /* first element in list */ + ctx->session_cache_head = s->next; + s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); + } else { /* middle of list */ + s->next->prev = s->prev; + s->prev->next = s->next; + } + } + s->prev = s->next = NULL; +} + +static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) { + if (s->next != NULL && s->prev != NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); + } + + if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) { + ctx->session_cache_head = s; + ctx->session_cache_tail = s; + s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); + s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); + } else { + s->next = ctx->session_cache_head; + s->next->prev = s; + s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); + ctx->session_cache_head = s; + } +} + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) { + ctx->new_session_cb = cb; +} + +int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) { + return ctx->new_session_cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)) { + ctx->remove_session_cb = cb; +} + +void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx, + SSL_SESSION *sess) { + return ctx->remove_session_cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, + uint8_t *data, int len, + int *copy)) { + ctx->get_session_cb = cb; +} + +SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *data, + int len, int *copy) { + return ctx->get_session_cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { + ctx->info_callback = cb; +} + +void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type, + int val) { + return ctx->info_callback; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, + EVP_PKEY **pkey)) { + ctx->client_cert_cb = cb; +} + +int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, + EVP_PKEY **pkey) { + return ctx->client_cert_cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) { + ctx->channel_id_cb = cb; +} + +void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { + return ctx->channel_id_cb; +} + +IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) |