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-rw-r--r--src/crypto/err/ssl.errordata7
-rw-r--r--src/crypto/evp/p_dsa_asn1.c22
-rw-r--r--src/crypto/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl52
-rw-r--r--src/crypto/rand/hwrand.c30
-rw-r--r--src/crypto/rand/internal.h5
-rw-r--r--src/crypto/rand/rand.c5
-rw-r--r--src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c54
-rw-r--r--src/include/openssl/ssl.h45
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/internal.h18
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/s3_clnt.c74
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c129
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/ssl_cert.c51
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/ssl_lib.c14
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/ssl_test.cc35
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/t1_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--src/ssl/test/bssl_shim.cc14
16 files changed, 399 insertions, 158 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/err/ssl.errordata b/src/crypto/err/ssl.errordata
index 4ae0a51..9464c3d 100644
--- a/src/crypto/err/ssl.errordata
+++ b/src/crypto/err/ssl.errordata
@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ SSL,function,112,SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1
SSL,function,113,SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file
SSL,function,114,SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file
SSL,function,115,SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint
+SSL,function,280,SSL_SESSION_from_bytes
SSL,function,116,SSL_SESSION_new
+SSL,function,281,SSL_SESSION_parse
+SSL,function,150,SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string
+SSL,function,151,SSL_SESSION_parse_string
SSL,function,117,SSL_SESSION_print_fp
SSL,function,118,SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context
SSL,function,119,SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full
@@ -58,8 +62,6 @@ SSL,function,146,SSL_use_certificate_file
SSL,function,147,SSL_use_psk_identity_hint
SSL,function,148,SSL_write
SSL,function,149,d2i_SSL_SESSION
-SSL,function,150,d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_octet_string
-SSL,function,151,d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_string
SSL,function,152,do_ssl3_write
SSL,function,153,dtls1_accept
SSL,function,154,dtls1_buffer_record
@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@ SSL,function,166,i2d_SSL_SESSION
SSL,function,167,ssl3_accept
SSL,function,169,ssl3_cert_verify_hash
SSL,function,170,ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm
+SSL,function,282,ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher
SSL,function,171,ssl3_connect
SSL,function,172,ssl3_ctrl
SSL,function,173,ssl3_ctx_ctrl
diff --git a/src/crypto/evp/p_dsa_asn1.c b/src/crypto/evp/p_dsa_asn1.c
index 0ac7da7..826d4e4 100644
--- a/src/crypto/evp/p_dsa_asn1.c
+++ b/src/crypto/evp/p_dsa_asn1.c
@@ -129,21 +129,37 @@ err:
static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
DSA *dsa;
- void *pval = NULL;
+ ASN1_STRING *pval = NULL;
uint8_t *penc = NULL;
int penclen;
dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
dsa->write_params = 0;
- penclen = i2d_DSAPublicKey(dsa, &penc);
+ int ptype;
+ if (dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
+ pval = ASN1_STRING_new();
+ if (!pval) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, dsa_pub_encode, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pval->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &pval->data);
+ if (pval->length <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, dsa_pub_encode, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+ } else {
+ ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
+ }
+ penclen = i2d_DSAPublicKey(dsa, &penc);
if (penclen <= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, dsa_pub_encode, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA), V_ASN1_UNDEF, pval,
+ if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA), ptype, pval,
penc, penclen)) {
return 1;
}
diff --git a/src/crypto/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl b/src/crypto/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl
index a917611..c32a55c 100644
--- a/src/crypto/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl
+++ b/src/crypto/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
#!/usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+# SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+# OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+# CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
$flavour = shift;
$output = shift;
if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
@@ -14,11 +28,47 @@ open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
print<<___;
.text
+# CRYPTO_rdrand writes eight bytes of random data from the hardware RNG to
+# |out|. It returns one on success or zero on hardware failure.
+# int CRYPTO_rdrand(uint8_t out[8]);
.globl CRYPTO_rdrand
.type CRYPTO_rdrand,\@function,1
.align 16
CRYPTO_rdrand:
- .byte 0x48, 0x0f, 0xc7, 0xf0
+ xorq %rax, %rax
+ # This is rdrand %rcx. It sets rcx to a random value and sets the carry
+ # flag on success.
+ .byte 0x48, 0x0f, 0xc7, 0xf1
+ # An add-with-carry of zero effectively sets %rax to the carry flag.
+ adcq %rax, %rax
+ movq %rcx, 0(%rdi)
+ retq
+
+# CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf fills |len| bytes at |buf| with random data from
+# the hardware RNG. The |len| argument must be a multiple of eight. It returns
+# one on success and zero on hardware failure.
+# int CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
+.globl CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf
+.type CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf,\@function,2
+.align 16
+CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf:
+ test %rsi, %rsi
+ jz .Lout
+ movq \$8, %rdx
+.Lloop:
+ # This is rdrand %rcx. It sets rcx to a random value and sets the carry
+ # flag on success.
+ .byte 0x48, 0x0f, 0xc7, 0xf1
+ jnc .Lerr
+ movq %rcx, 0(%rdi)
+ addq %rdx, %rdi
+ subq %rdx, %rsi
+ jnz .Lloop
+.Lout:
+ movq \$1, %rax
+ retq
+.Lerr:
+ xorq %rax, %rax
retq
___
diff --git a/src/crypto/rand/hwrand.c b/src/crypto/rand/hwrand.c
index 73d3de7..5f81f09 100644
--- a/src/crypto/rand/hwrand.c
+++ b/src/crypto/rand/hwrand.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -26,21 +27,28 @@ int CRYPTO_have_hwrand(void) {
return (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1u << 30)) != 0;
}
-/* CRYPTO_rdrand is defined in asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl */
-extern uint64_t CRYPTO_rdrand(void);
+/* These functions are defined in asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl */
+extern int CRYPTO_rdrand(uint8_t out[8]);
+extern int CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
-void CRYPTO_hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
- while (len >= 8) {
- uint64_t rand = CRYPTO_rdrand();
- memcpy(buf, &rand, sizeof(rand));
- len -= sizeof(rand);
- buf += sizeof(rand);
+int CRYPTO_hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
+ const size_t len_multiple8 = len & ~7;
+ if (!CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(buf, len_multiple8)) {
+ return 0;
}
+ len -= len_multiple8;
+
+ if (len != 0) {
+ assert(len < 8);
- if (len > 0) {
- uint64_t rand = CRYPTO_rdrand();
- memcpy(buf, &rand, len);
+ uint8_t rand_buf[8];
+ if (!CRYPTO_rdrand(rand_buf)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf + len_multiple8, rand_buf, len);
}
+
+ return 1;
}
#else
diff --git a/src/crypto/rand/internal.h b/src/crypto/rand/internal.h
index 1cca7f3..5e6ea11 100644
--- a/src/crypto/rand/internal.h
+++ b/src/crypto/rand/internal.h
@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
int CRYPTO_have_hwrand(void);
/* CRYPTO_hwrand fills |len| bytes at |buf| with entropy from the hardware.
- * This function can only be called if |CRYPTO_have_hwrand| returns one. */
-void CRYPTO_hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
+ * This function can only be called if |CRYPTO_have_hwrand| returns one.
+ * It returns one on success or zero on hardware failure. */
+int CRYPTO_hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
diff --git a/src/crypto/rand/rand.c b/src/crypto/rand/rand.c
index a647b6a..a96ac48 100644
--- a/src/crypto/rand/rand.c
+++ b/src/crypto/rand/rand.c
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ int RAND_bytes(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
return 1;
}
- if (!CRYPTO_have_hwrand()) {
+ if (!CRYPTO_have_hwrand() ||
+ !CRYPTO_hwrand(buf, len)) {
/* Without a hardware RNG to save us from address-space duplication, the OS
* entropy is used directly. */
CRYPTO_sysrand(buf, len);
@@ -108,8 +109,6 @@ int RAND_bytes(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
state->partial_block_used = sizeof(state->partial_block);
}
- CRYPTO_hwrand(buf, len);
-
if (len >= sizeof(state->partial_block)) {
size_t remaining = len;
while (remaining > 0) {
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 2ba9c84..f53f279 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1829,49 +1829,89 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
ASN1_TIME atm;
long offset;
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
- int i,j;
+ int i, j, remaining;
p=buff1;
- i=ctm->length;
+ remaining = ctm->length;
str=(char *)ctm->data;
+ /* Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in
+ * the time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is
+ * fixed:
+ * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
- if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
+ /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ return 0;
memcpy(p,str,10);
p+=10;
str+=10;
+ remaining -= 10;
}
else
{
- if (i < 13) return 0;
+ /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ return 0;
memcpy(p,str,12);
p+=12;
str+=12;
+ remaining -= 12;
}
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
else
{
+ /* SS (seconds) */
+ if (remaining < 2)
+ return 0;
*(p++)= *(str++);
*(p++)= *(str++);
- /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
- if (*str == '.')
+ remaining -= 2;
+ /* Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
+ * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
+ * Can we just kill them altogether? */
+ if (remaining && *str == '.')
{
str++;
- while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
+ remaining--;
+ for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--)
+ {
+ if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
+ break;
+ }
}
}
*(p++)='Z';
*(p++)='\0';
+ /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
+ if (!remaining)
+ return 0;
if (*str == 'Z')
+ {
+ if (remaining != 1)
+ return 0;
offset=0;
+ }
else
{
+ /* (+-)HHMM */
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
return 0;
+ /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
+ if (remaining != 5)
+ return 0;
+ if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
+ str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
+ return 0;
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
if (*str == '-')
diff --git a/src/include/openssl/ssl.h b/src/include/openssl/ssl.h
index 217dbaf..2735e15 100644
--- a/src/include/openssl/ssl.h
+++ b/src/include/openssl/ssl.h
@@ -517,6 +517,10 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out);
+/* SSL_initial_handshake_complete returns one if the initial handshake has
+ * completed and zero otherwise. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_initial_handshake_complete(const SSL *ssl);
+
/* Underdocumented functions.
*
@@ -646,7 +650,12 @@ struct ssl_session_st {
* disable session caching and tickets. */
int not_resumable;
- /* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */
+ /* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection
+ *
+ * TODO(davidben): Remove this field. It is not serialized as part of the
+ * session, but some APIs access it. Certificate-related fields, where not
+ * redundant with |peer|, should be added to the session. Others should
+ * probably not be retained across resumptions. */
struct sess_cert_st /* SESS_CERT */ *sess_cert;
/* This is the cert for the other end. On clients, it will be the same as
@@ -1963,31 +1972,34 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl,
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
size_t *out_len);
-/* SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket serializes |in|, but excludes the session ID
- * which is not necessary in a session ticket. */
+/* SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket serializes |in|, but excludes the session
+ * identification information, namely the session ID and ticket. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(SSL_SESSION *in,
uint8_t **out_data,
size_t *out_len);
+/* SSL_SESSION_from_bytes parses |in_len| bytes from |in| as an SSL_SESSION. It
+ * returns a newly-allocated |SSL_SESSION| on success or NULL on error. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t in_len);
+
/* Deprecated: i2d_SSL_SESSION serializes |in| to the bytes pointed to by
* |*pp|. On success, it returns the number of bytes written and advances |*pp|
* by that many bytes. On failure, it returns -1. If |pp| is NULL, no bytes are
* written and only the length is returned.
*
- * Use SSL_SESSION_to_bytes instead. */
+ * Use |SSL_SESSION_to_bytes| instead. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **pp);
-/* d2i_SSL_SESSION deserializes a serialized buffer contained in the |length|
- * bytes pointed to by |*pp|. It returns the new SSL_SESSION and advances |*pp|
- * by the number of bytes consumed on success and NULL on failure. If |a| is
- * NULL, the caller takes ownership of the new session and must call
- * |SSL_SESSION_free| when done.
+/* Deprecated: d2i_SSL_SESSION parses a serialized session from the |length|
+ * bytes pointed to by |*pp|. It returns the new |SSL_SESSION| and advances
+ * |*pp| by the number of bytes consumed on success and NULL on failure. The
+ * caller takes ownership of the new session and must call |SSL_SESSION_free|
+ * when done.
*
- * If |a| and |*a| are not NULL, the SSL_SESSION at |*a| is overridden with the
- * deserialized session rather than allocating a new one. In addition, |a| is
- * not NULL, but |*a| is, |*a| is set to the new SSL_SESSION.
+ * If |a| is non-NULL, |*a| is released and set the new |SSL_SESSION|.
*
- * Passing a value other than NULL to |a| is deprecated. */
+ * Use |SSL_SESSION_from_bytes| instead. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp,
long length);
@@ -2621,8 +2633,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSLeay_version(int unused);
#define SSL_F_SSL_use_psk_identity_hint 147
#define SSL_F_SSL_write 148
#define SSL_F_d2i_SSL_SESSION 149
-#define SSL_F_d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_octet_string 150
-#define SSL_F_d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_string 151
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string 150
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_parse_string 151
#define SSL_F_do_ssl3_write 152
#define SSL_F_dtls1_accept 153
#define SSL_F_dtls1_buffer_record 154
@@ -2747,6 +2759,9 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSLeay_version(int unused);
#define SSL_F_SSL_AEAD_CTX_open 277
#define SSL_F_SSL_AEAD_CTX_seal 278
#define SSL_F_dtls1_seal_record 279
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_from_bytes 280
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_parse 281
+#define SSL_F_ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher 282
#define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100
#define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 101
#define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT 102
diff --git a/src/ssl/internal.h b/src/ssl/internal.h
index 7d9a5ad..4d70431 100644
--- a/src/ssl/internal.h
+++ b/src/ssl/internal.h
@@ -581,15 +581,13 @@ typedef struct cert_st {
} CERT;
typedef struct sess_cert_st {
- STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; /* as received from peer (not for SSL2) */
+ /* cert_chain is the certificate chain sent by the peer. NOTE: for a client,
+ * this does includes the server's leaf certificate, but, for a server, this
+ * does NOT include the client's leaf. */
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
- /* The 'peer_...' members are used only by clients. */
- int peer_cert_type;
-
- CERT_PKEY *peer_key; /* points to an element of peer_pkeys (never NULL!) */
- CERT_PKEY peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
- /* Obviously we don't have the private keys of these,
- * so maybe we shouldn't even use the CERT_PKEY type here. */
+ /* peer_cert, on a client, is the leaf certificate of the peer. */
+ X509 *peer_cert;
DH *peer_dh_tmp;
EC_KEY *peer_ecdh_tmp;
@@ -799,8 +797,8 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c);
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c);
SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void);
-void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_dup(const SESS_CERT *sess_cert);
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sess_cert);
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx);
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs);
diff --git a/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 159e2d7..d334e1d 100644
--- a/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -1028,10 +1028,8 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) {
SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- sc->peer_cert_type = i;
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
- sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = X509_up_ref(x);
- sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+ X509_free(sc->peer_cert);
+ sc->peer_cert = X509_up_ref(x);
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer = X509_up_ref(x);
@@ -1195,8 +1193,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
}
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_cert);
}
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
@@ -1258,14 +1255,12 @@ int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA and
* ECDSA. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+ if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aECDSA)) {
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_cert);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise this is ECDHE_PSK, so no public key. */
+ assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK);
}
- /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
ecdh = NULL;
@@ -1508,6 +1503,36 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) {
return n;
}
+ if (s->hit) {
+ /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
+ * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
+ * existing session. */
+ uint8_t *bytes;
+ size_t bytes_len;
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(s->session, &bytes, &bytes_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION *new_session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(bytes, bytes_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(bytes);
+ if (new_session == NULL) {
+ /* This should never happen. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
+ /* |sess_cert| is not serialized and must be duplicated explicitly. */
+ assert(new_session->sess_cert == NULL);
+ new_session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_dup(s->session->sess_cert);
+ if (new_session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(new_session);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_session;
+ }
+
CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, s->init_msg, n);
if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket,
@@ -1702,8 +1727,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
goto err;
}
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_cert);
if (pkey == NULL ||
pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
@@ -2159,9 +2183,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) {
#define has_bits(i, m) (((i) & (m)) == (m))
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) {
- int i, idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
DH *dh;
@@ -2181,11 +2203,9 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) {
dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
- /* This is the passed certificate */
-
- idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
- if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
+ int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_cert, NULL);
+ if (cert_type & EVP_PK_EC) {
+ if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_cert, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
@@ -2197,25 +2217,21 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) {
SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
- i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
- if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(cert_type, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !has_bits(cert_type, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
- !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || dh != NULL)) {
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && dh == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
diff --git a/src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
index d1ac1b6..76052df 100644
--- a/src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
+++ b/src/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
}
}
- if (in->tlsext_tick) {
+ if (in->tlsext_tick && !for_ticket) {
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketTag) ||
!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->tlsext_tick, in->tlsext_ticklen)) {
@@ -360,26 +360,27 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **pp) {
return len;
}
-/* d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
+/* SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
* explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and saves it in |*out|. On
* entry, if |*out| is not NULL, it frees the existing contents. If
* the element was not found, it sets |*out| to NULL. It returns one
* on success, whether or not the element was found, and zero on
* decode error. */
-static int d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_string(CBS *cbs, char **out, unsigned tag) {
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_string(CBS *cbs, char **out, unsigned tag) {
CBS value;
int present;
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, &present, tag)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse_string, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
return 0;
}
if (present) {
if (CBS_contains_zero_byte(&value)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse_string,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
return 0;
}
if (!CBS_strdup(&value, out)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse_string, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
} else {
@@ -389,45 +390,42 @@ static int d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_string(CBS *cbs, char **out, unsigned tag) {
return 1;
}
-/* d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
+/* SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
* explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and stows it in |*out_ptr|
* and |*out_len|. If |*out_ptr| is not NULL, it frees the existing
* contents. On entry, if the element was not found, it sets
* |*out_ptr| to NULL. It returns one on success, whether or not the
* element was found, and zero on decode error. */
-static int d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_octet_string(CBS *cbs, uint8_t **out_ptr,
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(CBS *cbs, uint8_t **out_ptr,
size_t *out_len, unsigned tag) {
CBS value;
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, NULL, tag)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
return 0;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&value, out_ptr, out_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
- SSL_SESSION *ret, *allocated = NULL;
- CBS cbs, session, cipher, session_id, master_key;
+static SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_parse(CBS *cbs) {
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
+ CBS session, cipher, session_id, master_key;
CBS peer, sid_ctx, peer_sha256, original_handshake_hash;
int has_peer, has_peer_sha256, extended_master_secret;
uint64_t version, ssl_version;
uint64_t session_time, timeout, verify_result, ticket_lifetime_hint;
- if (a && *a) {
- ret = *a;
- } else {
- ret = allocated = SSL_SESSION_new();
- if (allocated == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
+ ret = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ goto err;
}
- CBS_init(&cbs, *pp, length);
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&cbs, &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &version) ||
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &ssl_version) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &cipher, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
@@ -441,21 +439,21 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
kSessionIDContextTag) ||
!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(&session, &verify_result, kVerifyResultTag,
X509_V_OK)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
- if (!d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_hostname,
- kHostNameTag) ||
- !d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_string(&session, &ret->psk_identity,
- kPSKIdentityTag)) {
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_hostname,
+ kHostNameTag) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_string(&session, &ret->psk_identity,
+ kPSKIdentityTag)) {
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(&session, &ticket_lifetime_hint,
kTicketLifetimeHintTag, 0)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
- if (!d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_octet_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick,
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick,
&ret->tlsext_ticklen, kTicketTag)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -463,14 +461,14 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
&has_peer_sha256, kPeerSHA256Tag) ||
!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(&session, &original_handshake_hash,
NULL, kOriginalHandshakeHashTag)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
- if (!d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_octet_string(
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(
&session, &ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
&ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length,
kSignedCertTimestampListTag) ||
- !d2i_SSL_SESSION_get_octet_string(
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(
&session, &ret->ocsp_response, &ret->ocsp_response_length,
kOCSPResponseTag)) {
goto err;
@@ -479,44 +477,44 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
kExtendedMasterSecretTag,
0 /* default to false */) ||
CBS_len(&session) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
ret->extended_master_secret = extended_master_secret;
if (version != SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
/* Only support SSLv3/TLS and DTLS. */
if ((ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
(ssl_version >> 8) != (DTLS1_VERSION >> 8)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION);
goto err;
}
ret->ssl_version = ssl_version;
uint16_t cipher_value;
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher, &cipher_value) || CBS_len(&cipher) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
ret->cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value);
if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
if (CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
memcpy(ret->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id));
ret->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
if (CBS_len(&master_key) > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
memcpy(ret->master_key, CBS_data(&master_key), CBS_len(&master_key));
@@ -524,7 +522,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
if (session_time > LONG_MAX ||
timeout > LONG_MAX) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
ret->time = session_time;
@@ -540,13 +538,13 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
goto err;
}
if (ptr != CBS_data(&peer) + CBS_len(&peer)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
}
if (CBS_len(&sid_ctx) > sizeof(ret->sid_ctx)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, CBS_data(&sid_ctx), CBS_len(&sid_ctx));
@@ -554,7 +552,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
if (verify_result > LONG_MAX ||
ticket_lifetime_hint > 0xffffffff) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
ret->verify_result = verify_result;
@@ -562,7 +560,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
if (has_peer_sha256) {
if (CBS_len(&peer_sha256) != sizeof(ret->peer_sha256)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
memcpy(ret->peer_sha256, CBS_data(&peer_sha256), sizeof(ret->peer_sha256));
@@ -573,20 +571,53 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
if (CBS_len(&original_handshake_hash) >
sizeof(ret->original_handshake_hash)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_parse, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
goto err;
}
memcpy(ret->original_handshake_hash, CBS_data(&original_handshake_hash),
CBS_len(&original_handshake_hash));
ret->original_handshake_hash_len = CBS_len(&original_handshake_hash);
+ return ret;
+
+err:
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+ CBS cbs;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_SESSION_parse(&cbs);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_from_bytes, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
+ if (length < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, d2i_SSL_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ CBS cbs;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, *pp, length);
+
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_SESSION_parse(&cbs);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
if (a) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(*a);
*a = ret;
}
*pp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return ret;
-
-err:
- SSL_SESSION_free(allocated);
- return NULL;
}
diff --git a/src/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/src/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index f1fd675..85aa079 100644
--- a/src/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/src/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -119,11 +119,13 @@
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
@@ -409,33 +411,48 @@ SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void) {
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret);
- ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
return ret;
}
-void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc) {
- int i;
-
- if (sc == NULL) {
- return;
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_dup(const SESS_CERT *sess_cert) {
+ SESS_CERT *ret = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
}
- sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
-
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ if (sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) {
+ ret->cert_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(sess_cert->cert_chain);
+ if (ret->cert_chain == NULL) {
+ ssl_sess_cert_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
}
+ if (sess_cert->peer_cert != NULL) {
+ ret->peer_cert = X509_up_ref(sess_cert->peer_cert);
+ }
+ if (sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) {
+ ret->peer_dh_tmp = sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ DH_up_ref(ret->peer_dh_tmp);
+ }
+ if (sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
+ ret->peer_ecdh_tmp = sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
+ EC_KEY_up_ref(ret->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
- DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
- EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sess_cert) {
+ if (sess_cert == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
- OPENSSL_free(sc);
-}
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ X509_free(sess_cert->peer_cert);
+ DH_free(sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
+ EC_KEY_free(sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type) {
- sc->peer_cert_type = type;
- return 1;
+ OPENSSL_free(sess_cert);
}
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
diff --git a/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index e95226f..9e1e308 100644
--- a/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1975,8 +1975,16 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) {
return;
}
+ int has_new_session = !s->hit;
+ if (!s->server && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ /* A client may see new sessions on abbreviated handshakes if the server
+ * decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should
+ * be inserted into the cache. */
+ has_new_session = 1;
+ }
+
SSL_CTX *ctx = s->initial_ctx;
- if ((ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) == mode && !s->hit &&
+ if ((ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) == mode && has_new_session &&
((ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) ||
SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, s->session)) &&
ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) {
@@ -2960,6 +2968,10 @@ err:
return 0;
}
+int SSL_initial_handshake_complete(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
+}
+
int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
diff --git a/src/ssl/ssl_test.cc b/src/ssl/ssl_test.cc
index 1c6e24a..9f2ddb9 100644
--- a/src/ssl/ssl_test.cc
+++ b/src/ssl/ssl_test.cc
@@ -359,6 +359,18 @@ static const char kBadSessionVersion[] =
"q+Topyzvx9USFgRvyuoxn0Hgb+R0A3j6SLRuyOdAi4gv7Y5oliynrSIEIAYGBgYG"
"BgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGrgMEAQevAwQBBLADBAEF";
+// kBadSessionTrailingData is a custom serialized SSL_SESSION with trailing data
+// appended.
+static const char kBadSessionTrailingData[] =
+ "MIIBdgIBAQICAwMEAsAvBCAG5Q1ndq4Yfmbeo1zwLkNRKmCXGdNgWvGT3cskV0yQ"
+ "kAQwJlrlzkAWBOWiLj/jJ76D7l+UXoizP2KI2C7I2FccqMmIfFmmkUy32nIJ0mZH"
+ "IWoJoQYCBFRDO46iBAICASykAwQBAqUDAgEUphAEDnd3dy5nb29nbGUuY29tqAcE"
+ "BXdvcmxkqQUCAwGJwKqBpwSBpBwUQvoeOk0Kg36SYTcLEkXqKwOBfF9vE4KX0Nxe"
+ "LwjcDTpsuh3qXEaZ992r1N38VDcyS6P7I6HBYN9BsNHM362zZnY27GpTw+Kwd751"
+ "CLoXFPoaMOe57dbBpXoro6Pd3BTbf/Tzr88K06yEOTDKPNj3+inbMaVigtK4PLyP"
+ "q+Topyzvx9USFgRvyuoxn0Hgb+R0A3j6SLRuyOdAi4gv7Y5oliynrSIEIAYGBgYG"
+ "BgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGBgYGrgMEAQevAwQBBLADBAEFAAAA";
+
static bool DecodeBase64(std::vector<uint8_t> *out, const char *in) {
size_t len;
if (!EVP_DecodedLength(&len, strlen(in))) {
@@ -387,10 +399,10 @@ static bool TestSSL_SESSIONEncoding(const char *input_b64) {
}
// Verify the SSL_SESSION decodes.
- cptr = bssl::vector_data(&input);
- ScopedSSL_SESSION session(d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &cptr, input.size()));
- if (!session || cptr != bssl::vector_data(&input) + input.size()) {
- fprintf(stderr, "d2i_SSL_SESSION failed\n");
+ ScopedSSL_SESSION session(SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(bssl::vector_data(&input),
+ input.size()));
+ if (!session) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL_SESSION_from_bytes failed\n");
return false;
}
@@ -409,6 +421,14 @@ static bool TestSSL_SESSIONEncoding(const char *input_b64) {
return false;
}
+ // Verify the SSL_SESSION also decodes with the legacy API.
+ cptr = bssl::vector_data(&input);
+ session.reset(d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &cptr, input.size()));
+ if (!session || cptr != bssl::vector_data(&input) + input.size()) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "d2i_SSL_SESSION failed\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
// Verify the SSL_SESSION encoding round-trips via the legacy API.
int len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session.get(), NULL);
if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != input.size()) {
@@ -447,10 +467,10 @@ static bool TestBadSSL_SESSIONEncoding(const char *input_b64) {
}
// Verify that the SSL_SESSION fails to decode.
- const uint8_t *ptr = bssl::vector_data(&input);
- ScopedSSL_SESSION session(d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &ptr, input.size()));
+ ScopedSSL_SESSION session(SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(bssl::vector_data(&input),
+ input.size()));
if (session) {
- fprintf(stderr, "d2i_SSL_SESSION unexpectedly succeeded\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL_SESSION_from_bytes unexpectedly succeeded\n");
return false;
}
ERR_clear_error();
@@ -537,6 +557,7 @@ int main(void) {
!TestSSL_SESSIONEncoding(kCustomSession) ||
!TestBadSSL_SESSIONEncoding(kBadSessionExtraField) ||
!TestBadSSL_SESSIONEncoding(kBadSessionVersion) ||
+ !TestBadSSL_SESSIONEncoding(kBadSessionTrailingData) ||
!TestDefaultVersion(0, &TLS_method) ||
!TestDefaultVersion(SSL3_VERSION, &SSLv3_method) ||
!TestDefaultVersion(TLS1_VERSION, &TLSv1_method) ||
diff --git a/src/ssl/t1_lib.c b/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 9e5c011..213a647 100644
--- a/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const uint8_t *etick, int eticklen,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
p = sdec;
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+ sess = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(sdec, slen);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess) {
/* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect that the
diff --git a/src/ssl/test/bssl_shim.cc b/src/ssl/test/bssl_shim.cc
index 40cb149..3b95d7e 100644
--- a/src/ssl/test/bssl_shim.cc
+++ b/src/ssl/test/bssl_shim.cc
@@ -838,6 +838,20 @@ static bool DoExchange(ScopedSSL_SESSION *out_session, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx,
return false;
}
}
+
+ if (!config->is_server) {
+ /* Clients should expect a peer certificate chain iff this was not a PSK
+ * cipher suite. */
+ if (config->psk.empty()) {
+ if (SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl.get()) == nullptr) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing peer certificate chain!\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else if (SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl.get()) != nullptr) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected peer certificate chain!\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
}
if (config->export_keying_material > 0) {