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Diffstat (limited to 'Source/WebCore/page/SecurityOrigin.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | Source/WebCore/page/SecurityOrigin.cpp | 564 |
1 files changed, 564 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Source/WebCore/page/SecurityOrigin.cpp b/Source/WebCore/page/SecurityOrigin.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16de640 --- /dev/null +++ b/Source/WebCore/page/SecurityOrigin.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,564 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of Apple Computer, Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of + * its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE + * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND + * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "config.h" +#include "SecurityOrigin.h" + +#include "BlobURL.h" +#include "Document.h" +#include "FileSystem.h" +#include "KURL.h" +#include "OriginAccessEntry.h" +#include "SchemeRegistry.h" +#include <wtf/StdLibExtras.h> + +namespace WebCore { + +static SecurityOrigin::LocalLoadPolicy localLoadPolicy = SecurityOrigin::AllowLocalLoadsForLocalOnly; +const int MaxAllowedPort = 65535; + +typedef Vector<OriginAccessEntry> OriginAccessWhiteList; +typedef HashMap<String, OriginAccessWhiteList*> OriginAccessMap; + +static OriginAccessMap& originAccessMap() +{ + DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(OriginAccessMap, originAccessMap, ()); + return originAccessMap; +} + +static bool schemeRequiresAuthority(const String& scheme) +{ + DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(URLSchemesMap, schemes, ()); + + if (schemes.isEmpty()) { + schemes.add("http"); + schemes.add("https"); + schemes.add("ftp"); + } + + return schemes.contains(scheme); +} + + +SecurityOrigin::SecurityOrigin(const KURL& url, SandboxFlags sandboxFlags) + : m_sandboxFlags(sandboxFlags) + , m_protocol(url.protocol().isNull() ? "" : url.protocol().lower()) + , m_host(url.host().isNull() ? "" : url.host().lower()) + , m_port(url.port()) + , m_isUnique(isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin) || SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsNoAccess(m_protocol)) + , m_universalAccess(false) + , m_domainWasSetInDOM(false) + , m_enforceFilePathSeparation(false) +{ + // These protocols do not create security origins; the owner frame provides the origin + if (m_protocol == "about" || m_protocol == "javascript") + m_protocol = ""; + + // For edge case URLs that were probably misparsed, make sure that the origin is unique. + if (schemeRequiresAuthority(m_protocol) && m_host.isEmpty()) + m_isUnique = true; + + // document.domain starts as m_host, but can be set by the DOM. + m_domain = m_host; + + // By default, only local SecurityOrigins can load local resources. + m_canLoadLocalResources = isLocal(); + if (m_canLoadLocalResources) { + // Directories should never be readable. + if (!url.hasPath() || url.path().endsWith("/")) + m_isUnique = true; + // Store the path in case we are doing per-file origin checking. + m_filePath = url.path(); + } + + if (isDefaultPortForProtocol(m_port, m_protocol)) + m_port = 0; +} + +SecurityOrigin::SecurityOrigin(const SecurityOrigin* other) + : m_sandboxFlags(other->m_sandboxFlags) + , m_protocol(other->m_protocol.threadsafeCopy()) + , m_host(other->m_host.threadsafeCopy()) + , m_encodedHost(other->m_encodedHost.threadsafeCopy()) + , m_domain(other->m_domain.threadsafeCopy()) + , m_filePath(other->m_filePath.threadsafeCopy()) + , m_port(other->m_port) + , m_isUnique(other->m_isUnique) + , m_universalAccess(other->m_universalAccess) + , m_domainWasSetInDOM(other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) + , m_canLoadLocalResources(other->m_canLoadLocalResources) + , m_enforceFilePathSeparation(other->m_enforceFilePathSeparation) +{ +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::isEmpty() const +{ + return m_protocol.isEmpty(); +} + +PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::create(const KURL& url, SandboxFlags sandboxFlags) +{ + if (!url.isValid()) + return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(KURL(), sandboxFlags)); +#if ENABLE(BLOB) + if (url.protocolIs(BlobURL::blobProtocol())) + return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(BlobURL::getOrigin(url), sandboxFlags)); +#endif + return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(url, sandboxFlags)); +} + +PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::createEmpty() +{ + return create(KURL()); +} + +PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::threadsafeCopy() +{ + return adoptRef(new SecurityOrigin(this)); +} + +void SecurityOrigin::setDomainFromDOM(const String& newDomain) +{ + m_domainWasSetInDOM = true; + m_domain = newDomain.lower(); +} + +static HashSet<String>& schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation() +{ + DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(HashSet<String>, schemes, ()); + return schemes; +} + +void SecurityOrigin::setDomainRelaxationForbiddenForURLScheme(bool forbidden, const String& scheme) +{ + if (scheme.isEmpty()) + return; + + if (forbidden) + schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation().add(scheme); + else + schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation().remove(scheme); +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::isDomainRelaxationForbiddenForURLScheme(const String& scheme) +{ + if (scheme.isEmpty()) + return false; + + return schemesForbiddenFromDomainRelaxation().contains(scheme); +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::canAccess(const SecurityOrigin* other) const +{ + if (m_universalAccess) + return true; + + if (isUnique() || other->isUnique()) + return false; + + // Here are two cases where we should permit access: + // + // 1) Neither document has set document.domain. In this case, we insist + // that the scheme, host, and port of the URLs match. + // + // 2) Both documents have set document.domain. In this case, we insist + // that the documents have set document.domain to the same value and + // that the scheme of the URLs match. + // + // This matches the behavior of Firefox 2 and Internet Explorer 6. + // + // Internet Explorer 7 and Opera 9 are more strict in that they require + // the port numbers to match when both pages have document.domain set. + // + // FIXME: Evaluate whether we can tighten this policy to require matched + // port numbers. + // + // Opera 9 allows access when only one page has set document.domain, but + // this is a security vulnerability. + + bool canAccess = false; + if (m_protocol == other->m_protocol) { + if (!m_domainWasSetInDOM && !other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) { + if (m_host == other->m_host && m_port == other->m_port) + canAccess = true; + } else if (m_domainWasSetInDOM && other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) { + if (m_domain == other->m_domain) + canAccess = true; + } + } + + if (canAccess && isLocal()) + canAccess = passesFileCheck(other); + + return canAccess; +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::passesFileCheck(const SecurityOrigin* other) const +{ + ASSERT(isLocal() && other->isLocal()); + + if (!m_enforceFilePathSeparation && !other->m_enforceFilePathSeparation) + return true; + + return (m_filePath == other->m_filePath); +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::canRequest(const KURL& url) const +{ + if (m_universalAccess) + return true; + + if (isUnique()) + return false; + + RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> targetOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(url); + + bool doUniqueOriginCheck = true; +#if ENABLE(BLOB) + // For blob scheme, we want to ignore this check. + doUniqueOriginCheck = !url.protocolIs(BlobURL::blobProtocol()); +#endif + if (doUniqueOriginCheck && targetOrigin->isUnique()) + return false; + + // We call isSameSchemeHostPort here instead of canAccess because we want + // to ignore document.domain effects. + if (isSameSchemeHostPort(targetOrigin.get())) + return true; + + if (isAccessWhiteListed(targetOrigin.get())) + return true; + + return false; +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::taintsCanvas(const KURL& url) const +{ + if (canRequest(url)) + return false; + + // This function exists because we treat data URLs as having a unique origin, + // contrary to the current (9/19/2009) draft of the HTML5 specification. + // We still want to let folks paint data URLs onto untainted canvases, so + // we special case data URLs below. If we change to match HTML5 w.r.t. + // data URL security, then we can remove this function in favor of + // !canRequest. + if (url.protocolIsData()) + return false; + + return true; +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::canReceiveDragData(const SecurityOrigin* dragInitiator) const +{ + if (this == dragInitiator) + return true; + + // FIXME: Currently we treat data URLs as having a unique origin, contrary to the + // current (9/19/2009) draft of the HTML5 specification. We still want to allow + // drop across data URLs, so we special case data URLs below. If we change to + // match HTML5 w.r.t. data URL security, then we can remove this check. + if (m_protocol == "data") + return true; + + return canAccess(dragInitiator); +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::isAccessWhiteListed(const SecurityOrigin* targetOrigin) const +{ + if (OriginAccessWhiteList* list = originAccessMap().get(toString())) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < list->size(); ++i) { + if (list->at(i).matchesOrigin(*targetOrigin)) + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::canDisplay(const KURL& url) const +{ +#if ENABLE(BLOB) + if (url.protocolIs(BlobURL::blobProtocol())) + return canRequest(url); +#endif + + if (!restrictAccessToLocal()) + return true; + + if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLAsLocal(url.string())) + return true; + + RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> targetOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(url); + if (isAccessWhiteListed(targetOrigin.get())) + return true; + + return canLoadLocalResources(); +} + +void SecurityOrigin::grantLoadLocalResources() +{ + // This function exists only to support backwards compatibility with older + // versions of WebKit. Granting privileges to some, but not all, documents + // in a SecurityOrigin is a security hazard because the documents without + // the privilege can obtain the privilege by injecting script into the + // documents that have been granted the privilege. + ASSERT(allowSubstituteDataAccessToLocal()); + m_canLoadLocalResources = true; +} + +void SecurityOrigin::grantUniversalAccess() +{ + m_universalAccess = true; +} + +void SecurityOrigin::enforceFilePathSeparation() +{ + ASSERT(isLocal()); + m_enforceFilePathSeparation = true; +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::isLocal() const +{ + return SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLocal(m_protocol); +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::isSecureTransitionTo(const KURL& url) const +{ + // New window created by the application + if (isEmpty()) + return true; + + RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> other = SecurityOrigin::create(url); + return canAccess(other.get()); +} + +String SecurityOrigin::toString() const +{ + if (isEmpty()) + return "null"; + + if (isUnique()) + return "null"; + + if (m_protocol == "file") { + if (m_enforceFilePathSeparation) + return "null"; + return "file://"; + } + + Vector<UChar> result; + result.reserveInitialCapacity(m_protocol.length() + m_host.length() + 10); + append(result, m_protocol); + append(result, "://"); + append(result, m_host); + + if (m_port) { + append(result, ":"); + append(result, String::number(m_port)); + } + + return String::adopt(result); +} + +PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::createFromString(const String& originString) +{ + return SecurityOrigin::create(KURL(KURL(), originString)); +} + +static const char SeparatorCharacter = '_'; + +PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::createFromDatabaseIdentifier(const String& databaseIdentifier) +{ + // Make sure there's a first separator + size_t separator1 = databaseIdentifier.find(SeparatorCharacter); + if (separator1 == notFound) + return create(KURL()); + + // Make sure there's a second separator + size_t separator2 = databaseIdentifier.reverseFind(SeparatorCharacter); + if (separator2 == notFound) + return create(KURL()); + + // Ensure there were at least 2 separator characters. Some hostnames on intranets have + // underscores in them, so we'll assume that any additional underscores are part of the host. + if (separator1 == separator2) + return create(KURL()); + + // Make sure the port section is a valid port number or doesn't exist + bool portOkay; + int port = databaseIdentifier.right(databaseIdentifier.length() - separator2 - 1).toInt(&portOkay); + bool portAbsent = (separator2 == databaseIdentifier.length() - 1); + if (!(portOkay || portAbsent)) + return create(KURL()); + + if (port < 0 || port > MaxAllowedPort) + return create(KURL()); + + // Split out the 3 sections of data + String protocol = databaseIdentifier.substring(0, separator1); + String host = databaseIdentifier.substring(separator1 + 1, separator2 - separator1 - 1); + + host = decodeURLEscapeSequences(host); + return create(KURL(KURL(), protocol + "://" + host + ":" + String::number(port))); +} + +PassRefPtr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::create(const String& protocol, const String& host, int port) +{ + if (port < 0 || port > MaxAllowedPort) + create(KURL()); + String decodedHost = decodeURLEscapeSequences(host); + return create(KURL(KURL(), protocol + "://" + host + ":" + String::number(port))); +} + +String SecurityOrigin::databaseIdentifier() const +{ + String separatorString(&SeparatorCharacter, 1); + + if (m_encodedHost.isEmpty()) + m_encodedHost = encodeForFileName(m_host); + + return m_protocol + separatorString + m_encodedHost + separatorString + String::number(m_port); +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::equal(const SecurityOrigin* other) const +{ + if (other == this) + return true; + + if (!isSameSchemeHostPort(other)) + return false; + + if (m_domainWasSetInDOM != other->m_domainWasSetInDOM) + return false; + + if (m_domainWasSetInDOM && m_domain != other->m_domain) + return false; + + return true; +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::isSameSchemeHostPort(const SecurityOrigin* other) const +{ + if (m_host != other->m_host) + return false; + + if (m_protocol != other->m_protocol) + return false; + + if (m_port != other->m_port) + return false; + + if (isLocal() && !passesFileCheck(other)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::shouldHideReferrer(const KURL& url, const String& referrer) +{ + bool referrerIsSecureURL = protocolIs(referrer, "https"); + bool referrerIsWebURL = referrerIsSecureURL || protocolIs(referrer, "http"); + + if (!referrerIsWebURL) + return true; + + if (!referrerIsSecureURL) + return false; + + bool URLIsSecureURL = url.protocolIs("https"); + + return !URLIsSecureURL; +} + +void SecurityOrigin::setLocalLoadPolicy(LocalLoadPolicy policy) +{ + localLoadPolicy = policy; +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::restrictAccessToLocal() +{ + return localLoadPolicy != SecurityOrigin::AllowLocalLoadsForAll; +} + +bool SecurityOrigin::allowSubstituteDataAccessToLocal() +{ + return localLoadPolicy != SecurityOrigin::AllowLocalLoadsForLocalOnly; +} + +void SecurityOrigin::addOriginAccessWhitelistEntry(const SecurityOrigin& sourceOrigin, const String& destinationProtocol, const String& destinationDomains, bool allowDestinationSubdomains) +{ + ASSERT(isMainThread()); + ASSERT(!sourceOrigin.isEmpty()); + if (sourceOrigin.isEmpty()) + return; + + String sourceString = sourceOrigin.toString(); + pair<OriginAccessMap::iterator, bool> result = originAccessMap().add(sourceString, 0); + if (result.second) + result.first->second = new OriginAccessWhiteList; + + OriginAccessWhiteList* list = result.first->second; + list->append(OriginAccessEntry(destinationProtocol, destinationDomains, allowDestinationSubdomains ? OriginAccessEntry::AllowSubdomains : OriginAccessEntry::DisallowSubdomains)); +} + +void SecurityOrigin::removeOriginAccessWhitelistEntry(const SecurityOrigin& sourceOrigin, const String& destinationProtocol, const String& destinationDomains, bool allowDestinationSubdomains) +{ + ASSERT(isMainThread()); + ASSERT(!sourceOrigin.isEmpty()); + if (sourceOrigin.isEmpty()) + return; + + String sourceString = sourceOrigin.toString(); + OriginAccessMap& map = originAccessMap(); + OriginAccessMap::iterator it = map.find(sourceString); + if (it == map.end()) + return; + + OriginAccessWhiteList* list = it->second; + size_t index = list->find(OriginAccessEntry(destinationProtocol, destinationDomains, allowDestinationSubdomains ? OriginAccessEntry::AllowSubdomains : OriginAccessEntry::DisallowSubdomains)); + if (index == notFound) + return; + + list->remove(index); + + if (!list->isEmpty()) + return; + + map.remove(it); + delete list; +} + +void SecurityOrigin::resetOriginAccessWhitelists() +{ + ASSERT(isMainThread()); + OriginAccessMap& map = originAccessMap(); + deleteAllValues(map); + map.clear(); +} + +} // namespace WebCore |