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author | Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> | 2012-04-30 16:11:30 -0400 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-04-30 15:30:18 -0700 |
commit | fec6c20b570bcf541e581fc97f2e0cbdb9725b98 (patch) | |
tree | 2c84d6748a2aeff0f98ef5abbcc0144273bb8978 /drivers/firmware | |
parent | 41b3254c93acc56adc3c4477fef7c9512d47659e (diff) | |
download | kernel_goldelico_gta04-fec6c20b570bcf541e581fc97f2e0cbdb9725b98.zip kernel_goldelico_gta04-fec6c20b570bcf541e581fc97f2e0cbdb9725b98.tar.gz kernel_goldelico_gta04-fec6c20b570bcf541e581fc97f2e0cbdb9725b98.tar.bz2 |
efi: Validate UEFI boot variables
A common flaw in UEFI systems is a refusal to POST triggered by a malformed
boot variable. Once in this state, machines may only be restored by
reflashing their firmware with an external hardware device. While this is
obviously a firmware bug, the serious nature of the outcome suggests that
operating systems should filter their variable writes in order to prevent
a malicious user from rendering the machine unusable.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/firmware')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/firmware/efivars.c | 182 |
1 files changed, 182 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c index d25599f..891e467 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efivars.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efivars.c @@ -191,6 +191,176 @@ utf16_strncmp(const efi_char16_t *a, const efi_char16_t *b, size_t len) } } +static bool +validate_device_path(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, int len) +{ + struct efi_generic_dev_path *node; + int offset = 0; + + node = (struct efi_generic_dev_path *)buffer; + + while (offset < len) { + offset += node->length; + + if (offset > len) + return false; + + if ((node->type == EFI_DEV_END_PATH || + node->type == EFI_DEV_END_PATH2) && + node->sub_type == EFI_DEV_END_ENTIRE) + return true; + + node = (struct efi_generic_dev_path *)(buffer + offset); + } + + /* + * If we're here then either node->length pointed past the end + * of the buffer or we reached the end of the buffer without + * finding a device path end node. + */ + return false; +} + +static bool +validate_boot_order(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, int len) +{ + /* An array of 16-bit integers */ + if ((len % 2) != 0) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static bool +validate_load_option(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, int len) +{ + u16 filepathlength; + int i, desclength = 0; + + /* Either "Boot" or "Driver" followed by four digits of hex */ + for (i = match; i < match+4; i++) { + if (hex_to_bin(var->VariableName[i] & 0xff) < 0) + return true; + } + + /* A valid entry must be at least 6 bytes */ + if (len < 6) + return false; + + filepathlength = buffer[4] | buffer[5] << 8; + + /* + * There's no stored length for the description, so it has to be + * found by hand + */ + desclength = utf16_strsize((efi_char16_t *)(buffer + 6), len) + 2; + + /* Each boot entry must have a descriptor */ + if (!desclength) + return false; + + /* + * If the sum of the length of the description, the claimed filepath + * length and the original header are greater than the length of the + * variable, it's malformed + */ + if ((desclength + filepathlength + 6) > len) + return false; + + /* + * And, finally, check the filepath + */ + return validate_device_path(var, match, buffer + desclength + 6, + filepathlength); +} + +static bool +validate_uint16(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, int len) +{ + /* A single 16-bit integer */ + if (len != 2) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static bool +validate_ascii_string(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *buffer, int len) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (buffer[i] > 127) + return false; + + if (buffer[i] == 0) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +struct variable_validate { + char *name; + bool (*validate)(struct efi_variable *var, int match, u8 *data, + int len); +}; + +static const struct variable_validate variable_validate[] = { + { "BootNext", validate_uint16 }, + { "BootOrder", validate_boot_order }, + { "DriverOrder", validate_boot_order }, + { "Boot*", validate_load_option }, + { "Driver*", validate_load_option }, + { "ConIn", validate_device_path }, + { "ConInDev", validate_device_path }, + { "ConOut", validate_device_path }, + { "ConOutDev", validate_device_path }, + { "ErrOut", validate_device_path }, + { "ErrOutDev", validate_device_path }, + { "Timeout", validate_uint16 }, + { "Lang", validate_ascii_string }, + { "PlatformLang", validate_ascii_string }, + { "", NULL }, +}; + +static bool +validate_var(struct efi_variable *var, u8 *data, int len) +{ + int i; + u16 *unicode_name = var->VariableName; + + for (i = 0; variable_validate[i].validate != NULL; i++) { + const char *name = variable_validate[i].name; + int match; + + for (match = 0; ; match++) { + char c = name[match]; + u16 u = unicode_name[match]; + + /* All special variables are plain ascii */ + if (u > 127) + return true; + + /* Wildcard in the matching name means we've matched */ + if (c == '*') + return variable_validate[i].validate(var, + match, data, len); + + /* Case sensitive match */ + if (c != u) + break; + + /* Reached the end of the string while matching */ + if (!c) + return variable_validate[i].validate(var, + match, data, len); + } + } + + return true; +} + static efi_status_t get_var_data_locked(struct efivars *efivars, struct efi_variable *var) { @@ -324,6 +494,12 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) return -EINVAL; } + if ((new_var->Attributes & ~EFI_VARIABLE_MASK) != 0 || + validate_var(new_var, new_var->Data, new_var->DataSize) == false) { + printk(KERN_ERR "efivars: Malformed variable content\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + spin_lock(&efivars->lock); status = efivars->ops->set_variable(new_var->VariableName, &new_var->VendorGuid, @@ -626,6 +802,12 @@ static ssize_t efivar_create(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; + if ((new_var->Attributes & ~EFI_VARIABLE_MASK) != 0 || + validate_var(new_var, new_var->Data, new_var->DataSize) == false) { + printk(KERN_ERR "efivars: Malformed variable content\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + spin_lock(&efivars->lock); /* |