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| author | Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> | 2012-06-11 09:47:47 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> | 2012-07-08 12:51:44 -0500 |
| commit | 2ecaf55db6dcf4dd25e1ef8d5eb6068e3286a20f (patch) | |
| tree | daa89105f89d64579d5ee04a376e4e31543871cf /fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | |
| parent | 566968866555a19d0a78e0bfa845cd249a7eeae2 (diff) | |
| download | kernel_goldelico_gta04-2ecaf55db6dcf4dd25e1ef8d5eb6068e3286a20f.zip kernel_goldelico_gta04-2ecaf55db6dcf4dd25e1ef8d5eb6068e3286a20f.tar.gz kernel_goldelico_gta04-2ecaf55db6dcf4dd25e1ef8d5eb6068e3286a20f.tar.bz2 | |
eCryptfs: Make all miscdev functions use daemon ptr in file private_data
Now that a pointer to a valid struct ecryptfs_daemon is stored in the
private_data of an opened /dev/ecryptfs file, the remaining miscdev
functions can utilize the pointer rather than looking up the
ecryptfs_daemon at the beginning of each operation.
The security model of /dev/ecryptfs is simplified a little bit with this
patch. Upon opening /dev/ecryptfs, a per-user ecryptfs_daemon is
registered. Another daemon cannot be registered for that user until the
last file reference is released. During the lifetime of the
ecryptfs_daemon, access checks are not performed on the /dev/ecryptfs
operations because it is assumed that the application securely handles
the opened file descriptor and does not unintentionally leak it to
processes that are not trusted.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 16 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h index 01a1f85..0deb4f2 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h @@ -392,10 +392,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_daemon { #define ECRYPTFS_DAEMON_MISCDEV_OPEN 0x00000008 u32 flags; u32 num_queued_msg_ctx; - struct pid *pid; - uid_t euid; - struct user_namespace *user_ns; - struct task_struct *task; + struct file *file; struct mutex mux; struct list_head msg_ctx_out_queue; wait_queue_head_t wait; @@ -619,9 +616,8 @@ int ecryptfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int ecryptfs_read_xattr_region(char *page_virt, struct inode *ecryptfs_inode); -int ecryptfs_process_response(struct ecryptfs_message *msg, uid_t euid, - struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct pid *pid, - u32 seq); +int ecryptfs_process_response(struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon, + struct ecryptfs_message *msg, u32 seq); int ecryptfs_send_message(char *data, int data_len, struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx **msg_ctx); int ecryptfs_wait_for_response(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx, @@ -666,8 +662,7 @@ int ecryptfs_read_lower_page_segment(struct page *page_for_ecryptfs, struct inode *ecryptfs_inode); struct page *ecryptfs_get_locked_page(struct inode *inode, loff_t index); int ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon(struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon); -int ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(struct ecryptfs_daemon **daemon, uid_t euid, - struct user_namespace *user_ns); +int ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(struct ecryptfs_daemon **daemon); int ecryptfs_parse_packet_length(unsigned char *data, size_t *size, size_t *length_size); int ecryptfs_write_packet_length(char *dest, size_t size, @@ -679,8 +674,7 @@ int ecryptfs_send_miscdev(char *data, size_t data_size, u16 msg_flags, struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon); void ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx); int -ecryptfs_spawn_daemon(struct ecryptfs_daemon **daemon, uid_t euid, - struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct pid *pid); +ecryptfs_spawn_daemon(struct ecryptfs_daemon **daemon, struct file *file); int ecryptfs_init_kthread(void); void ecryptfs_destroy_kthread(void); int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file, |