diff options
author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2006-06-26 00:25:45 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org> | 2006-06-26 09:58:24 -0700 |
commit | 68602066c3327fa340899609d715781eda423751 (patch) | |
tree | fdd1db5b08755bf2c353364b56a778f62e5009f4 /fs/proc | |
parent | aed7a6c476d90660ac5af860158407ae9fe61c68 (diff) | |
download | kernel_goldelico_gta04-68602066c3327fa340899609d715781eda423751.zip kernel_goldelico_gta04-68602066c3327fa340899609d715781eda423751.tar.gz kernel_goldelico_gta04-68602066c3327fa340899609d715781eda423751.tar.bz2 |
[PATCH] proc: Remove bogus proc_task_permission
First we can access every /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> directory as /proc/<pid> so
proc_task_permission is not usefully limiting visibility.
Second having related filesystems information should have nothing to do with
process visibility. kill does not implement any checks like that.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 63 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 63 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 9562df76..6080672 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -361,54 +361,6 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, struct vf return result; } - -/* Same as proc_root_link, but this addionally tries to get fs from other - * threads in the group */ -static int proc_task_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, - struct vfsmount **mnt) -{ - struct fs_struct *fs; - int result = -ENOENT; - struct task_struct *leader = proc_task(inode); - - task_lock(leader); - fs = leader->fs; - if (fs) { - atomic_inc(&fs->count); - task_unlock(leader); - } else { - /* Try to get fs from other threads */ - task_unlock(leader); - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - if (pid_alive(leader)) { - struct task_struct *task = leader; - - while ((task = next_thread(task)) != leader) { - task_lock(task); - fs = task->fs; - if (fs) { - atomic_inc(&fs->count); - task_unlock(task); - break; - } - task_unlock(task); - } - } - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - } - - if (fs) { - read_lock(&fs->lock); - *mnt = mntget(fs->rootmnt); - *dentry = dget(fs->root); - read_unlock(&fs->lock); - result = 0; - put_fs_struct(fs); - } - return result; -} - - #define MAY_PTRACE(task) \ (task == current || \ (task->parent == current && \ @@ -600,20 +552,6 @@ static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) return proc_check_root(inode); } -static int proc_task_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) -{ - struct dentry *root; - struct vfsmount *vfsmnt; - - if (generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL) != 0) - return -EACCES; - - if (proc_task_root_link(inode, &root, &vfsmnt)) - return -ENOENT; - - return proc_check_chroot(root, vfsmnt); -} - extern struct seq_operations proc_pid_maps_op; static int maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { @@ -1583,7 +1521,6 @@ static struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = { static struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations = { .lookup = proc_task_lookup, - .permission = proc_task_permission, }; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY |