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| author | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2008-04-22 00:46:42 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2008-04-22 00:46:42 -0700 |
| commit | c5d18e984a313adf5a1a4ae69e0b1d93cf410229 (patch) | |
| tree | 2922514a388759b999757eec49b7a5bd9f290e3c /net/key | |
| parent | 7c3f944e29c02d71e13442e977cf4cec19c39e98 (diff) | |
| download | kernel_goldelico_gta04-c5d18e984a313adf5a1a4ae69e0b1d93cf410229.zip kernel_goldelico_gta04-c5d18e984a313adf5a1a4ae69e0b1d93cf410229.tar.gz kernel_goldelico_gta04-c5d18e984a313adf5a1a4ae69e0b1d93cf410229.tar.bz2 | |
[IPSEC]: Fix catch-22 with algorithm IDs above 31
As it stands it's impossible to use any authentication algorithms
with an ID above 31 portably. It just happens to work on x86 but
fails miserably on ppc64.
The reason is that we're using a bit mask to check the algorithm
ID but the mask is only 32 bits wide.
After looking at how this is used in the field, I have concluded
that in the long term we should phase out state matching by IDs
because this is made superfluous by the reqid feature. For current
applications, the best solution IMHO is to allow all algorithms when
the bit masks are all ~0.
The following patch does exactly that.
This bug was identified by IBM when testing on the ppc64 platform
using the NULL authentication algorithm which has an ID of 251.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/key')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/key/af_key.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index 1fb0fe4..81a8e52 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -1907,7 +1907,7 @@ parse_ipsecrequest(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *rq) t->encap_family = xp->family; /* No way to set this via kame pfkey */ - t->aalgos = t->ealgos = t->calgos = ~0; + t->allalgs = 1; xp->xfrm_nr++; return 0; } |