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author | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2012-05-30 19:58:30 -0400 |
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committer | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2012-06-01 10:37:17 -0400 |
commit | 98de59bfe4b2ff6344d9ad8e5296f80de5dcc5b6 (patch) | |
tree | f2baf4a8eec3299d5e55dd3899812407cd6d52a7 /security/security.c | |
parent | 9ac4ed4bd0adec75db13a4b08a39a3918ec0e3c9 (diff) | |
download | kernel_goldelico_gta04-98de59bfe4b2ff6344d9ad8e5296f80de5dcc5b6.zip kernel_goldelico_gta04-98de59bfe4b2ff6344d9ad8e5296f80de5dcc5b6.tar.gz kernel_goldelico_gta04-98de59bfe4b2ff6344d9ad8e5296f80de5dcc5b6.tar.bz2 |
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 46 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 3b11b3b..3efc9b1 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -660,36 +660,46 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg); } -int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, - unsigned long flags) +static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - unsigned long reqprot = prot; - int ret; /* - * Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC? - * - * (the exception is when the underlying filesystem is noexec - * mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.) + * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect + * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... */ - if (!(reqprot & PROT_READ)) - goto out; + if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) + return prot; if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) - goto out; - if (!file) { - prot |= PROT_EXEC; - } else if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { + return prot; + /* + * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. + */ + if (!file) + return prot | PROT_EXEC; + /* + * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need + * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case + */ + if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { #ifndef CONFIG_MMU unsigned long caps = 0; struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info) caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities; if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP)) - goto out; + return prot; #endif - prot |= PROT_EXEC; + return prot | PROT_EXEC; } -out: - ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags); + /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ + return prot; +} + +int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) +{ + int ret; + ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot, + mmap_prot(file, prot), flags); if (ret) return ret; return ima_file_mmap(file, prot); |