diff options
| author | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2014-06-03 12:27:06 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr> | 2014-07-17 16:51:38 +0200 |
| commit | 8395f2ec35b7a744c8156e5b201e7cc6cb2da18a (patch) | |
| tree | 9f4c393e5a4b7076688566f9bc2d812edde2b2c1 /drivers/isdn/act2000 | |
| parent | ec44a62d580ca863e13a5f650333a6c778eb8550 (diff) | |
| download | kernel_samsung_aries-8395f2ec35b7a744c8156e5b201e7cc6cb2da18a.zip kernel_samsung_aries-8395f2ec35b7a744c8156e5b201e7cc6cb2da18a.tar.gz kernel_samsung_aries-8395f2ec35b7a744c8156e5b201e7cc6cb2da18a.tar.bz2 | |
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()
commit b3eaa9fc5cd0a4d74b18f6b8dc617aeaf1873270 upstream.
We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.
Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.
[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/isdn/act2000')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions