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| author | Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> | 2006-03-25 03:07:41 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org> | 2006-03-25 08:22:56 -0800 |
| commit | d4eb82c783992551c574580eb55fddc8bb006ad0 (patch) | |
| tree | 912aa24f162342bffae86a0c3e4713700a9e5c66 /security | |
| parent | 12b5989be10011387a9da5dee82e5c0d6f9d02e7 (diff) | |
| download | kernel_samsung_aries-d4eb82c783992551c574580eb55fddc8bb006ad0.zip kernel_samsung_aries-d4eb82c783992551c574580eb55fddc8bb006ad0.tar.gz kernel_samsung_aries-d4eb82c783992551c574580eb55fddc8bb006ad0.tar.bz2 | |
[PATCH] make cap_ptrace enforce PTRACE_TRACME checks
PTRACE_TRACEME doesn't have proper capabilities validation when parent is
less privileged than child. Issue pointed out by Ram Gupta
<ram.gupta5@gmail.com>.
Note: I haven't identified a strong security issue, and it's a small ABI
change that could break apps that rely on existing behaviour (which allows
parent that is less privileged than child to ptrace when child does
PTRACE_TRACEME).
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 8a6e097..841eb4e 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) { /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ - if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) && + !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) return -EPERM; return 0; } |