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authorThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2014-06-03 12:27:06 +0000
committerPaul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr>2014-07-17 16:50:06 +0200
commit48c9b318d2fe0d3f2899e16e08f0972ffbd8c2b5 (patch)
treeba8d23253918ab7876d0fdc24a7e499ab90dce10
parent3f77878d2e73858ec1a559666aeed198bced6902 (diff)
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futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()
We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel associated to the real owner. Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem. [ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try restoring the already corrupted user space state. ] Change-Id: Ic8714ed2e9dee323a011eed42f7c0159c65dfbf3 Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
-rw-r--r--kernel/futex.c14
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index 931b536..4cc87af 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -757,10 +757,18 @@ retry:
return -EDEADLK;
/*
- * Surprise - we got the lock. Just return to userspace:
+ * Surprise - we got the lock, but we do not trust user space at all.
*/
- if (unlikely(!curval))
- return 1;
+ if (unlikely(!curval)) {
+ /*
+ * We verify whether there is kernel state for this
+ * futex. If not, we can safely assume, that the 0 ->
+ * TID transition is correct. If state exists, we do
+ * not bother to fixup the user space state as it was
+ * corrupted already.
+ */
+ return futex_top_waiter(hb, key) ? -EINVAL : 1;
+ }
uval = curval;