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authorThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2014-06-03 12:27:08 +0000
committerPaul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr>2014-07-17 16:50:07 +0200
commit1d7d630c8e1cc3439898ab8a47fb50334b167148 (patch)
treef1a27d25fbbab87f2a1e4d6f2627f262d4875a48 /arch/sh/kernel/ftrace.c
parentc6889d981012a586c30acf9fc2c0f5b44d24f093 (diff)
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futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robustHEADreplicant-4.2-0004replicant-4.2-0003replicant-4.2
The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path or from user space just for fun. The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some circumstances. Handle the cases explicit: Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ? [1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid [2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid [3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid [4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid [5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid [6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid [7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid [8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid [9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid [10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died. [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED. [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list() and exit_pi_state_list() [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in the pi_state but cannot access the user space value. [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set. [8] Owner and user space value match [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0 except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4] [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space TID out of sync. Backport to 3.13 conflicts: kernel/futex.c Change-Id: Ic410036b38ccb7289b3d58eff56ad64d3a9dcada Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/sh/kernel/ftrace.c')
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