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author | Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> | 2007-02-14 00:34:16 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org> | 2007-02-14 08:10:00 -0800 |
commit | bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962 (patch) | |
tree | c90c927fa0547ba46cb01aaf7625008e350d84eb /fs | |
parent | b599fdfdb4bb4941e9076308efcf3bb89e577db5 (diff) | |
download | kernel_samsung_crespo-bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962.zip kernel_samsung_crespo-bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962.tar.gz kernel_samsung_crespo-bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962.tar.bz2 |
[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes
Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve). So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below. Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over
them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions