aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/fs
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>2007-02-14 00:34:16 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org>2007-02-14 08:10:00 -0800
commitbbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962 (patch)
treec90c927fa0547ba46cb01aaf7625008e350d84eb /fs
parentb599fdfdb4bb4941e9076308efcf3bb89e577db5 (diff)
downloadkernel_samsung_crespo-bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962.zip
kernel_samsung_crespo-bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962.tar.gz
kernel_samsung_crespo-bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962.tar.bz2
[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes
Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across execve). So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as below. Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing, as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over them. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions