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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-04-18 18:18:30 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-04-18 18:18:30 -0700 |
commit | 3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4 (patch) | |
tree | c9a58417d9492f39f7fe81d4721d674c34dd8be2 /security | |
parent | 334d094504c2fe1c44211ecb49146ae6bca8c321 (diff) | |
parent | 7cea51be4e91edad05bd834f3235b45c57783f0d (diff) | |
download | kernel_samsung_crespo-3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4.zip kernel_samsung_crespo-3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4.tar.gz kernel_samsung_crespo-3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter
Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
SELinux: remove redundant exports
Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/dummy.c | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 73 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/exports.c | 42 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/audit.h | 65 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smackfs.c | 11 |
9 files changed, 269 insertions, 61 deletions
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 480366f..98d5f96 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -424,6 +424,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu return 0; } +static void dummy_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; @@ -542,7 +547,9 @@ static int dummy_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p) } static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) -{ } +{ + *secid = 0; +} static int dummy_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info) { @@ -616,6 +623,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return 0; } +static void dummy_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg) { return 0; @@ -983,7 +995,33 @@ static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ -struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT +static inline int dummy_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int dummy_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int dummy_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void dummy_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ } + +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = { + .name = "dummy", +}; #define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \ do { \ @@ -1060,6 +1098,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_permission); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_free_security); @@ -1096,6 +1135,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security); @@ -1170,6 +1210,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_free); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission); #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ - +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free); +#endif } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 54affd0..2e250c70 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/security.h> +/* Boot-time LSM user choice */ +static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]; /* things that live in dummy.c */ extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; @@ -67,13 +69,47 @@ int __init security_init(void) return 0; } +/* Save user chosen LSM */ +static int __init choose_lsm(char *str) +{ + strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX); + return 1; +} +__setup("security=", choose_lsm); + +/** + * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ? + * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked. + * + * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations + * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used + * to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization. + * + * Return true if: + * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time, + * -or user didsn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask + * for registeration permissoin, + * -or the passed LSM is currently loaded. + * Otherwise, return false. + */ +int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops) +{ + if (!*chosen_lsm) + strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX); + else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + /** * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered * * This function is to allow a security module to register itself with the * kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops - * value passed to this function. + * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM + * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops). * * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel, * an error will be returned. Otherwise 0 is returned on success. @@ -523,6 +559,11 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size); } +void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid); +} + int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { return security_ops->file_permission(file, mask); @@ -712,6 +753,11 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag); } +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid); +} + int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) { return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); @@ -1111,3 +1157,28 @@ int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +{ + return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); +} + +int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule); +} + +void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ + security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule); +} + +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx) +{ + return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c index 87d2bb3..64af2d3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/exports.c +++ b/security/selinux/exports.c @@ -25,48 +25,6 @@ /* SECMARK reference count */ extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount; -int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) -{ - if (selinux_enabled) - return security_sid_to_context(sid, ctx, ctxlen); - else { - *ctx = NULL; - *ctxlen = 0; - } - - return 0; -} - -void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid) -{ - if (selinux_enabled) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; - *sid = isec->sid; - return; - } - *sid = 0; -} - -void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid) -{ - if (selinux_enabled) { - struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; - *sid = isec->sid; - return; - } - *sid = 0; -} - -void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid) -{ - if (selinux_enabled) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; - *sid = tsec->sid; - return; - } - *sid = 0; -} - int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid) { if (selinux_enabled) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 34f2d46..f9927f0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ #include "netport.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "netlabel.h" +#include "audit.h" #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX @@ -2792,6 +2793,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry); } +static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + *secid = isec->sid; +} + /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) @@ -3183,7 +3190,8 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { - selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid); + struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security; + *secid = tsec->sid; } static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info) @@ -4149,7 +4157,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff * goto out; if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) - selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); + selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); else if (skb) selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); @@ -5026,6 +5034,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } +static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; + *secid = isec->sid; +} + /* module stacking operations */ static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) { @@ -5281,6 +5295,8 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, #endif static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { + .name = "selinux", + .ptrace = selinux_ptrace, .capget = selinux_capget, .capset_check = selinux_capset_check, @@ -5342,6 +5358,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv, .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv, + .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, @@ -5382,6 +5399,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, + .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid, .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, @@ -5463,12 +5481,24 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .key_free = selinux_key_free, .key_permission = selinux_key_permission, #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init, + .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known, + .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match, + .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free, +#endif }; static __init int selinux_init(void) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; + if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) { + selinux_enabled = 0; + return 0; + } + if (!selinux_enabled) { printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); return 0; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c8b9ef --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks + * + * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which + * is released under below copyrights: + * + * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> + * + * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> + * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> + * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H +#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure. + * @field: the field this rule refers to + * @op: the operater the rule uses + * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule + * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * + * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure + * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with + * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. + * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed + * + * This will free all memory associated with the given rule. + * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed. + */ +void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule); + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule. + * @sid: the context ID to check + * @field: the field this rule refers to + * @op: the operater the rule uses + * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against + * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check + * + * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and + * -errno on failure. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule, + struct audit_context *actx); + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields. + * @rule: rule to be checked + * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); + +#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */ + diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 33425b1..b341b8f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #include "netlabel.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "ebitmap.h" +#include "audit.h" extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno); unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; @@ -2296,21 +2297,23 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule { struct context au_ctxt; }; -void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule) +void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) { + struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule; + if (rule) { context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt); kfree(rule); } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - struct selinux_audit_rule **rule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) { struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule; struct role_datum *roledatum; struct type_datum *typedatum; struct user_datum *userdatum; + struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule; int rc = 0; *rule = NULL; @@ -2397,12 +2400,37 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, return rc; } -int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, - struct selinux_audit_rule *rule, +/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */ +int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; + switch (f->type) { + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, struct audit_context *actx) { struct context *ctxt; struct mls_level *level; + struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule; int match = 0; if (!rule) { @@ -2509,7 +2537,7 @@ out: return match; } -static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL; +static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules; static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) @@ -2534,11 +2562,6 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void) } __initcall(aurule_init); -void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void)) -{ - aurule_callback = callback; -} - #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL /** * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 62c1e98..4a4477f 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> /* @@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_star; extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset; extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list; +extern struct security_operations smack_ops; /* * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation. diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index e2d6f7c..93f5b0c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2424,7 +2424,9 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { } -static struct security_operations smack_ops = { +struct security_operations smack_ops = { + .name = "smack", + .ptrace = smack_ptrace, .capget = cap_capget, .capset_check = cap_capset_check, @@ -2557,6 +2559,9 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = { */ static __init int smack_init(void) { + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + return 0; + printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n"); /* diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index cfae8af..6ba2837 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -965,12 +965,21 @@ static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount; * * register the smackfs * - * Returns 0 unless the registration fails. + * Do not register smackfs if Smack wasn't enabled + * on boot. We can not put this method normally under the + * smack_init() code path since the security subsystem get + * initialized before the vfs caches. + * + * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if + * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded. */ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) { int err; + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + return 0; + err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type); if (!err) { smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type); |