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-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c51
-rw-r--r--security/security.c73
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/exports.c42
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c34
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/audit.h65
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c45
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c7
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c11
9 files changed, 269 insertions, 61 deletions
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 480366f..98d5f96 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -424,6 +424,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu
return 0;
}
+static void dummy_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -542,7 +547,9 @@ static int dummy_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
}
static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
-{ }
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
static int dummy_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
{
@@ -616,6 +623,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return 0;
}
+static void dummy_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return 0;
@@ -983,7 +995,33 @@ static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void dummy_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = {
+ .name = "dummy",
+};
#define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \
do { \
@@ -1060,6 +1098,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
@@ -1096,6 +1135,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
@@ -1170,6 +1210,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_free);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free);
+#endif
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 54affd0..2e250c70 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
+static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
/* things that live in dummy.c */
extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
@@ -67,13 +69,47 @@ int __init security_init(void)
return 0;
}
+/* Save user chosen LSM */
+static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
+{
+ strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
+
+/**
+ * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
+ * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked.
+ *
+ * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
+ * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
+ * to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization.
+ *
+ * Return true if:
+ * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
+ * -or user didsn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask
+ * for registeration permissoin,
+ * -or the passed LSM is currently loaded.
+ * Otherwise, return false.
+ */
+int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+ if (!*chosen_lsm)
+ strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+ else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/**
* register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel
* @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered
*
* This function is to allow a security module to register itself with the
* kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops
- * value passed to this function.
+ * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM
+ * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops).
*
* If there is already a security module registered with the kernel,
* an error will be returned. Otherwise 0 is returned on success.
@@ -523,6 +559,11 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size);
}
+void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
+}
+
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
@@ -712,6 +753,11 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
}
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
+}
+
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
@@ -1111,3 +1157,28 @@ int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule);
+}
+
+void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+ security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index 87d2bb3..64af2d3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -25,48 +25,6 @@
/* SECMARK reference count */
extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount;
-int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled)
- return security_sid_to_context(sid, ctx, ctxlen);
- else {
- *ctx = NULL;
- *ctxlen = 0;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
- *sid = tsec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
{
if (selinux_enabled)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 34f2d46..f9927f0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
#include "netport.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
@@ -2792,6 +2793,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
}
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
/* file security operations */
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -3183,7 +3190,8 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+ *secid = tsec->sid;
}
static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
@@ -4149,7 +4157,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
goto out;
if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
- selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
else if (skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
@@ -5026,6 +5034,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
/* module stacking operations */
static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
@@ -5281,6 +5295,8 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
#endif
static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
+ .name = "selinux",
+
.ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
.capget = selinux_capget,
.capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
@@ -5342,6 +5358,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
.inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
.inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
+ .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
.file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
.file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
@@ -5382,6 +5399,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
+ .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
.msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
.msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
@@ -5463,12 +5481,24 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.key_free = selinux_key_free,
.key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
+ .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
+ .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
+ .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
+#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
+ selinux_enabled = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!selinux_enabled) {
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
return 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c8b9ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which
+ * is released under below copyrights:
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
+ * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ * -errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
+ * @rule: rule to be checked
+ * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 33425b1..b341b8f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include "netlabel.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
@@ -2296,21 +2297,23 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule {
struct context au_ctxt;
};
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
if (rule) {
context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
kfree(rule);
}
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
{
struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
struct role_datum *roledatum;
struct type_datum *typedatum;
struct user_datum *userdatum;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
int rc = 0;
*rule = NULL;
@@ -2397,12 +2400,37 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return rc;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
if (!rule) {
@@ -2509,7 +2537,7 @@ out:
return match;
}
-static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
@@ -2534,11 +2562,6 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
}
__initcall(aurule_init);
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- aurule_callback = callback;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/**
* security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 62c1e98..4a4477f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
/*
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset;
extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
+extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
/*
* Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation.
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index e2d6f7c..93f5b0c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2424,7 +2424,9 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
}
-static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
+struct security_operations smack_ops = {
+ .name = "smack",
+
.ptrace = smack_ptrace,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset_check = cap_capset_check,
@@ -2557,6 +2559,9 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
*/
static __init int smack_init(void)
{
+ if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+ return 0;
+
printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index cfae8af..6ba2837 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -965,12 +965,21 @@ static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount;
*
* register the smackfs
*
- * Returns 0 unless the registration fails.
+ * Do not register smackfs if Smack wasn't enabled
+ * on boot. We can not put this method normally under the
+ * smack_init() code path since the security subsystem get
+ * initialized before the vfs caches.
+ *
+ * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if
+ * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded.
*/
static int __init init_smk_fs(void)
{
int err;
+ if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+ return 0;
+
err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type);
if (!err) {
smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type);