| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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new helper (wrapper around mnt_drop_write()) to be used in pair with
mnt_want_write_file().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Conflicts:
fs/inode.c
fs/ext4/ioctl.c
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
Change-Id: Idcde3c3eba747966dcfc692f1a2f473cbfdf050a
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it's both faster (in case when file has been opened for write) and cleaner.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Conflicts:
fs/ext4/ioctl.c
fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
Change-Id: Ibb2cc434d8d320d7c1790add3108330f6d5b2fc5
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commit 247500820ebd02ad87525db5d9b199e5b66f6636 upstream.
A freebsd NFSv4.0 client was getting rare IO errors expanding a tarball.
A network trace showed the server returning BAD_XDR on the final getattr
of a getattr+write+getattr compound. The final getattr started on a
page boundary.
I believe the Linux client ignores errors on the post-write getattr, and
that that's why we haven't seen this before.
Reported-by: Rick Macklem <rmacklem@uoguelph.ca>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bf8d909705e9d9bac31d9b8eac6734d2b51332a7 upstream.
The seconds field of an nfstime4 structure is 64bit, but we are assuming
that the first 32bits are zero-filled. So if the client tries to set
atime to a value before the epoch (touch -t 196001010101), then the
server will save the wrong value on disk.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0c7c3e67ab91ec6caa44bdf1fc89a48012ceb0c5 upstream.
Don't actually close any opens until we don't need them at all.
This means being left with write access when it's not really necessary,
but that's better than putting a file that might still have posix locks
held on it, as we have been.
Reported-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 64a817cfbded8674f345d1117b117f942a351a69 upstream.
Since we only enforce an upper bound, not a lower bound, a "negative"
length can get through here.
The symptom seen was a warning when we attempt to a kmalloc with an
excessive size.
Reported-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d5f50b0c290431c65377c4afa1c764e2c3fe5305 upstream.
If the argument and reply together exceed the maximum payload size, then
a reply with a read-like operation can overlow the rq_pages array.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a007c4c3e943ecc054a806c259d95420a188754b upstream.
I don't think there's a practical difference for the range of values
these interfaces should see, but it would be safer to be unambiguous.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2930d381d22b9c56f40dd4c63a8fa59719ca2c3c upstream.
Actually, xfs and jfs can optionally be case insensitive; we'll handle
that case in later patches.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04da6e9d63427b2d0fd04766712200c250b3278f upstream.
nfsd_open() already returns an NFS error value; only vfs_test_lock()
result needs to be fed through nfserrno(). Broken by commit 55ef12
(nfsd: Ensure nfsv4 calls the underlying filesystem on LOCKT)
three years ago...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 96f6f98501196d46ce52c2697dd758d9300c63f5 upstream.
..._want_write() returns -EROFS on failure, _not_ an NFS error value.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit efe39651f08813180f37dc508d950fc7d92b29a8 upstream.
Restore the original logics ("fail on mountpoints, negatives and in
case of fh_compose() failures"). Since commit 8177e (nfsd: clean up
readdirplus encoding) that got broken -
rv = fh_compose(fhp, exp, dchild, &cd->fh);
if (rv)
goto out;
if (!dchild->d_inode)
goto out;
rv = 0;
out:
is equivalent to
rv = fh_compose(fhp, exp, dchild, &cd->fh);
out:
and the second check has no effect whatsoever...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b2ea70afade7080360ac55c4e64ff7a5fafdb67b upstream.
expkey_parse() oopses when handling a 0 length export. This is easily
triggerable from usermode by writing 0 bytes into
'/proc/[proc id]/net/rpc/nfsd.fh/channel'.
Below is the log:
[ 1402.286893] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880077c49fff
[ 1402.287632] IP: [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1
[ 1402.287632] PGD 2206063 PUD 1fdfd067 PMD 1ffbc067 PTE 8000000077c49160
[ 1402.287632] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1402.287632] CPU 1
[ 1402.287632] Pid: 20198, comm: trinity Not tainted 3.2.0-rc2-sasha-00058-gc65cd37 #6
[ 1402.287632] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b4b99>] [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1
[ 1402.287632] RSP: 0018:ffff880077f0fd68 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 1402.287632] RAX: ffff880077c49fff RBX: 00000000ffffffea RCX: 0000000001043400
[ 1402.287632] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880077c4a000 RDI: ffffffff82283de0
[ 1402.287632] RBP: ffff880077f0fe18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff880000000000
[ 1402.287632] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff880077c4a000
[ 1402.287632] R13: ffffffff82283de0 R14: 0000000001043400 R15: ffffffff82283de0
[ 1402.287632] FS: 00007f25fec3f700(0000) GS:ffff88007d400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1402.287632] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1402.287632] CR2: ffff880077c49fff CR3: 0000000077e1d000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[ 1402.287632] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1402.287632] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 1402.287632] Process trinity (pid: 20198, threadinfo ffff880077f0e000, task ffff880077db17b0)
[ 1402.287632] Stack:
[ 1402.287632] ffff880077db17b0 ffff880077c4a000 ffff880077f0fdb8 ffffffff810b411e
[ 1402.287632] ffff880000000000 ffff880077db17b0 ffff880077c4a000 ffffffff82283de0
[ 1402.287632] 0000000001043400 ffffffff82283de0 ffff880077f0fde8 ffffffff81111f63
[ 1402.287632] Call Trace:
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff810b411e>] ? lock_release+0x1af/0x1bc
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81111f63>] ? might_fault+0x97/0x9e
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81111f1a>] ? might_fault+0x4e/0x9e
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8bcf2>] cache_do_downcall+0x3e/0x4f
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c950>] cache_write.clone.16+0xbb/0x130
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c9df>] ? cache_write_pipefs+0x1a/0x1a
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c9f8>] cache_write_procfs+0x19/0x1b
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8118dc54>] proc_reg_write+0x8e/0xad
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8113fe81>] vfs_write+0xaa/0xfd
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8114142d>] ? fget_light+0x35/0x9e
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8113ff8b>] sys_write+0x48/0x6f
[ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81bbdb92>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1402.287632] Code: c0 c9 c3 55 48 63 d2 48 89 e5 48 8d 44 32 ff 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 bb ea ff ff ff 48 81 ec 88 00 00 00 48 89 b5 58 ff ff ff
[ 1402.287632] 38 0a 0f 85 89 02 00 00 c6 00 00 48 8b 3d 44 4a e5 01 48 85
[ 1402.287632] RIP [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1
[ 1402.287632] RSP <ffff880077f0fd68>
[ 1402.287632] CR2: ffff880077c49fff
[ 1402.287632] ---[ end trace 368ef53ff773a5e3 ]---
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c30e92df30d7d5fe65262fbce5d1b7de675fe34e upstream.
We don't use WANT bits yet--and sending them can probably trigger a
BUG() further down.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 3d02fa29dec920c597dd7b7db608a4bc71f088ce upstream.
Yet another open-management regression:
- nfs4_file_downgrade() doesn't remove the BOTH access bit on
downgrade, so the server's idea of the stateid's access gets
out of sync with the client's. If we want to keep an O_RDWR
open in this case, we should do that in the file_put_access
logic rather than here.
- We forgot to convert v4 access to an open mode here.
This logic has proven too hard to get right. In the future we may
consider:
- reexamining the lock/openowner relationship (locks probably
don't really need to take their own references here).
- adding open upgrade/downgrade support to the vfs.
- removing the atomic operations. They're redundant as long as
this is all under some other lock.
Also, maybe some kind of additional static checking would help catch
O_/NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS confusion.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a043226bc140a2c1dde162246d68a67e5043e6b2 upstream.
A client that wants to execute a file must be able to read it. Read
opens over nfs are therefore implicitly allowed for executable files
even when those files are not readable.
NFSv2/v3 get this right by using a passed-in NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE on
read requests, but NFSv4 has gotten this wrong ever since
dc730e173785e29b297aa605786c94adaffe2544 "nfsd4: fix owner-override on
open", when we realized that the file owner shouldn't override
permissions on non-reclaim NFSv4 opens.
So we can't use NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE to tell nfsd_permission to allow
reads of executable files.
So, do the same thing we do whenever we encounter another weird NFS
permission nit: define yet another NFSD_MAY_* flag.
The industry's future standardization on 128-bit processors will be
motivated primarily by the need for integers with enough bits for all
the NFSD_MAY_* flags.
Reported-by: Leonardo Borda <leonardoborda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 576163005de286bbd418fcb99cfd0971523a0c6d upstream.
The set of errors here does *not* agree with the set of errors specified
in the rfc!
While we're there, turn this macros into a function, for the usual
reasons, and move it to the one place where it's actually used.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 3e77246393c0a433247631a1f0e9ec98d3d78a1c upstream.
The server is returning nfserr_resource for both permanent errors and
for errors (like allocation failures) that might be resolved by retrying
later. Save nfserr_resource for the former and use delay/jukebox for
the latter.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 832023bffb4b493f230be901f681020caf3ed1f8 upstream.
Fan Yong <yong.fan@whamcloud.com> noticed setting
FMODE_32bithash wouldn't work with nfsd v4, as
nfsd4_readdir() checks for 32 bit cookies. However, according to RFC 3530
cookies have a 64 bit type and cookies are also defined as u64 in
'struct nfsd4_readdir'. So remove the test for >32-bit values.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd.schubert@itwm.fraunhofer.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f197c27196a5e7631b89e2e92daa096fcf7c302c upstream.
Stateid's hold a read reference for a read open, a write reference for a
write open, and an additional one of each for each read+write open. The
latter wasn't getting put on a downgrade, so something like:
open RW
open R
downgrade to R
was resulting in a file leak.
Also fix an imbalance in an error path.
Regression from 7d94784293096c0a46897acdb83be5abd9278ece "nfsd4: fix
downgrade/lock logic".
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 499f3edc23ca0431f3a0a6736b3a40944c81bf3b upstream.
Without this, for example,
open read
open read+write
close
will result in a struct file leak.
Regression from 7d94784293096c0a46897acdb83be5abd9278ece "nfsd4: fix
downgrade/lock logic".
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0c12eaffdf09466f36a9ffe970dda8f4aeb6efc0 upstream.
CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR is used in response to a broken lease; allowing it
to break the lease and return EAGAIN leaves the client unable to make
progress in returning the delegation
nfs4_get_vfs_file() now takes struct nfsd4_open for access to the
claim type, and calls nfsd_open() with NFSD_MAY_NOT_BREAK_LEASE when
claim type is CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR
Signed-off-by: Casey Bodley <cbodley@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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Thanks to Casey Bodley for pointing out that on a read open we pass 0,
instead of O_RDONLY, to break_lease, with the result that a read open is
treated like a write open for the purposes of lease breaking!
Reported-by: Casey Bodley <cbodley@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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fix for commit 4795bb37effb7b8fe77e2d2034545d062d3788a8, nfsd: break
lease on unlink, link, and rename
if the LINK operation breaks a delegation, it returns NFS4ERR_NOENT
(which is not a valid error in rfc 5661) instead of NFS4ERR_DELAY.
the return value of nfsd_break_lease() in nfsd_link() must be
converted from host_err to err
Signed-off-by: Casey Bodley <cbodley@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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nfsd V4 support uses crypto interfaces, so select CRYPTO
to fix build errors in 2.6.39:
ERROR: "crypto_destroy_tfm" [fs/nfsd/nfsd.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "crypto_alloc_base" [fs/nfsd/nfsd.ko] undefined!
Reported-by: Wakko Warner <wakko@animx.eu.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Commit b0b0c0a26e84 "nfsd: add proc file listing kernel's gss_krb5
enctypes" added an nunnecessary dependency of nfsd on the auth_rpcgss
module.
It's a little ad hoc, but since the only piece of information nfsd needs
from rpcsec_gss_krb5 is a single static string, one solution is just to
share it with an include file.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Michael Guntsche <mike@it-loops.com>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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* 'for-2.6.40' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (22 commits)
nfsd: make local functions static
NFSD: Remove unused variable from nfsd4_decode_bind_conn_to_session()
NFSD: Check status from nfsd4_map_bcts_dir()
NFSD: Remove setting unused variable in nfsd_vfs_read()
nfsd41: error out on repeated RECLAIM_COMPLETE
nfsd41: compare request's opcnt with session's maxops at nfsd4_sequence
nfsd v4.1 lOCKT clientid field must be ignored
nfsd41: add flag checking for create_session
nfsd41: make sure nfs server process OPEN with EXCLUSIVE4_1 correctly
nfsd4: fix wrongsec handling for PUTFH + op cases
nfsd4: make fh_verify responsibility of nfsd_lookup_dentry caller
nfsd4: introduce OPDESC helper
nfsd4: allow fh_verify caller to skip pseudoflavor checks
nfsd: distinguish functions of NFSD_MAY_* flags
svcrpc: complete svsk processing on cb receive failure
svcrpc: take advantage of tcp autotuning
SUNRPC: Don't wait for full record to receive tcp data
svcrpc: copy cb reply instead of pages
svcrpc: close connection if client sends short packet
svcrpc: note network-order types in svc_process_calldir
...
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This also fixes a number of sparse warnings.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Compiling gave me this warning:
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c: In function ‘nfsd4_decode_bind_conn_to_session’:
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:427:6: warning: variable ‘dummy’ set but not used
[-Wunused-but-set-variable]
The local variable "dummy" wasn't being used past the READ32() macro that
set it. READ_BUF() should ensure that the xdr buffer is pushed past the
data read into dummy already, so nothing needs to be read in.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
[bfields@redhat.com: minor comment fixup.]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Compiling gave me this warning:
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c: In function ‘nfsd4_bind_conn_to_session’:
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c:1623:9: warning: variable ‘status’ set but not used
[-Wunused-but-set-variable]
The local variable "status" was being set by nfsd4_map_bcts_dir() and
then ignored before calling nfsd4_new_conn().
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Compiling gave me this warning:
fs/nfsd/vfs.c: In function ‘nfsd_vfs_read’:
fs/nfsd/vfs.c:880:16: warning: variable ‘inode’ set but not used
[-Wunused-but-set-variable]
I discovered that a local variable "inode" was being set towards the
beginning of nfsd_vfs_read() and then ignored for the rest of the
function.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Servers are supposed to return nfserr_complete_already to clients that
attempt to send multiple RECLAIM_COMPLETEs.
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Make sure nfs server errors out if request contains more ops
than channel allows.
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
[bfields@redhat.com: use helper function]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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RFC 5661 Section 18.11.3
The clientid field of the owner MAY be set to any value by the client
and MUST be ignored by the server. The reason the server MUST ignore
the clientid field is that the server MUST derive the client ID from
the session ID from the SEQUENCE operation of the COMPOUND request.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Teach the NFS server to reject invalid create_session flags.
Also do some minor formatting adjustments.
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The NFS server uses nfsd_create_v3 to handle EXCLUSIVE4_1 opens, but
that function is not prepared to handle them.
Rename nfsd_create_v3() to do_nfsd_create(), and add handling of
EXCLUSIVE4_1.
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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When PUTFH is followed by an operation that uses the filehandle, and
when the current client is using a security flavor that is inconsistent
with the given filehandle, we have a choice: we can return WRONGSEC
either when the current filehandle is set using the PUTFH, or when the
filehandle is first used by the following operation.
Follow the recommendations of RFC 5661 in making this choice.
(Our current behavior prevented the client from doing security
negotiation by returning WRONGSEC on PUTFH+SECINFO_NO_NAME.)
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The secinfo caller actually won't want this.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Most of the NFSD_MAY_* flags actually request permissions, but over the
years we've accreted a few that modify the behavior of the permission or
open code in other ways.
Distinguish the two cases a little more. In particular, allow the
shortcut at the start of nfsd_permission to ignore the
non-permission-requesting bits.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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- kenrel -> kernel
- whetehr -> whether
- ttt -> tt
- sss -> ss
Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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directories
An open on a NFS4 share using the O_CREAT flag on an existing file for
which we have permissions to open but contained in a directory with no
write permissions will fail with EACCES.
A tcpdump shows that the client had set the open mode to UNCHECKED which
indicates that the file should be created if it doesn't exist and
encountering an existing flag is not an error. Since in this case the
file exists and can be opened by the user, the NFS server is wrong in
attempting to check create permissions on the parent directory.
The patch adds a conditional statement to check for create permissions
only if the file doesn't exist.
Signed-off-by: Sachin S. Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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23fcf2ec93fb8573a653408316af599939ff9a8e (nfsd4: fix oops on lock failure)
The above patch breaks free path for stp->st_file. If stp was inserted
into sop->so_stateids, we have to free stp->st_file refcount. Because
stp->st_file refcount itself is taken whether or not any refcounts are
taken on the stp->st_file->fi_fds[].
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Introduced by acfdf5c383b38f7f4dddae41b97c97f1ae058f49.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Gerhard Heift <ml-nfs-linux-20110412-ef47@gheift.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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* 'for-2.6.39' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux:
nfsd4: fix oops on lock failure
nfsd: fix auth_domain reference leak on nlm operations
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Lock stateid's can have access_bmap 0 if they were only partially
initialized (due to a failed lock request); handle that case in
free_generic_stateid.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c:380!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run
Modules linked in: nfs fscache md4 nls_utf8 cifs ip6table_filter ip6_tables ebtable_nat ebtables ipt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat bridge stp llc nfsd lockd nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrpc ipv6 ppdev parport_pc parport pcnet32 mii pcspkr microcode i2c_piix4 BusLogic floppy [last unloaded: mperf]
Pid: 1468, comm: nfsd Not tainted 2.6.38+ #120 VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform
EIP: 0060:[<e24f180d>] EFLAGS: 00010297 CPU: 0
EIP is at nfs4_access_to_omode+0x1c/0x29 [nfsd]
EAX: ffffffff EBX: dd758120 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000004
ESI: dd758120 EDI: ddfe657c EBP: dd54dde0 ESP: dd54dde0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
Process nfsd (pid: 1468, ti=dd54c000 task=ddc92580 task.ti=dd54c000)
Stack:
dd54ddf0 e24f19ca 00000000 ddfe6560 dd54de08 e24f1a5d dd758130 deee3a20
ddfe6560 31270000 dd54df1c e24f52fd 0000000f dd758090 e2505dd0 0be304cf
dbb51d68 0000000e ddfe657c ddcd8020 dd758130 dd758128 dd7580d8 dd54de68
Call Trace:
[<e24f19ca>] free_generic_stateid+0x1c/0x3e [nfsd]
[<e24f1a5d>] release_lockowner+0x71/0x8a [nfsd]
[<e24f52fd>] nfsd4_lock+0x617/0x66c [nfsd]
[<e24e57b6>] ? nfsd_setuser+0x199/0x1bb [nfsd]
[<e24e056c>] ? nfsd_setuser_and_check_port+0x65/0x81 [nfsd]
[<c07a0052>] ? _cond_resched+0x8/0x1c
[<c04ca61f>] ? slab_pre_alloc_hook.clone.33+0x23/0x27
[<c04cac01>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1a/0xd2
[<c04835a0>] ? __call_rcu+0xd7/0xdd
[<e24e0dfb>] ? fh_verify+0x401/0x452 [nfsd]
[<e24f0b61>] ? nfsd4_encode_operation+0x52/0x117 [nfsd]
[<e24ea0d7>] ? nfsd4_putfh+0x33/0x3b [nfsd]
[<e24f4ce6>] ? nfsd4_delegreturn+0xd4/0xd4 [nfsd]
[<e24ea2c9>] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x1ea/0x33e [nfsd]
[<e24de6ee>] nfsd_dispatch+0xd1/0x1a5 [nfsd]
[<e1d6e1c7>] svc_process_common+0x282/0x46f [sunrpc]
[<e1d6e578>] svc_process+0xdc/0xfa [sunrpc]
[<e24de0fa>] nfsd+0xd6/0x115 [nfsd]
[<e24de024>] ? nfsd_shutdown+0x24/0x24 [nfsd]
[<c0454322>] kthread+0x62/0x67
[<c04542c0>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x114/0x114
[<c07a6ebe>] kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0x10
Code: eb 05 b8 00 00 27 4f 8d 65 f4 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 83 e0 03 55 83 f8 02 89 e5 74 17 83 f8 03 74 05 48 75 09 eb 09 b8 02 00 00 00 eb 0b <0f> 0b 31 c0 eb 05 b8 01 00 00 00 5d c3 55 89 e5 57 56 89 d6 8d
EIP: [<e24f180d>] nfs4_access_to_omode+0x1c/0x29 [nfsd] SS:ESP 0068:dd54dde0
---[ end trace 2b0bf6c6557cb284 ]---
The trace route is:
-> nfsd4_lock()
-> if (lock->lk_is_new) {
-> alloc_init_lock_stateid()
3739: stp->st_access_bmap = 0;
->if (status && lock->lk_is_new && lock_sop)
-> release_lockowner()
-> free_generic_stateid()
-> nfs4_access_bmap_to_omode()
-> nfs4_access_to_omode()
380: BUG(); *****
This problem was introduced by 0997b173609b9229ece28941c118a2a9b278796e.
Reported-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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This was noticed by users who performed more than 2^32 lock operations
and hence made this counter overflow (eventually leading to
use-after-free's). Setting rq_client to NULL here means that it won't
later get auth_domain_put() when it should be.
Appears to have been introduced in 2.5.42 by "[PATCH] kNFSd: Move auth
domain lookup into svcauth" which moved most of the rq_client handling
to common svcauth code, but left behind this one line.
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
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