aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/net/ipv6
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>2011-03-15 13:37:13 +0100
committerPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>2011-03-15 13:37:13 +0100
commit6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 (patch)
treebdd3ebda1c8b1e75c32f6fa115ada1dcef18f1f4 /net/ipv6
parent78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a (diff)
downloadkernel_samsung_smdk4412-6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54.zip
kernel_samsung_smdk4412-6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54.tar.gz
kernel_samsung_smdk4412-6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54.tar.bz2
ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index 47b7b8d..c9598a9 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -1275,6 +1275,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
@@ -1822,6 +1823,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
@@ -2051,6 +2053,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
+ rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;
if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
target = 1;