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authorMilan Broz <mbroz@redhat.com>2011-03-24 13:54:30 +0000
committerAlasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>2011-03-24 13:54:30 +0000
commitf868120549fc1664b2c451d4b9882a363928c698 (patch)
tree20d95a8f3b9fac1348bd42a5ff1e3f9d43918b93 /drivers/md
parent6bb43b5d1f54fb44c0408d86d5e71e4405a3ebe1 (diff)
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dm ioctl: add flag to wipe buffers for secure data
Add DM_SECURE_DATA_FLAG which userspace can use to ensure that all buffers allocated for dm-ioctl are wiped immediately after use. The user buffer is wiped as well (we do not want to keep and return sensitive data back to userspace if the flag is set). Wiping is useful for cryptsetup to ensure that the key is present in memory only in defined places and only for the time needed. (For crypt, key can be present in table during load or table status, wait and message commands). Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <mbroz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md')
-rw-r--r--drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c23
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
index 3a8f6a0..4cacdad 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
@@ -1504,6 +1504,7 @@ static int check_version(unsigned int cmd, struct dm_ioctl __user *user)
static int copy_params(struct dm_ioctl __user *user, struct dm_ioctl **param)
{
struct dm_ioctl tmp, *dmi;
+ int secure_data;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp) - sizeof(tmp.data)))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1511,17 +1512,28 @@ static int copy_params(struct dm_ioctl __user *user, struct dm_ioctl **param)
if (tmp.data_size < (sizeof(tmp) - sizeof(tmp.data)))
return -EINVAL;
+ secure_data = tmp.flags & DM_SECURE_DATA_FLAG;
+
dmi = vmalloc(tmp.data_size);
- if (!dmi)
+ if (!dmi) {
+ if (secure_data && clear_user(user, tmp.data_size))
+ return -EFAULT;
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
if (copy_from_user(dmi, user, tmp.data_size))
goto bad;
+ /* Wipe the user buffer so we do not return it to userspace */
+ if (secure_data && clear_user(user, tmp.data_size))
+ goto bad;
+
*param = dmi;
return 0;
bad:
+ if (secure_data)
+ memset(dmi, 0, tmp.data_size);
vfree(dmi);
return -EFAULT;
}
@@ -1531,6 +1543,7 @@ static int validate_params(uint cmd, struct dm_ioctl *param)
/* Always clear this flag */
param->flags &= ~DM_BUFFER_FULL_FLAG;
param->flags &= ~DM_UEVENT_GENERATED_FLAG;
+ param->flags &= ~DM_SECURE_DATA_FLAG;
/* Ignores parameters */
if (cmd == DM_REMOVE_ALL_CMD ||
@@ -1558,6 +1571,7 @@ static int validate_params(uint cmd, struct dm_ioctl *param)
static int ctl_ioctl(uint command, struct dm_ioctl __user *user)
{
int r = 0;
+ int wipe_buffer;
unsigned int cmd;
struct dm_ioctl *uninitialized_var(param);
ioctl_fn fn = NULL;
@@ -1602,13 +1616,15 @@ static int ctl_ioctl(uint command, struct dm_ioctl __user *user)
* Copy the parameters into kernel space.
*/
r = copy_params(user, &param);
- input_param_size = param->data_size;
current->flags &= ~PF_MEMALLOC;
if (r)
return r;
+ input_param_size = param->data_size;
+ wipe_buffer = param->flags & DM_SECURE_DATA_FLAG;
+
r = validate_params(cmd, param);
if (r)
goto out;
@@ -1623,6 +1639,9 @@ static int ctl_ioctl(uint command, struct dm_ioctl __user *user)
r = -EFAULT;
out:
+ if (wipe_buffer)
+ memset(param, 0, input_param_size);
+
vfree(param);
return r;
}