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author | Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> | 2015-04-19 02:48:39 +0200 |
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committer | Ziyan <jaraidaniel@gmail.com> | 2016-10-29 01:34:04 +0200 |
commit | 48f019d171cdd9e327886cbdcb9dc6c924d20c14 (patch) | |
tree | f104e0df761e032cee37a146e6cedf9c3eec9b9f /fs | |
parent | ba42a3d920ccbdf1c359abbdfe8af2a9398faf6e (diff) | |
download | kernel_samsung_tuna-48f019d171cdd9e327886cbdcb9dc6c924d20c14.zip kernel_samsung_tuna-48f019d171cdd9e327886cbdcb9dc6c924d20c14.tar.gz kernel_samsung_tuna-48f019d171cdd9e327886cbdcb9dc6c924d20c14.tar.bz2 |
fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
fs/exec.c
Change-Id: Iecebf23d07e299689e4ba4fd74ea8821ef96e72b
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 65 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 25 deletions
@@ -1263,6 +1263,45 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return res; } +static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct inode *inode; + unsigned int mode; + uid_t uid; + gid_t gid; + + /* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */ + bprm->cred->euid = current_euid(); + bprm->cred->egid = current_egid(); + + if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) + return; + + inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + mode = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_mode); + if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID))) + return; + + /* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */ + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); + + /* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */ + mode = inode->i_mode; + uid = inode->i_uid; + gid = inode->i_gid; + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); + + if (mode & S_ISUID) { + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->cred->euid = uid; + } + + if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->cred->egid = gid; + } +} + /* * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes @@ -1271,36 +1310,12 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - umode_t mode; - struct inode * inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; int retval; - mode = inode->i_mode; if (bprm->file->f_op == NULL) return -EACCES; - /* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */ - bprm->cred->euid = current_euid(); - bprm->cred->egid = current_egid(); - - if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) { - /* Set-uid? */ - if (mode & S_ISUID) { - bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid; - } - - /* Set-gid? */ - /* - * If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this - * is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid - * executable. - */ - if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { - bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid; - } - } + bprm_fill_uid(bprm); /* fill in binprm security blob */ retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm); |