aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* tuna config: bcmdhd as a moduleHEADreplicant-6.0Wolfgang Wiedmeyer2017-06-131-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
* tuna config: disable TEE-related driver codeWolfgang Wiedmeyer2017-05-141-6/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
* tuna config: enable ath9k and do some hardeningWolfgang Wiedmeyer2017-05-131-8/+89
| | | | | | | Ensure that heap randomization is enabled all the time. Enable stack-protector mode and seccomp. Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
* fs/ntfs: Disable optimization for ntfs_runlists_mergeWolfgang Wiedmeyer2017-05-121-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | GCC version 5.4.1+svn241155-1 in Debian Stretch has a bug that breaks the build. The error is attached. TODO: Figure out the actual bug or revert patch if a newer GCC is available in Stretch. /home/wolfi/replicant/6.0-romsrc-official/kernel/samsung/tuna/fs/ntfs/runlist.c: In function 'ntfs_runlists_merge': /home/wolfi/replicant/6.0-romsrc-official/kernel/samsung/tuna/fs/ntfs/runlist.c:719:1: error: insn does not satisfy its constraints: } ^ (insn 1914 3742 3628 272 (parallel [ (set (reg:SI 2 r2 [orig:463 D.21528 ] [463]) (and:SI (geu:SI (reg:SI 2 r2 [orig:463 D.21528 ] [463]) (reg:SI 3 r3 [orig:1339 D.21528 ] [1339])) (leu:SI (reg:SI 2 r2 [orig:463 D.21528 ] [463]) (const_int -134217729 [0xfffffffff7ffffff])))) (clobber (reg:CC 100 cc)) ]) /home/wolfi/replicant/6.0-romsrc-official/kernel/samsung/tuna/include/linux/mm.h:315 256 {*and_scc_scc_nodom} (nil)) /home/wolfi/replicant/6.0-romsrc-official/kernel/samsung/tuna/fs/ntfs/runlist.c:719:1: internal compiler error: in extract_constrain_insn, at recog.c:2246 /home/wolfi/replicant/6.0-romsrc-official/kernel/samsung/tuna/fs/ntfs/runlist.c:719:1: internal compiler error: Segmentation fault arm-none-eabi-gcc: internal compiler error: Segmentation fault (program cc1) Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
* mmc: quirks: disable TEST_MMC_FW_PATCHINGZiyan2017-05-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | I'm randomly getting broken kernels with this problematic emmc since switching to GCC 4.8. The problem seems to happen inside the mmc firmware patching procedure. We tried to disable GCC optimizations for these methods, but that didn't always fix the issue. By disabling TEST_MMC_FW_PATCHING, it seems like the kernel somewhat stabilized - we need to look into why it caused broken kernels/emmc lockups in the future. Change-Id: I7cf8fe14e7ab0358228a844c582e17d6bf9731a1
* omap: dss: Suspend DSS with earlysuspendPaul Kocialkowski2017-05-111-0/+36
| | | | Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr>
* mm: Disable optimization for function shrink_page_list()Wolfgang Wiedmeyer2017-05-111-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | GCC version 5.4.1+svn241155-1 in Debian Stretch has a bug that breaks the build. The error is attached. TODO: Gigure out the actual bug or revert patch if a newer GCC is available in Stretch. /home/wolfi/6.0-romsrc/kernel/samsung/smdk4412/mm/vmscan.c: In function 'shrink_page_list': /home/wolfi/6.0-romsrc/kernel/samsung/smdk4412/mm/vmscan.c:1019:1: error: insn does not satisfy its constraints: } ^ (insn 1111 1814 1112 116 (parallel [ (set (reg/v:SI 3 r3 [orig:111 nr_dirty ] [111]) (and:SI (ne:SI (reg/v:SI 3 r3 [orig:111 nr_dirty ] [111]) (const_int 0 [0])) (eq:SI (reg/v:SI 3 r3 [orig:111 nr_dirty ] [111]) (reg/v:SI 2 r2 [orig:112 nr_congested ] [112])))) (clobber (reg:CC 100 cc)) ]) /home/wolfi/6.0-romsrc/kernel/samsung/smdk4412/mm/vmscan.c:1011 256 {*and_scc_scc_nodom} (nil)) /home/wolfi/6.0-romsrc/kernel/samsung/smdk4412/mm/vmscan.c:1019:1: internal compiler error: in extract_constrain_insn, at recog.c:2246 /home/wolfi/6.0-romsrc/kernel/samsung/smdk4412/mm/vmscan.c:1019:1: internal compiler error: Segmentation fault arm-none-eabi-gcc: internal compiler error: Segmentation fault (program cc1) Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wiedmeyer <wolfgit@wiedmeyer.de>
* kernel: add support for gcc 5Sasha Levin2017-05-111-0/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 71458cfc782eafe4b27656e078d379a34e472adf upstream. We're missing include/linux/compiler-gcc5.h which is required now because gcc branched off to v5 in trunk. Just copy the relevant bits out of include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h, no new code is added as of now. This fixes a build error when using gcc 5. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* omap: remoteproc: add a notification for loading errorMiguel Vadillo2017-05-103-1/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When calling rproc_get for the first time, the loading of the remoteproc image will be requested using a non-blocking request_firmware_no_wait, and the caller can continue before the actual loading is complete. The loader later can return an error due to a non-existing or wrong image and there should be a way to notify about this to users having a rproc handle. This functionality is added and is leveraged by rpmsg to release some resources it had already acquired since requesting a firmware load. Change-Id: I1d3523efbcfd613bca74d363084791ceaaaa9989 Signed-off-by: Miguel Vadillo <vadillo@ti.com>
* WiFi nvram path for tunaPaul Kocialkowski2017-05-101-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr>
* Replicant kernel releasePaul Kocialkowski2017-05-101-2/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr>
* Get rid of proprietary firmwares and related instructionsPaul Kocialkowski2017-05-10162-136972/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr>
* vfs: more mnt_parent cleanupsAl Viro2016-10-294-55/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | a) mount --move is checking that ->mnt_parent is non-NULL before looking if that parent happens to be shared; ->mnt_parent is never NULL and it's not even an misspelled !mnt_has_parent() b) pivot_root open-codes is_path_reachable(), poorly. c) so does path_is_under(), while we are at it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> (backported from commit afac7cba7ed31968a95e181dc25e204e45009ea8) CVE-2014-7970 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1383356 Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Change-Id: I6b2297f46388f135c1b760a37d45efc0e33542db
* vfs: new internal helper: mnt_has_parent(mnt)Al Viro2016-10-295-12/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | vfsmounts have ->mnt_parent pointing either to a different vfsmount or to itself; it's never NULL and termination condition in loops traversing the tree towards root is mnt == mnt->mnt_parent. At least one place (see the next patch) is confused about what's going on; let's add an explicit helper checking it right way and use it in all places where we need it. Not that there had been too many, but... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit b2dba1af3c4157040303a76d25216b1713d333d0) CVE-2014-7970 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1383356 Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Change-Id: Iaa5ab510804f3b17fe71197b8919d663a416bf05
* KEYS: Fix short sprintf buffer in /proc/keys show functionDavid Howells2016-10-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption. The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout rendered as weeks: (gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7) $2 = 30500568904943 That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL. Expand the buffer to 16 chars. I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a 64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that isn't checked again on the other side. The panic incurred looks something like: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Change-Id: I0787d5a38c730ecb75d3c08f28f0ab36295d59e7 Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
* tcp: fix use after free in tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue()Eric Dumazet2016-10-291-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail() Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb. If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb. Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb) Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped, this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy, returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel. This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller. Change-Id: I264f97d30d0a623011d9ee811c63fa0e0c2149a2 Fixes: 6859d49475d4 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb") Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* perf: duplicate deletion of perf eventSrinivasarao P2016-10-291-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | a malicious app can open a perf event with constraint_duplicate bit set, disable the event, and close the fd. On closing the fd, the perf_release() modification causes the kernel to clean up the event as if it still were enabled, leading to the event being removed from a list twice. CRs-Fixed: 977563 Change-Id: I5fbec3722407d2f3d0ff0d9f7097c5889e31fd62 Signed-off-by: Srinivasarao P <spathi@codeaurora.org>
* net: fix iterating over hashtable in tcp_nuke_addr()Dmitry Torokhov2016-10-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | The actual size of the tcp hashinfo table is tcp_hashinfo.ehash_mask + 1 so we need to adjust the loop accordingly to get the sockets hashed into the last bucket. Change-Id: I796b3c7b4a1a7fa35fba9e5192a4a403eb6e17de Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@google.com>
* __ptrace_may_access() should not deny sub-threadsMark Grondona2016-10-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 73af963f9f3036dffed55c3a2898598186db1045 upstream. __ptrace_may_access() checks get_dumpable/ptrace_has_cap/etc if task != current, this can can lead to surprising results. For example, a sub-thread can't readlink("/proc/self/exe") if the executable is not readable. setup_new_exec()->would_dump() notices that inode_permission(MAY_READ) fails and then it does set_dumpable(suid_dumpable). After that get_dumpable() fails. (It is not clear why proc_pid_readlink() checks get_dumpable(), perhaps we could add PTRACE_MODE_NODUMPABLE) Change __ptrace_may_access() to use same_thread_group() instead of "task == current". Any security check is pointless when the tasks share the same ->mm. Change-Id: Ib6ca927a1eb0637df8030aabcb3129d5be343512 Signed-off-by: Mark Grondona <mgrondona@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* mnt: Prevent pivot_root from creating a loop in the mount treeEric W. Biederman2016-10-291-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Andy Lutomirski recently demonstrated that when chroot is used to set the root path below the path for the new ``root'' passed to pivot_root the pivot_root system call succeeds and leaks mounts. In examining the code I see that starting with a new root that is below the current root in the mount tree will result in a loop in the mount tree after the mounts are detached and then reattached to one another. Resulting in all kinds of ugliness including a leak of that mounts involved in the leak of the mount loop. Prevent this problem by ensuring that the new mount is reachable from the current root of the mount tree. [Added stable cc. Fixes CVE-2014-7970. --Andy] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bnpmihks.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> (backported from commit 0d0826019e529f21c84687521d03f60cd241ca7d) CVE-2014-7970 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1383356 Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Change-Id: I0fe1d090eeb4765cc49401784e44a430f9585498
* mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remountEric W. Biederman2016-10-292-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a6138db815df5ee542d848318e5dae681590fccd upstream. Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> discovered that by remounting a read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user to the remount a read-only mount read-write. Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags simply won't change. Change-Id: I8ab8bda03a14b9b43e78f1dc6c818bbec048e986 Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Francis Moreau <francis.moro@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
* ARM: 7527/1: uaccess: explicitly check __user pointer when !CPU_USE_DOMAINSRussell King2016-10-294-21/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8404663f81d212918ff85f493649a7991209fa04 upstream. The {get,put}_user macros don't perform range checking on the provided __user address when !CPU_HAS_DOMAINS. This patch reworks the out-of-line assembly accessors to check the user address against a specified limit, returning -EFAULT if is is out of range. [will: changed get_user register allocation to match put_user] [rmk: fixed building on older ARM architectures] Change-Id: I9bfb98408bd76da6a342258dd50e72aa283f5416 Reported-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ARM: assembler.h: Add string declaration macroDave Martin2016-10-291-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Declaring strings in assembler source involves a certain amount of tedious boilerplate code in order to annotate the resulting symbol correctly. Encapsulating this boilerplate in a macro should help to avoid some duplication and the occasional mistake. Change-Id: I0238dfb0bc97285d9a32b55289b4949cda13fbde Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@linaro.org> Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
* ARM: 7301/1: Rename the T() macro to TUSER() to avoid namespace conflictsCatalin Marinas2016-10-297-79/+79
| | | | | | | | | | This macro is used to generate unprivileged accesses (LDRT/STRT) to user space. Change-Id: Iede5f5f8454abafd3b7d4519b7aa77b85fe474b6 Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
* drivers:staging:android Typos: fix some comments that have typos in them.Justin P. Mattock2016-10-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Below is a patch that fixes some typos in some comments. Change-Id: Ib0e8349b23013c955cbbe9d3f2b4e934bf650ec6 Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Staging: android: binder: Remove an inconsequential conditional macroSachin Kamat2016-10-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | Removes an inconsequential conditional macro. Change-Id: I77e4d975e86e31702ae9325d8e1a06a35e668c74 Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* drivers: staging: android: binder.c: fix printk macrosSherwin Soltani2016-10-291-27/+27
| | | | | | | | Change printk() messages to pr_* macros. Change-Id: I7a9be004c1d735248783ed3a69abd7a88503b176 Signed-off-by: Sherwin Soltani <sherwin@wybc.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()Linus Torvalds2016-10-292-2/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once (badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug"). In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will have to look at the page state itself. Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger. To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes, we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that the FOLL_COW flag is still valid. Change-Id: Id9bec3722797dff7d0ff0d9f6097c4229e31fd62 Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [wt: s/gup.c/memory.c; s/follow_page_pte/follow_page_mask; s/faultin_page/__get_user_page] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
* HID: hiddev: validate num_values for HIDIOCGUSAGES, HIDIOCSUSAGES commandsScott Bauer2016-10-291-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter leading to a heap overflow. Change-Id: I10866ee01c7ba430eab2b5cc3356c9519c7f9730 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mountsEric W. Biederman2016-10-291-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts it is reasonable to fail early. The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears reasonable. Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts that appear in the mount tree. Change-Id: I2edfee6d6951a2179ce8f53785b65ddb1eb95629 Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* net: wireless: bcmdhd: check privilege on priv cmdJerry Lee2016-10-291-0/+4
| | | | | | | | check net admin capability for ioctl calls BUG=26425765 Change-Id: Idae75c9fc530add3ead3508d25e994bbfec9a6de
* USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devioKangjie Lu2016-10-291-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland via “copy_to_user”. Change-Id: Icd49231ee1862682739a871ae78a5602ee104731 Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ppp: take reference on channels netnsGuillaume Nault2016-10-291-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace. Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from under them. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at addr ffff880064e217e0 Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581 ============================================================================= BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906 [< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440 [< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469 [< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532 [< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574 [< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579 [< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597 [< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325 [< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360 [< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95 [< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150 [< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451 [< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274 [< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723 [< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832 [< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826 [< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185 INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631 [< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650 [< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805 [< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814 [< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341 [< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348 [< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448 [< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036 [< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170 [< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303 [< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468 INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000 flags=0x5fffc0000004080 INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200 CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300 ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054 ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15 [<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50 [<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654 [<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661 [< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138 [<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236 [< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259 [<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280 [< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218 [<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392 [< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218 [<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392 [< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293 [<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392 [<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241 [<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000 [<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478 [<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744 [<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772 [<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901 [<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688 [<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208 [<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244 [<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115 [< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21 [<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750 [<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123 [<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357 [<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550 [<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145 [<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880 [<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307 [< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113 [<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158 [<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712 [<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655 [<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165 [<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692 [< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099 [<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678 [< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807 [<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283 [<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247 [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282 [<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344 [<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Change-Id: I591b30eafa1b57bd2e211e1f33c39128702ff0b0 Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2") Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflowFlorian Westphal2016-10-291-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | Ben Hawkes says: integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap corruption. Change-Id: I13c554c630651a37e3f6a195e9a5f40cddcb29a1 Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
* ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterruptKangjie Lu2016-10-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field “event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized. Change-Id: Ie3dcdee7da8ad292712814e8402c571a717ab8d1 Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
* ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_ccallbackKangjie Lu2016-10-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field “event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized. Change-Id: I5ece63432f6ca6251fa31c046c211c8c03313a59 Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
* ALSA: timer: Fix leak in SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMSKangjie Lu2016-10-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | The stack object “tread” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field “event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized. Change-Id: Ibf2868136a538eed0f2e75395a5f14a8608dd86d Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
* Input: aiptek - adjust error-handling code labelJulia Lawall2016-10-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | At the point of this error-handling code, aiptek->urb has been allocated, and it does not appear to be less necessary to free it here than in the error-handling code just below. Change-Id: I1b07d7cd62a3df78759dd5a9a5ad27e58350df01 Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@mail.ru>
* Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpointsVladis Dronov2016-10-291-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths. Change-Id: I02fa4ffcbe9a71948947ef5baeb72632688d9d07 Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helperFlorian Westphal2016-10-293-33/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called -- the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP. However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies. It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching. However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches (no -m args). The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule. Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'. Change-Id: Id2b4779f2e41b1a82b1d266bb9e11118c4428afc Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
* ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.David S. Miller2016-10-293-2/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large: 1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no point in doing this. 2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to do this once, as is already caught by the existing masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this. Change-Id: I4b2a3ed665543728451c21465fb90ec89f739135 Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
* USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checkingOliver Neukum2016-10-291-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check to the code path for quirky devices. Change-Id: Ie96a95d833e4ca9c3c3c3557679115ffb7069b5b Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()Oliver Neukum2016-10-291-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled. They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to the double free reported in http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm. Change-Id: I43b1673bc31b3af05789e461b39c55062735cc56 Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* ALSA: hrtimer: Fix stall by hrtimer_cancel()Takashi Iwai2016-10-291-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it must not be called inside the callback itself. This was already a problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit [fcfdebe70759: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it. However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback. Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall. This is no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer. This patch tries to fix the issue again. Now we call hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue if the functions have been called outside the callback. The proper hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be enough. Change-Id: Id6224b2a3ade0d217e891e6af09744df4d0b2e5c Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
* pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipesWilly Tarreau2016-10-295-2/+87
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to prevent this from happening. This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing pipes to work correctly though with less data at once. The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024) to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB = 1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use of pipes (eg: for splicing). Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+) Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Conflicts: Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt fs/pipe.c include/linux/sched.h Change-Id: Ic7c678af18129943e16715fdaa64a97a7f0854be
* ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handlingTakashi Iwai2016-10-291-4/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected accesses. This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock. Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close(). Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop() at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch. Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and this hopefully fixes these issues. Change-Id: I572878b909dda522dbedc84633414185802bc974 Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
* ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctlsTakashi Iwai2016-10-291-13/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl. The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to serialize there. Change-Id: Iaa21b00f62e02cc58e346a29846e0fce6536e860 Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
* ALSA: timer: Fix double unlink of active_listTakashi Iwai2016-10-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ALSA timer instance object has a couple of linked lists and they are unlinked unconditionally at snd_timer_stop(). Meanwhile snd_timer_interrupt() unlinks it, but it calls list_del() which leaves the element list itself unchanged. This ends up with unlinking twice, and it was caught by syzkaller fuzzer. The fix is to use list_del_init() variant properly there, too. Change-Id: I95e2ab06180dfe43fb6b7c2875a866b53ca245ce Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
* ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twiceAndrey Konovalov2016-10-291-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free() when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface. Found by KASAN. Change-Id: I8534867beeac111370017ef246adc17e23e1a3b1 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
* pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed readBen Hutchings2016-10-291-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Quoting the RHEL advisory: > It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer > offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially > resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user > could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user > space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate) The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to 3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y. We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds. Change-Id: I988802f38acf40c7671fa0978880928b02d29b56 References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit feae3ca2e5e1a8f44aa6290255d3d9709985d0b2)
generated by cgit v1.1 at 2025-07-03 02:06:51 +0000