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| author | Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> | 2013-04-16 16:41:32 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> | 2013-04-24 08:53:26 -0700 |
| commit | e18c0d508a6d8b4376c6f0b8c22600e5aca37f69 (patch) | |
| tree | fcc32d8ac71aa67dba344a8a71114a49ee9430d0 /adb/adb.c | |
| parent | 072ee0143048a6bbd4068002352a4201ac853b6e (diff) | |
| download | system_core-e18c0d508a6d8b4376c6f0b8c22600e5aca37f69.zip system_core-e18c0d508a6d8b4376c6f0b8c22600e5aca37f69.tar.gz system_core-e18c0d508a6d8b4376c6f0b8c22600e5aca37f69.tar.bz2 | |
fs_mgr: make block devices read-only
When a filesystem is mounted read-only, make the underlying
block device read-only too. This helps prevent an attacker
who is able to change permissions on the files in /dev
(for example, symlink attack) from modifying the block device.
In particular, this change would have stopped the LG Thrill / Optimus
3D rooting exploit
(http://vulnfactory.org/blog/2012/02/26/rooting-the-lg-thrill-optimus-3d/)
as that exploit modified the raw block device corresponding to /system.
This change also makes UID=0 less powerful. Block devices cannot
be made writable again without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so an escalation
to UID=0 by itself doesn't give full root access.
adb/mount: Prior to mounting something read-write, remove the
read-only restrictions on the underlying block device. This avoids
messing up developer workflows.
Change-Id: I135098a8fe06f327336f045aab0d48ed9de33807
Diffstat (limited to 'adb/adb.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions