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authorDavid 'Digit' Turner <digit@google.com>2009-05-02 19:43:30 +0200
committerDavid 'Digit' Turner <digit@google.com>2009-05-02 19:43:30 +0200
commita26c4e049a8fd163ba5f25d0c43c8a3fee86453f (patch)
treecf940d15e1d28f3c2d5919ff4427e5d39fa1f135 /libcutils
parent7e3424b9c17ad94f14fe71cecca3d7cc33c0e7a9 (diff)
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Fix a potential integer overflow bug that could result in memory overwrites.
Also add a check to the result of malloc()
Diffstat (limited to 'libcutils')
-rw-r--r--libcutils/strdup16to8.c108
1 files changed, 86 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/libcutils/strdup16to8.c b/libcutils/strdup16to8.c
index fadaabe..1a8ba86 100644
--- a/libcutils/strdup16to8.c
+++ b/libcutils/strdup16to8.c
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
** limitations under the License.
*/
+#include <limits.h> /* for SIZE_MAX */
+
#include <cutils/jstring.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -26,19 +28,67 @@
*/
extern size_t strnlen16to8(const char16_t* utf16Str, size_t len)
{
- size_t utf8Len = 0;
-
- while (len--) {
- unsigned int uic = *utf16Str++;
-
- if (uic > 0x07ff)
- utf8Len += 3;
- else if (uic > 0x7f || uic == 0)
- utf8Len += 2;
- else
- utf8Len++;
- }
- return utf8Len;
+ size_t utf8Len = 0;
+
+ /* A small note on integer overflow. The result can
+ * potentially be as big as 3*len, which will overflow
+ * for len > SIZE_MAX/3.
+ *
+ * Moreover, the result of a strnlen16to8 is typically used
+ * to allocate a destination buffer to strncpy16to8 which
+ * requires one more byte to terminate the UTF-8 copy, and
+ * this is generally done by careless users by incrementing
+ * the result without checking for integer overflows, e.g.:
+ *
+ * dst = malloc(strnlen16to8(utf16,len)+1)
+ *
+ * Due to this, the following code will try to detect
+ * overflows, and never return more than (SIZE_MAX-1)
+ * when it detects one. A careless user will try to malloc
+ * SIZE_MAX bytes, which will return NULL which can at least
+ * be detected appropriately.
+ *
+ * As far as I know, this function is only used by strndup16(),
+ * but better be safe than sorry.
+ */
+
+ /* Fast path for the usual case where 3*len is < SIZE_MAX-1.
+ */
+ if (len < (SIZE_MAX-1)/3) {
+ while (len--) {
+ unsigned int uic = *utf16Str++;
+
+ if (uic > 0x07ff)
+ utf8Len += 3;
+ else if (uic > 0x7f || uic == 0)
+ utf8Len += 2;
+ else
+ utf8Len++;
+ }
+ return utf8Len;
+ }
+
+ /* The slower but paranoid version */
+ while (len--) {
+ unsigned int uic = *utf16Str++;
+ size_t utf8Cur = utf8Len;
+
+ if (uic > 0x07ff)
+ utf8Len += 3;
+ else if (uic > 0x7f || uic == 0)
+ utf8Len += 2;
+ else
+ utf8Len++;
+
+ if (utf8Len < utf8Cur) /* overflow detected */
+ return SIZE_MAX-1;
+ }
+
+ /* don't return SIZE_MAX to avoid common user bug */
+ if (utf8Len == SIZE_MAX)
+ utf8Len = SIZE_MAX-1;
+
+ return utf8Len;
}
@@ -50,7 +100,7 @@ extern size_t strnlen16to8(const char16_t* utf16Str, size_t len)
*
* Make sure you allocate "utf8Str" with the result of strlen16to8() + 1,
* not just "len".
- *
+ *
* Please note, a terminated \0 is always added, so your result will always
* be "strlen16to8() + 1" bytes long.
*/
@@ -58,6 +108,10 @@ extern char* strncpy16to8(char* utf8Str, const char16_t* utf16Str, size_t len)
{
char* utf8cur = utf8Str;
+ /* Note on overflows: We assume the user did check the result of
+ * strnlen16to8() properly or at a minimum checked the result of
+ * its malloc(SIZE_MAX) in case of overflow.
+ */
while (len--) {
unsigned int uic = *utf16Str++;
@@ -73,8 +127,8 @@ extern char* strncpy16to8(char* utf8Str, const char16_t* utf16Str, size_t len)
if (uic == 0) {
break;
- }
- }
+ }
+ }
}
*utf8cur = '\0';
@@ -85,20 +139,30 @@ extern char* strncpy16to8(char* utf8Str, const char16_t* utf16Str, size_t len)
/**
* Convert a UTF-16 string to UTF-8.
*
- * Make sure you allocate "dest" with the result of strblen16to8(),
- * not just "strlen16()".
*/
char * strndup16to8 (const char16_t* s, size_t n)
{
- char *ret;
+ char* ret;
+ size_t len;
if (s == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
- ret = malloc(strnlen16to8(s, n) + 1);
+ len = strnlen16to8(s, n);
+
+ /* We are paranoid, and we check for SIZE_MAX-1
+ * too since it is an overflow value for our
+ * strnlen16to8 implementation.
+ */
+ if (len >= SIZE_MAX-1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = malloc(len + 1);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
strncpy16to8 (ret, s, n);
-
- return ret;
+
+ return ret;
}