diff options
| author | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2014-06-03 12:27:06 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Kocialkowski <contact@paulk.fr> | 2014-07-17 16:50:06 +0200 |
| commit | 48c9b318d2fe0d3f2899e16e08f0972ffbd8c2b5 (patch) | |
| tree | ba8d23253918ab7876d0fdc24a7e499ab90dce10 /arch/x86/Makefile | |
| parent | 3f77878d2e73858ec1a559666aeed198bced6902 (diff) | |
| download | kernel_samsung_crespo-48c9b318d2fe0d3f2899e16e08f0972ffbd8c2b5.zip kernel_samsung_crespo-48c9b318d2fe0d3f2899e16e08f0972ffbd8c2b5.tar.gz kernel_samsung_crespo-48c9b318d2fe0d3f2899e16e08f0972ffbd8c2b5.tar.bz2 | |
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()
We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.
Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.
[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]
Change-Id: Ic8714ed2e9dee323a011eed42f7c0159c65dfbf3
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/Makefile')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions