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* consitify do_mount() argumentsAl Viro2016-04-031-2/+2
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09)
* selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore filesStephen Smalley2016-03-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Support per-file labeling of sysfs and pstore files based on genfscon policy entries. This is safe because the sysfs and pstore directory tree cannot be manipulated by userspace, except to unlink pstore entries. This provides an alternative method of assigning per-file labeling to sysfs or pstore files without needing to set the labels from userspace on each boot. The advantages of this approach are that the labels are assigned as soon as the dentry is first instantiated and userspace does not need to walk the sysfs or pstore tree and set the labels on each boot. The limitations of this approach are that the labels can only be assigned based on pathname prefix matching. You can initially assign labels using this mechanism and then change them at runtime via setxattr if allowed to do so by policy. Change-Id: If5999785fdc1d24d869b23ae35cd302311e94562 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Suggested-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
* selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.Stephen Smalley2016-03-111-22/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | upstream commit 6f29997f4a3117169eeabd41dbea4c1bd94a739c Add support for per-file labeling of debugfs files so that we can distinguish them in policy. This is particularly important in Android where certain debugfs files have to be writable by apps and therefore the debugfs directory tree can be read and searched by all. Since debugfs is entirely kernel-generated, the directory tree is immutable by userspace, and the inodes are pinned in memory, we can simply use the same approach as with proc and label the inodes from policy based on pathname from the root of the debugfs filesystem. Generalize the existing labeling support used for proc and reuse it for debugfs too. [sds: Back-ported to 3.4. superblock_security_struct flags field is only unsigned char in 3.4 so we have to redefine SE_SBGENFS. However, this definition is kernel-private, not exposed to userspace or stored anywhere persistent. Also depends on I7742b4b7e53b45e4dd13d99c39553a927aa4a7e9.] Change-Id: I6460fbed6bb6bd36eb8554ac8c4fdd574edf3b07 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loadedPaul Moore2016-03-111-9/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f64410ec665479d7b4b77b7519e814253ed0f686 upstream. This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes the problem below: "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry() on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { if (opt_dentry) { isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...) rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); if (rc) goto out_unlock; isec->sid = sid; } } Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid() and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock. I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..." On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in /proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were accessed early in the boot), for example: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax However, with this patch in place we see the expected result: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax Change-Id: I7742b4b7e53b45e4dd13d99c39553a927aa4a7e9 Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* selinux: fix inode security list corruptionStephen Smalley2016-03-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 923190d32de4428afbea5e5773be86bea60a9925 upstream. sb_finish_set_opts() can race with inode_free_security() when initializing inode security structures for inodes created prior to initial policy load or by the filesystem during ->mount(). This appears to have always been a possible race, but commit 3dc91d4 ("SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()") made it more evident by immediately reusing the unioned list/rcu element of the inode security structure for call_rcu() upon an inode_free_security(). But the underlying issue was already present before that commit as a possible use-after-free of isec. Shivnandan Kumar reported the list corruption and proposed a patch to split the list and rcu elements out of the union as separate fields of the inode_security_struct so that setting the rcu element would not affect the list element. However, this would merely hide the issue and not truly fix the code. This patch instead moves up the deletion of the list entry prior to dropping the sbsec->isec_lock initially. Then, if the inode is dropped subsequently, there will be no further references to the isec. Change-Id: Iac9264851e98933deabedaa9c4ead434669a07a8 Reported-by: Shivnandan Kumar <shivnandan.k@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* pstore: selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfsMark Salyzyn2016-03-111-9/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | - add "pstore" and "debugfs" to list of in-core exceptions - change fstype checks to boolean equation - change from strncmp to strcmp for checking (Cherry Pick from commit 2294d499b7969df3838becf5e58bf16b0e3c86c8) Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com> Bug: 18917345 Bug: 18935184 Change-Id: Ib648f30ce4b5d6c96f11465836d6fee89bec1c72
* LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_dataEric Paris2016-03-111-1/+70
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a bigger space requirement. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: security/selinux/avc.c
* Revert "selinux: fix merge conflicts"Ziyan2016-03-111-0/+2
| | | | This reverts commit ed376663c228d53902ee78a89b1d3549565f4825.
* security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()Eric Paris2016-03-111-19/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the capable() call. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirelyEric Paris2016-03-111-13/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor. I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it. The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* selinux: fix merge conflictsZiyan2016-01-171-2/+0
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* SELinux: per-command whitelisting of ioctlsJeff Vander Stoep2016-01-171-1/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | note that this patch depends on a prior patch that is already in android-3.4 but has not apparently found its way into the msm 3.4 branches (but is included in exynos and tegra), https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/92962/ Extend the generic ioctl permission check with support for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allow <source> <target>:<class> { 0x8910-0x8926 0x892A-0x8935 } auditallow <source> <target>:<class> 0x892A When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission which may be too imprecise in some circumstances. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS=30 to account for the format change. Bug: 18087110 Change-Id: Ibf0e36728f6f3f0d5af56ccdeddee40800af689d Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
* Enable setting security contexts on rootfs inodes.Stephen Smalley2014-11-261-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rootfs (ramfs) can support setting of security contexts by userspace due to the vfs fallback behavior of calling the security module to set the in-core inode state for security.* attributes when the filesystem does not provide an xattr handler. No xattr handler required as the inodes are pinned in memory and have no backing store. This is useful in allowing early userspace to label individual files within a rootfs while still providing a policy-defined default via genfs. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()Steven Rostedt2014-11-201-2/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit this bug: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000 RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54 R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 Call Trace: security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30 __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0 inode_permission+0x18/0x50 link_path_walk+0x66/0x920 path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0 do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x146/0x240 SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 CR2: 0000000000000020 Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the dereference of it caused the oops. in selinux_inode_permission(): isec = inode->i_security; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder to hit. What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted. As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock(). The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the permission check). Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Add permission checking for binder IPC.Stephen Smalley2013-04-291-0/+64
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do not apply permission checks to private files. Fix security_binder_transfer_binder hook. Drop the owning task argument to security_binder_transfer_binder since ref->node->proc can be NULL (dead owner?). Revise the SELinux checking to apply a single transfer check between the source and destination tasks. Owning task is no longer relevant. Drop the receive permission definition as it is no longer used. This makes the transfer permission similar to the call permission; it is only useful if you want to allow a binder IPC between two tasks (call permission) but deny passing of binder references between them (transfer permission). Change-Id: I51e7a9a6662e826073b35e4f70a57f9ec73e472e Signed-off-by: William Roberts <w.roberts@sta.samsung.com>
* selinux: simplify and clean up inode_has_perm()Linus Torvalds2011-06-081-10/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a rather hot function that is called with a potentially NULL "struct common_audit_data" pointer argument. And in that case it has to provide and initialize its own dummy common_audit_data structure. However, all the _common_ cases already pass it a real audit-data structure, so that uncommon NULL case not only creates a silly run-time test, more importantly it causes that function to have a big stack frame for the dummy variable that isn't even used in the common case! So get rid of that stupid run-time behavior, and make the (few) functions that currently call with a NULL pointer just call a new helper function instead (naturally called inode_has_perm_noapd(), since it has no adp argument). This makes the run-time test be a static code generation issue instead, and allows for a much denser stack since none of the common callers need the dummy structure. And a denser stack not only means less stack space usage, it means better cache behavior. So we have a win-win-win from this simplification: less code executed, smaller stack footprint, and better cache behavior. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into ↵James Morris2011-05-241-37/+55
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | for-linus Conflicts: lib/flex_array.c security/selinux/avc.c security/selinux/hooks.c security/selinux/ss/policydb.c security/smack/smack_lsm.c Manually resolve conflicts. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: introduce path_has_permEric Paris2011-04-281-14/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We currently have inode_has_perm and dentry_has_perm. dentry_has_perm just calls inode_has_perm with additional audit data. But dentry_has_perm can take either a dentry or a path. Split those to make the code obvious and to fix the previous problem where I thought dentry_has_perm always had a valid dentry and mnt. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: pass last path component in may_createEric Paris2011-04-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only passed the path component information all the way down the security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places to harmonize the calculations and checks. Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATHEric Paris2011-04-251-13/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODEEric Paris2011-04-251-25/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code complexity. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safeEric Paris2011-04-251-13/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not be RCU safe. This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue. Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen2011-04-251-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: silence build warning when !CONFIG_BUGEric Paris2011-04-251-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If one builds a kernel without CONFIG_BUG there are a number of 'may be used uninitialized' warnings. Silence these by returning after the BUG(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux ↵James Morris2011-05-041-1/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | into for-linus
| * | SELinux: pass last path component in may_createEric Paris2011-04-281-1/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only passed the path component information all the way down the security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places to harmonize the calculations and checks. Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safeEric Paris2011-04-251-13/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not be RCU safe. This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue. Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen2011-04-221-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | userns: rename is_owner_or_cap to inode_owner_or_capableSerge E. Hallyn2011-03-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | And give it a kernel-doc comment. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: btrfs changed in linux-next] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespaceSerge E. Hallyn2011-03-231-5/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6Linus Torvalds2011-03-161-3/+5
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits) bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag bonding: wrap slave state work net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler be2net: Bump up the version number be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables xen network backend driver bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward() be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve netxen: support for GbE port settings ... Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c with the staging updates.
| * net: Put flowi_* prefix on AF independent members of struct flowiDavid S. Miller2011-03-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes first, much like struct sock_common. This is the first step to move in that direction. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * netlink: kill loginuid/sessionid/sid members from struct netlink_skb_parmsPatrick McHardy2011-03-031-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Netlink message processing in the kernel is synchronous these days, the session information can be collected when needed. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2011-03-081-162/+188
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| * SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hookEric Paris2011-03-031-0/+86
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For SELinux we do not allow security information to change during a remount operation. Thus this hook simply strips the security module options from the data and verifies that those are the same options as exist on the current superblock. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socketHarry Ciao2011-03-031-6/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security context for the newly created socket shares the same user, role and MLS attribute as its creator but may have a different type, which could be specified by a type_transition rule in the relevant policy package. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> [fix call to security_transition_sid to include qstr, Eric Paris] Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| * Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"Eric Paris2011-02-251-8/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 242631c49d4cf39642741d6627750151b058233b. Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c SELinux used to recognize certain individual ioctls and check permissions based on the knowledge of the individual ioctl. In commit 242631c49d4cf396 the SELinux code stopped trying to understand individual ioctls and to instead looked at the ioctl access bits to determine in we should check read or write for that operation. This same suggestion was made to SMACK (and I believe copied into TOMOYO). But this suggestion is total rubbish. The ioctl access bits are actually the access requirements for the structure being passed into the ioctl, and are completely unrelated to the operation of the ioctl or the object the ioctl is being performed upon. Take FS_IOC_FIEMAP as an example. FS_IOC_FIEMAP is defined as: FS_IOC_FIEMAP _IOWR('f', 11, struct fiemap) So it has access bits R and W. What this really means is that the kernel is going to both read and write to the struct fiemap. It has nothing at all to do with the operations that this ioctl might perform on the file itself! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
| * selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postroutingSteffen Klassert2011-02-251-18/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The IPSKB_FORWARDED and IP6SKB_FORWARDED flags are used only in the multicast forwarding case to indicate that a packet looped back after forward. So these flags are not a good indicator for packet forwarding. A better indicator is the incoming interface. If we have no socket context, but an incoming interface and we see the packet in the ip postroute hook, the packet is going to be forwarded. With this patch we use the incoming interface as an indicator on packet forwarding. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeerSteffen Klassert2011-02-251-18/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat and selinux_ip_postroute_compat are just called if selinux_policycap_netpeer is not set. However in these functions we check if selinux_policycap_netpeer is set. This leads to some dead code and to the fact that selinux_xfrm_postroute_last is never executed. This patch removes the dead code and the checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer in the compatibility functions. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * security/selinux: fix /proc/sys/ labelingLucian Adrian Grijincu2011-02-011-102/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes an old (2007) selinux regression: filesystem labeling for /proc/sys returned -r--r--r-- unknown /proc/sys/fs/file-nr instead of -r--r--r-- system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t:s0 /proc/sys/fs/file-nr Events that lead to breaking of /proc/sys/ selinux labeling: 1) sysctl was reimplemented to route all calls through /proc/sys/ commit 77b14db502cb85a031fe8fde6c85d52f3e0acb63 [PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc support 2) proc_dir_entry was removed from ctl_table: commit 3fbfa98112fc3962c416452a0baf2214381030e6 [PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables 3) selinux still walked the proc_dir_entry tree to apply labeling. Because ctl_tables don't have a proc_dir_entry, we did not label /proc/sys/ inodes any more. To achieve this the /proc/sys/ inodes were marked private and private inodes were ignored by selinux. commit bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962 [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes commit 86a71dbd3e81e8870d0f0e56b87875f57e58222b [PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux Access control checks have been done by means of a special sysctl hook that was called for read/write accesses to any /proc/sys/ entry. We don't have to do this because, instead of walking the proc_dir_entry tree we can walk the dentry tree (as done in this patch). With this patch: * we don't mark /proc/sys/ inodes as private * we don't need the sysclt security hook * we walk the dentry tree to find the path to the inode. We have to strip the PID in /proc/PID/ entries that have a proc_dir_entry because selinux does not know how to label paths like '/1/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and defaults to 'proc_t' labeling). Selinux does know of '/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and applies the 'sysctl_rpc_t' label). PID stripping from the path was done implicitly in the previous code because the proc_dir_entry tree had the root in '/net' in the example from above. The dentry tree has the root in '/1'. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: Use dentry name in new object labelingEric Paris2011-02-011-8/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria. The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.) This patch adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd. There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical. Either the policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't. This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new rules. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creationEric Paris2011-02-011-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path, just the last component of the path. This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating /etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name exists it is fine to pass NULL. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | CRED: Fix BUG() upon security_cred_alloc_blank() failureTetsuo Handa2011-02-071-1/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In cred_alloc_blank() since 2.6.32, abort_creds(new) is called with new->security == NULL and new->magic == 0 when security_cred_alloc_blank() returns an error. As a result, BUG() will be triggered if SELinux is enabled or CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y. If CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y, BUG() is called from __invalid_creds() because cred->magic == 0. Failing that, BUG() is called from selinux_cred_free() because selinux_cred_free() is not expecting cred->security == NULL. This does not affect smack_cred_free(), tomoyo_cred_free() or apparmor_cred_free(). Fix these bugs by (1) Set new->magic before calling security_cred_alloc_blank(). (2) Handle null cred->security in creds_are_invalid() and selinux_cred_free(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2011-01-101-1/+4
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| * SELinux: do not compute transition labels on mountpoint labeled filesystemsEric Paris2010-12-021-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_inode_init_security computes transitions sids even for filesystems that use mount point labeling. It shouldn't do that. It should just use the mount point label always and no matter what. This causes 2 problems. 1) it makes file creation slower than it needs to be since we calculate the transition sid and 2) it allows files to be created with a different label than the mount point! # id -Z staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 # sesearch --type --class file --source sysadm_t --target tmp_t Found 1 semantic te rules: type_transition sysadm_t tmp_t : file user_tmp_t; # mount -o loop,context="system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0" /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # ls -lZ /mnt/tmp drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+found # touch /mnt/tmp/file1 # ls -lZ /mnt/tmp -rw-r--r--. root root staff_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 file1 drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+found Whoops, we have a mount point labeled filesystem tmp_t with a user_tmp_t labeled file! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.David S. Miller2011-01-051-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other" during stream connects. However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned to NULL under the unix_state_lock(). Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead of the forward mapping. Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge branch 'master' of ↵David S. Miller2010-12-261-5/+1
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | | | master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6 Conflicts: net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
| * capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failureEric Paris2010-11-151-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code which used the new option was built even though the variable in question didn't exist. The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization better to eliminate the hook altogether. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | SELinux: indicate fatal error in compat netfilter codeEric Paris2010-11-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SELinux ip postroute code indicates when policy rejected a packet and passes the error back up the stack. The compat code does not. This patch sends the same kind of error back up the stack in the compat code. Based-on-patch-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | SELinux: Only return netlink error when we know the return is fatalEric Paris2010-11-231-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some of the SELinux netlink code returns a fatal error when the error might actually be transient. This patch just silently drops packets on potentially transient errors but continues to return a permanant error indicator when the denial was because of policy. Based-on-comments-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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